UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS

1774-1788

WALTER H. MOHR

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA
1933

FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS

1774-1788

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

https://archive.org/details/IA41547323_0002



NEW YORK INDIAN COUNTRY

FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS

1774-1788

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

WALTER H. MOHR

PHILADELPHIA
1933

Copyright 1933
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS
Printed in the United States of America

To
My Father and my Mother
CONRAD MOHR
and
ELIZABETH B. MOHR

PREFACE

THE management of Indian affairs was one of the many problems that faced the new American government at the beginning of the Revolutionary War. Whether the states or the confederation should assume the responsibility for dealing with the tribes was an unsettled question, also there were such problems as the control of Indian trade and the purchase of their lands. These had presented many difficulties for the British government and were to prove themselves equally troublesome for the American Congress. This dissertation undertakes to trace the attempts to evolve a federal system for the management of Indian affairs during the pre-constitutional period.

The study was carried out under the direction of Dr. St. George L. Sioussat, of the University of Pennsylvania, to whom I am primarily indebted. I am also under obligation to Dr. Herman V. Ames, Dr. Albert E. McKinley, and Dr. Roy Franklin Nichols, all of the University of Pennsylvania, for many valuable suggestions. Brigadier General E. A. Cruikshank, of Ottawa, Canada, made many constructive suggestions regarding the chapter dealing with the Indians as a factor during the Revolutionary War. To my former colleague, Professor S. Wynne Keever, I owe a debt of gratitude for his criticisms of the form of the manuscript. For such errors as may appear I assume full responsibility.

I wish to express my appreciation to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles J. Rhoads, and to Assistant Commissioner J. Henry Scattergood, for the courtesies extended to me in the Indian Office.

The many kindnesses shown me at the Library of Congress, the Virginia State Library, the North Carolina State Historical Library, the South Carolina Historical Commission, the South Carolina Historical Society, the William L.

Clements Library, the Manuscripts Division of the New York Public Library, the Canadian Archives, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the University of Chicago Library, the Newberry Library in Chicago, and the Burton Collection of the Detroit Public Library helped greatly to make pleasant the research connected with this dissertation.

To the Headmaster of George School, Mr. George A. Walton, and to the Committee of Management of the School, I am indebted for generous allowances of time for graduate study. The keen interest of Mr. Francis C. Pyle of George School in the problems of research had always been an inspiration to me.

My wife, Beulah Conn Mohr, generously surrendered her time to facilitate the work undertaken.

W. H. M.

George School
December 30, 1932

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

NEW YORK INDIAN COUNTRY .....*Frontispiece*

From *New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Proceedings, 1784-90,* edited by Franklin B. Hough.

I THE COLLAPSE OF IMPERIAL CONTROL 1

The importance of the Indian problem: The tribes with whom the government dealt: The establishment of imperial control a matter of necessity: The Proclamation of 1763 a temporary expedient: The excellent but expensive plan of 1764: Establishment of an Indian boundary which was to be maintained by the individual colonies: The imperial land policy not always consistent: The Indian department tries to prevent illegal land purchases in the south: Encroachments on tribal lands in the north: Lord Dunmore's war—a speculators' war: The Indian department meets with difficulties in trying to enforce trade regulations in the south: The attempt to establish a unified trade policy in the north does not succeed: The Quebec act an attempt to place northern Indian trade under government control: The collapse of British control of Indian affairs in the south: End of imperial rule in the north: The New York colony proposes a policy of unified control of Indian affairs: The Pennsylvania-Virginia boundary dispute: Virginia takes steps to protect the western frontier: Establishment of the continental Indian departments: Preliminary negotiations with the tribes.

II THE INDIAN AS A FACTOR IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 37

The problem of Indian participation in the war: Why the Americans failed to secure the Indians as allies: Congressional machinery for managing Indian affairs: Treaties with the Six Nations: British able to maintain many agents among the tribes: Activities on the New York frontier, 1775: The Fort Pitt frontier, 1776-77: Congress takes charge of the Fort Pitt frontier, 1777: The British Indian department in the south: Rivalry of the British agents in the north: Rivalry of the British and Americans for the support of the Six Nations: The Burgoyne expedition: The St. Leger expedition: The Fort Pitt frontier, 1777-79: The Clark expedition an episode in the struggle for possession of western

CHAPTER PAGE

land: Controversy of Virginia with the land companies: The Sullivan expedition: The New York frontier, 1780: The British attack on St. Louis: The New York frontier, 1781: The Fort Pitt frontier, 1781: The Indians as auxiliaries during the war.

III THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE; NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTHERN INDIANS 93

The Indians not mentioned in the peace treaty of 1783: The failure of the Douglass mission: General Schuyler's preliminary negotiations with the Six Nations: Generals Schuyler and Washington advise Congress with regard to Indian affairs: Congress proposes to secure revenue from the western lands: The Land Ordinance of 1785: The Ordinance of 1786 for regulating Indian affairs: The treaty of Fort Stanwix: Clash with the state of New York: The Fort McIntosh treaty not acceptable to the Indians: Captain Doughty points out the weakness of the federal Indian policy: The treaty at Fort Finney—Indians not willing to accept its provisions: The federal government tries to prevent intrusion on Indian land: The British policy of watchful waiting: The western Indians attempt a unified policy: The federal government prepares for a policy of frontier defense: The Northwest Ordinance: Establishment of the new government in the northwest territory: Final confederation treaties with the northern and western Indians: The Indian problem in the north and west is left unsettled.

IV THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE; NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOUTHERN INDIANS 139

The report of the committee on Indian affairs in the south: Proposals for a southern confederacy to deal with the Indians: State negotiations with the tribes: Conditions in the south hasten federal action: The federal commissioners fail to secure a treaty with the Creeks: Spanish influence on southern Indian affairs: Georgia opposes the federal policy: The treaty with the Cherokees: North Carolina opposes the treaty: Treaties with the Choctaws and Chickasaws: Georgia attempts to secure more land from the Creeks: The State of Franklin makes unlawful seizures of Cherokee land: James White, the newly elected federal superintendent of Indian affairs, tries to mediate between Georgia and the Creeks: Secretary Knox's report on a plan for military action: Knox's report on the dispute between North Carolina, Georgia, and the Indians: The report of congressional committee on federal and state relations: Georgia is unable to carry out its particular-

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

istic policy: The Congressional proposal for dealing with the southern Indians: Georgia hopes to secure for herself Indian cessions already made: Congressional resolution for the protection of the Indian lands: North Carolina in opposition to the federal Indian policy is also unable to give proper financial support for federal negotiations with the tribes: Failure of the Cherokee and Creek treaties.

V TOWARD AN INDIAN POLICY 173

The first statement of a policy of federal control: Early tendencies toward decentralization of control in Indian affairs: The management of Indian affairs become a function of the War Department: Indian affairs in the Articles of Confederation: Spanish and English attempts to establish a monopoly over Indian trade: Congress unable to supply presents and goods in sufficient quantities to keep the tribes friendly: The problem of control of Indian trade is discussed in the Continental Congress: The plan of 1786: Final failure of government-controlled trade: Trade carried on by private interests in the north and south: Financing the Indian department: Education of Indian youths at government expense a war measure: The plan of the Countess of Huntington for the civilization of the Indians: Conclusions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 203

INDEX 225

I

THE COLLAPSE OF IMPERIAL CONTROL

THE Indian problem was not new. For years it had concerned the statesmen of England, France, and Spain, as well as the colonial leaders. The tribes were in possession of valuable land, their trade was the cause of much rivalry, and their warlike abilities made them very formidable.

Before taking up the main thread of the story, it will be necessary to give a brief review of the later stages of British control. In this chapter, therefore, we shall give a general view of the tribes during the final period of imperial control. It will then be necessary to see how the British machinery for the management of Indian affairs ceased to function and also to note the early steps taken by the new government in its attempt to deal with the tribes.

The Micmac was one of the more important northeastern Indian tribes. It occupied parts of Nova Scotia, Cape Breton and Prince Edward Islands, the northern part of New Brunswick, and probably southern and western Newfoundland.[1] This group, along with the smaller tribes of St. Johns and Nova Scotia, were the principal nations with whom the Continental Congress dealt. On the whole the Indians of this region played one of the least important rôles.

The Iroquois tribes were located in central New York and northern Pennsylvania. According to an estimate of 1774, this group numbered between 10,000 and 12,000 souls. Their location within striking distance of one of the rich grain sections of the country and athwart one of the main routes into

[1] F. W. Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians, north of Mexico*, I, 858. (Hereafter referred to as *Handbook*.)

the west, as well as their fighting qualities, made these tribes an important factor in northern Indian affairs.

In the country north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi were numerous tribes, most of whom were confirmed enemies of the colonists. The Delaware, or Leni-Lenape, were found northwest of the Ohio River, in the valley of the Muskingum and along other streams of eastern Ohio.[2] Their lands joined those of the Senecas, the largest and most western of the Six Nations. About the year 1770 the Delawares had received permission from the Miamis and Piankishaws to settle the territory between the Ohio and White Rivers in what is now the state of Indiana.[3]

The Shawanees lived in the valley of the Scioto and on the Pickaway plains. They were to play an active part in the Revolutionary War, doing much damage in Kentucky, and upon them the organized vengeance of the Kentucky frontiersmen was to fall most often. The Shawanees were closely united with the Delawares, and their villages were often intermixed. The Miamis and Twightwees, together with their associated tribes, the Piankishaws and Weas, occupied the Wabash country and the territory northwest of the Ohio. They were destined to take a prominent part in Indian affairs until after the war of 1812.

The chief seat of the Ottawas seems to have been near the lower end of Lake Michigan, extending along the eastern shore as far as the St. Joseph River. Some had settled in southern Wisconsin, while others had occupied territory with the Wyandots along the shores of Lake Erie, from Detroit to Beaver Creek in Pennsylvania.[4] The Pottawatomis were a group continually moving southward, and might be found anywhere from the Milwaukee River through Illinois north

[2]Hodge, *Handbook,* I, 385.

[3]*Ibid.,* 385. See also the description of Delaware territories as found in the speech of a group of Delaware chiefs to Washington, May 14, 1779, Library of Congress, Box of Miscellaneous Indian Papers, 1683-1901

[4]Hodge, *Handbook,* II, 170.

and east of the Sauks, Foxes, and Kickapoos, also in southern Michigan, and in the Wabash regions.[5] The Winnebagos resided west of Lake Michigan in the region of the Wisconsin, Rock, and Fox Rivers. In 1788 they were spoken of as living on a small island near the eastern end of Lake Winnebago.[6]

The Wyandot or Huron remnant of the old Huron tribe, conquered by the Iroquois, lived in the vicinity of Detroit and Sandusky, and claimed most of the Ohio territory. They also insisted upon the right of lighting the council fire at all the intertribal councils. They were loyal supporters of the British interests.[7]

The survivors of the old Illinois groups lived around the French villages in western Illinois. The Sauks and Foxes were found in western Illinois and eastern Iowa. A group of renegade Cherokees lived in the territories of the Shawanees. In the same regions, but a little farther east, lived the Mingoes, an outlaw group recruited from the Wyandots, Miamis, Iroquois, and Delawares.

The chief southern tribes were the Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws. The Cherokees, who numbered 12,000 to 14,000 souls, claimed the Allegheny regions from the headwaters of the Kanawha almost to the site of Atlanta in Georgia, and from the Blue Ridge to the Cumberland Mountains. Their principal towns were upon the headwaters of the Savannah, Hiawassee, and Tuckasege Rivers and upon the whole course of the Little Tennessee. They were grouped into three settlements known as the Lower Towns, the Middle or Valley towns, and the Overhill towns. Echota on the south bank of the Little Tennessee was commonly considered as the capital of the nation. This tribe, whose territories lay across the path of the westward-moving stream of

[5] *Ibid.*, 290.
[6] *Ibid.*, 958.
[7] *Ibid.*, 589-90.

population, was to clash frequently with the Americans during the period 1774-1788.[8]

The Creeks occupied the greater portion of Alabama and Georgia. Their chief places of residence were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa, Flint and Chattahoochee Rivers. They claimed territory on the east from the Savannah to the St. Johns River, and all the islands thence to Apalache Bay, and thence northward to the mountains.[9] The Chickasaw, a tribe noted for its bravery, whose chief trading place was near the present site of the city of Memphis, claimed the territory north to the junction of the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers, as well as that north of the Tennessee to the divide between the Cumberland and Duck Rivers and north of a line running from Chickasaw Old Fields to the Mississippi River.[10]

The Choctaws occupied central and southern Mississippi. They have been characterized as the preëminently agricultural people among the Southern Indians.[11] The Seminoles were a tribe in Florida made up of immigrants from the lower Creek towns on the Chattahoochee.

A general survey shows that it was often very difficult to determine tribal divisions and their territories. Groups were constantly splitting up, absorbing others, being absorbed or changing their abodes. There were also numerous sub-tribes and renegade bands who acted either independently or in conjunction with other tribes.[12]

During most of the colonial period Indian affairs had been in the hands of individual colonies. Several of them, notably Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, had been fairly successful in their dealings with the tribes.

[8]U. B. Phillips, "Georgia and State Rights" American Historical Association *Report,* 1901, II, 66; also James Mooney, "Myths of the Cherokees" *Nineteenth Report of the Bureau of Ethnology,* I.

[9]Hodge, *Handbook,* I, 362-64.

[10]*Ibid.,* 260-61.

[11]*Ibid.,* 288.

[12]Theodore Roosevelt, *Winning of the West,* I, 77-78.

No unified policy for the management of trade and land purchase had been evolved.[13]

The dangerous situation at the beginning of the French and Indian war, when many of the tribes joined with the French, necessitated prompt and unified action. Through the influence of Thomas Pownall, who had been an unofficial observer at the Albany Congress, Sir William Johnson received his warrant of appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs from the commander-in-chief, Major General Braddock, April 15, 1755.[14] Johnson was well qualified for this position, because of his experience as an Indian agent and trader. This appointment was ratified by the Crown in 1756.[15] At about the same time Edmund Atkin was appointed superintendent of the southern department. The division into two departments was probably made to correspond to the military divisions, because the problem of defense and Indian affairs were closely allied.[16]

The commissions to the Indian superintendents were renewed up to the Revolutionary War, and in each case they were issued by the commander-in-chief. Although Johnson had difficulties with Generals Shirley and Amherst, he agreed very well with Gage. John Stuart, who had succeeded Atkin in 1762, had to be told very bluntly by Shelburne that "Indian affairs as managed by the superintendent must ultimately be under the direction of the commander."[17]

[13]H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century,* III, 386. At the treaty of Lancaster, Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania negotiated jointly with the Indians.

[14]*Sir William Johnson Papers,* I, 465. Arthur Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks,* 173.

[15]Arthur Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks,* 231.

[16]C. E. Carter, "Significance of the Military Office in America 1763-1775," *American Historical Review XXVIII.* (Hereafter referred to as A. H. R.) Johnson interpreted the limits of his jurisdiction as extending to the Tennessee, thus giving him control of the back country of three southern provinces.

[17]C. W. Alvord and C. E. Carter, *The New Regime,* 449. All bills of the Indian department had to be submitted to the commander-in-chief. The military officers at the various posts had direction of the expenses of the

The Indian department, especially in the North, rendered valuable assistance to the British armies during the French and Indian War. The loyalty of the Six Nations was retained, and these tribes furnished warriors at Niagara, Ticonderoga, and Montreal. Sir William Johnson had demonstrated that with proper leadership the cruelty of the Indians could be restrained, and that they were able to render valuable aid as auxiliaries.

At the end of the war the British government found itself rather heavily in debt, and it was decided that one method of saving was by discontinuing the policy of furnishing presents to the Indians. At the same time French traders among the tribes were urging the Indians to rise against the English, deceiving them with promises of military assistance from France in case such an uprising took place. The English traders made themselves obnoxious to the Indians by cheating them in trade, by selling rum illegally, and by defrauding them of their lands.

Thus the continuation of the encroachments on the Indian lands, the tricks of the traders, the policy of economy on the part of the English government, and the intrigues of the French traders led to Pontiac's conspiracy which, in turn, hastened the formation of an imperial Indian policy.

After preliminaries, the Proclamation of 1763, dated October 7, was hastily sent to America to help quiet the Indian allies.[18] By this Proclamation an Indian reservation, probably only temporary, in the intent of the ministry, was created between the southern boundary of Quebec, the water shed of

deputy Indian agents. C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics,* I, 219, note 391; also Alvord and Carter, *The New Regime,* 399.

Gage insisted upon the supremacy of the military. He advised his subordinates to use common sense and to avoid controversies over trivial matters. He ordered that they permit no encroachments upon the right of the military and that they obey Gage's orders to the letter, regardless of any orders emanating from other sources.

[18]Text of Proclamation in *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections,* XXXVI, 14-19.

the Appalachian mountains, the northern boundary of the two Floridas and the Mississippi River; no governor or commander-in-chief was to make any land grants beyond the limits of the designated colonies; within the Indian territory trade was to be free to all who would take out a license from the governor or commander and give security for obedience to future regulations; and finally, the military officers were empowered to arrest those fleeing to this reservation, who were charged with crime.

As has already been pointed out, the military office was an important center, a clearing house for colonial affairs. Under this system the Indian superintendents were subordinate to the commander-in-chief. It would, therefore, be very natural for the two superintendents to favor a policy which would make them more independent of the military.[19] The plan put forth in 1764 for the control of Indian affairs, would have met the demands of the Indian superintendents. However, it was energetically opposed by the traders in the colonies. This proposal provided for a complete regulation of trade and land sales, as well as for the repeal of all provincial laws concerning Indian affairs. All traders in the Indian country were to be under the control of the superintendent or his agents, civil cases could be tried by the Indian officers and they could commit for trial in all criminal cases. It was estimated that the cost of carrying out such a policy would be £20,000 per annum, and the proposal was to raise this amount by a tax upon the fur trade, which tax might be collected either at the exportation of the skins and furs (beaver skins were excepted), or paid by the traders at the posts and places of trade —that method to be adopted which would be least burdensome to the trade.[20] The plan of 1764 never received the sanction of Parliament, but in both the north and the south the

[19]*New York Colonial Documents,* VII, 572. (Hereafter referred to as *N. Y. Col. Doc.)*

[20]*N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VII, 634. Lords of Trade discuss the plan with Sir William Johnson. Plan on page 637.

Indian superintendents preferred to act according to its proposals. However, there were many objections to doing this. The expense of maintaining the Indian department on this basis was the cause for opposition on the part of the ministry. Virginia refused to coöperate with the Indian officers.[21] The Canadian merchants opposed the system of trading posts because they were equipped to trade, as the French had done, in the tribes. The principal justification for this centralized system was that it would increase the English fur trade, but this did not prove to be the case. On the contrary there was a steady decline.[22]

In 1767, Lord Shelburne, the Secretary of State, in whose department lay colonial affairs, who sensed the force of westward expansion, and who saw that the government was unable to finance such an Indian policy, recommended the abolition of imperial control of Indian affairs and suggested that this was a field for colonial regulation. He also recommended the establishment of western colonies far beyond the proposed Indian boundary, at Detroit and in the Illinois country. Urged by Benjamin Franklin, who reënforced his arguments with letters from George Croghan, Sir William Johnson's Indian deputy, and Joseph Galloway of Philadelphia, Shelburne added

[21]Virginia started a trading company in the spring of 1765 to carry on trade with the Cherokees. This act was disallowed by the Privy Council in 1766 because of the monopolistic character of the company. W. W. Hening, *The Statutes-at-Large, being a Collection of the Laws of Virginia, 1619-1792,* VIII, 114. (Hereafter referred to as Hening, *Statutes*) : *Acts of Privy Council,* Colonial Series, V, 36.

[22]C. E. Carter, *The British in the Illinois Country, 1763-1774,* 64.

Beaver Skins exported from America:

1764.....	£28,067	18s
1765.....	"27,801	11s
1766.....	"24,657	0s
1767.....	"20,262	2s
1768.....	"18,923	18s

Public Record Office, Customs Accounts LXIV-LXVIII. At the same time from 500 to 1,000 packs of peltries were sent from the Illinois country to New Orleans annually.

to his recommendations one for the establishment of a definite Indian boundary line.

The Board of Trade did not accept Shelburne's recommendation for the abolition of the Indian department. They were willing that the control of Indian trade should go back into the hands of the colonies, but they were not willing that the office of Indian superintendent should be abolished, for they felt that matters such as land purchase, the negotiations for boundaries, making of treaties, the settlement of disputes, and the holding of regular conferences should be in the hands of imperial officials. The idea of western colonies was opposed as being inconsistent with the recommendations for an Indian boundary line and thus liable to defeat the very purpose of such a boundary. The policy of westward expansion was to be a gradual one under imperial control.[23]

The ministry accepted the proposal for an Indian boundary and authorized it to be drawn. It also ordered the transfer of the regulation of Indian trade to the colonies and the retention of the office of Indian superintendent. Under the new plan the estimated cost of the Indian department was reduced from £20,000 to £8,000 per annum.[24]

This was the most definite policy the British government had adopted with regard to Indian affairs since the Proclamation of 1763. By it there was to be no encroachment on Indian lands, because of the establishment of a definite boundary line. The maintenance of the boundary and the control of the fur trade were to be in colonial hands. Why this control should be returned to the colonies after they had failed so signally was justified by the rather specious argument that the colonies, aware of their early mistakes, would not make them again.

The Indian superintendents proceeded to negotiate with the various tribes for the establishment and survey of a definite

[23]*N. Y. Col. Doc.*, VIII, 19-25. Board of Trade representations on the state of Indian affairs.

[24]W. Roy Smith, *South Carolina as a Royal Province*, 227; *N. Y. Col. Doc.*, VIII, 55-58.

boundary between the territory of the whites and the natives. Even before the plan for an official boundary had been decided upon, Stuart had agreed upon a line to be drawn between Georgia and the southern Indians. By 1767 this line had been extended back of all the colonies except Virginia. The Virginia boundary was settled at the treaty of Hard Labor on October 14, 1768. On February 25, 1773, Stuart submitted a map of the line drawn between the territories of the various colonies and the Indians in the southern district.[25]

In the north, Sir William Johnson at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, November 5, 1768, located the boundary for his district.[26] At this treaty the Iroquois insisted upon ceding their claims south of the Ohio as far as the mouth of the Tennessee. This, of course, aroused Virginia to insist on a cession from the Cherokees west of the original line, which reached the Ohio at the mouth of the Kanawha. Stuart secured the ratification of a new boundary, which, when it was surveyed, whether intentionally or through an error extended Virginia's Indian boundary to the Kentucky River.[27]

The drawing of this boundary established a definite Indian territory. The chief problem now was to prevent encroachments on the tribal lands. The imperial government had weakened the only possible machinery for preventing intrusions, when the powers of the Indian department were reduced. Leaving the protection of the reserved lands to the individual colonies could result in only one thing—a life-and-death struggle between the natives and frontiersmen.

[25]Public Record Office, Colonial Office Papers, Class 5, LXXIV, 19. These papers were used in the form of transcripts in the Library of Congress. (Hereafter will be referred to as C. O. 5.)

[26]*N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VIII, 112. The map of the northern boundary as copied from the original in Sir William Johnson's letter to Hillsborough is in *N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VIII, 136. See also map of the Indian boundary as prepared by David Matteson in E. M. Avery, *History of the United States,* V, 285.

[27]C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics,* II, 85, note 138.

THE COLLAPSE OF IMPERIAL CONTROL

The difficulties of the imperial government in formulating a western policy are described in a recent work on the War for Independence as follows:

"A score of clashing interests would buffet any government that tried to compose them. Land speculators and fur traders, philanthropic friends of the 'noble red men' and cynical imperialists eager to take up the 'white man's burden' would shout their conflicting arguments. Colonies with western claims and those without, statesmen of the old school and their opponents of the new school in colonial affairs, military men with opposing theories as to methods of control, all would demand a hearing and be content with no solution but their own. Greatest danger of all would be in the oppugnancy of imperial rights to colonial rights of domain."[28]

It has been pointed out in a recent study that the British government was inconsistent in its land policy. It sanctioned the Vandalia project, which was contrary to the principles of the Proclamation of 1763, and also permitted the purchase of lands as compensation for debts owed by the Indians to traders.[29]

Meanwhile land companies and individuals were striving to secure control of the Indian territories. Such projects as the Mississippi land company, the two colonies proposed by General Charles Lee, the plan of Governor Franklin, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan for the purchase of the lands of the French in Illinois, all concerned themselves with land in the Northwest.[30] In the Southwest hardy frontiersmen considered it preposterous that the royal government should in any way hinder them in their desire for the unoccupied western lands.

After a preliminary order which appeared to stop temporarily all grants, on February 3, 1774, a new plan for granting lands was announced. This provided for the survey of all

[28]C. H. Van Tyne, *Causes of the War of Independence,* 110-11.

[29]St. George L. Sioussat, *The Breakdown of the Royal Management of Lands in the Southern Provinces, 1773-75,* 84.

[30]C. E. Carter, *Great Britain and the Illinois Country, 1763-1774,* VI.

ungranted lands legally open to sale; its disposal by auction after due notice and advertisement at a price to be determined by the quality of the land sold, but with a sixpence per acre minimum. All land sold was subject to an increased annual quit rent of one halfpenny sterling per acre and to reservation by the Crown of all mines of gold, silver, and precious stones.

This plan was disliked even by the royal officials in the provinces. They realized the impossibility of enforcing it in the settled areas. It was also seen that the government could not enforce this plan in the back country because of its inability to prevent illegal purchases from the tribes. Finally the steady westward push of the land-hungry frontiersmen could not be checked by royal orders or parliamentary statutes.[31]

The British Indian department made a brave but futile attempt to prevent illegal land purchases in the south. In 1768 at the treaty of Hard Labor, Stuart was compelled to refuse permission for the cession of a tract of land twelve miles square to Alexander Cameron, his deputy among the Cherokees. The Indians made this cession for the benefit of one of Cameron's half-breed sons. In 1769 Richard Pearis and Jacob Hite secured a large cession from the Cherokee nation—Pearis under pretense of holding said cession for a son by an Indian mother and Hite by fraudulent letters to Stuart and the Governor of Virginia. The Indians insisted that these purchases had been secured in an illegal manner. At the same time Pearis was selling tracts in his cession to emigrants from the north.[32] On December 21, 1773, Stuart wrote:

> The cause of Richard Pearis and Jacob Hite, who illegally obtained cessions of, and seated themselves upon Indian lands beyond the established boundary, came on before the circuit court at Ninety Six last month, when judgment was given against them and they relinquished all claims or title to any lands beyond the boundary in virtue of any deed or conveyance to them from the

[31]Sioussat, *op. cit.*, 97-98; *N. Y. Col. Doc.* VIII, 410.

[32]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 42.

Indians, which I hope will have good effect by deterring others from any such attempts in the future, *but I beg leave to observe to your Lordship that this success is owing to the existance* (sic) *of a municipal law of this province: in provinces where no such local laws exist, I should be very doubtful of success.*[33] (The italics are mine.)

In 1770 Edward Wilkinson secured a grant from the Cherokees in payment for certain debts which this tribe owed him. Wilkinson had not gone about securing this land in an underhand fashion, but was of the opinion that land cessions in payment of debts would receive the sanction of the government. He made a trip to England to obtain a ratification of the grant, but the opposition of Stuart, and the government's land policy, prevented his securing consent from the authorities.[34]

In South Carolina W. H. Drayton wished to lease fifteen square miles of the Catawba reservation for a term of years. Stuart opposed this lease because the land in this reservation had never been ceded to the King. In this he was upheld by the home government, and Dartmouth wrote him on May 5, 1773:

> The King much approves the step you took to defeat Mr. Drayton's intended views; the proposal made by that gentleman to the Council of South Carolina was highly irregular and improper and the Council have given solid testimony of their respect for and duty to the King in unanimously rejecting it.[35]

When Governor Wright of the Georgia colony secured the consent of the Board of Trade for a land cession by the Creeks and the Cherokees to liquidate their debts, Stuart was one of the chief negotiators at the treaty which was made at Augusta.

[33]C. O. 5, LXXV, 9.

[34]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 42; C. O. 5, LXXIV, 69. Enclosure in Stuart's letter of January 8, 1773. Map of the lands surveyed by Patric Calhoun, Deputy-Surveyor, December 8, 1770, for Wilkinson—also reservations of Cameron and Pearis. Stuart and Dartmouth were willing that Wilkinson should be reimbursed from the proceeds of the sale of land in the Georgia cession.

[35]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 85; also C. O. 5, LXXIV, 127.

The Creeks were not willing to make any cessions.[36] However, at the treaty which was completed on June 1, 1773, the Indians finally ceded 2,100,000 acres comprising land in Wilkes, Lincoln, Taliaferro, Green, Oglethorpe, and Elbert counties, Georgia. The Indians were discontented with their bargain and Stuart felt that this was due in part to the fact that the ammunition promised them had not been delivered promptly.[37] The traders had been expected to furnish the goods for the treaty but had failed to do so, and Stuart had been compelled to make several hasty purchases to supply at least partially the wants of the Indians.

Stuart and Governor Wright insisted that the Indians punish the murderers of the white settlers on the new purchase, and when the Creeks hesitated an embargo was placed on trade with this tribe.[38] This was effective, and by October 1774 the Creeks seemed willing to meet the British demands.

In these October negotiations Stuart discovered another illegal land deal. In this case Jonathan Bryan, of Georgia, leased an extensive tract of land from the Creeks. The land was located in East Florida. The Indians tore up the deed at the conference, although on the way home Bryan inveigled them into renewing it.[39]

In the secluded valley through which flowed the Watauga River on the western frontier of Virginia and North Carolina, a group of restless frontiersmen began the famous push which was finally to secure the western regions for the United States. When it was discovered that their land was beyond the boundaries of Virginia and on the Indian reservation, these settlers adopted a working agreement among themselves and proceeded to secure a ten-year lease from the Cherokees for the territory which they occupied. Stuart's deputy among the Cherokees, Alexander Cameron, chided one of the chiefs for

[36]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 190.
[37]C. O. 5, LXXV, 55.
[38]C. O. 5, LXXV, 173.
[39]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 29.

making this cession. The latter replied that the Indian who negotiated the lease had not been authorized to do so and was a great rogue. At the same time he confessed that he had taken his share of the goods which had been furnished by the whites.[40] In 1773, by two purchases from the Cherokees, Jacob Brown secured title to the land as far south as the mouth of Camp Creek on the Nollichucky.

On December 17, 1774, Cameron wrote Stuart that Richard Henderson and others were among the Cherokees and he suspected that they were trying to make some land purchases.[41] These preliminary negotiations culminated in the Henderson purchase of March 17, 1775, at Sycamore Shoals. By this purchase a large tract of land bounded by the Kentucky, Holston, Cumberland, and Ohio Rivers became the property of Richard Henderson and Company. Henderson was undoubtedly influenced in this purchase by an opinion supposed to be derived from the eminent British jurists Camden and Yorke to the effect that deeds made at public conferences by the Indians as sovereign nations and the *bona fide* owners of the land were valid conveyances and required no confirmation by the Crown.

This purchase aroused opposition, and protests were made by Stuart, Cameron, and the Governors of Virginia and North Carolina. Although Virginia held the Henderson deed void against the state she later considered it valid against the Cherokees.

Thus it can be seen that in spite of the best efforts of the Indian department, the land cessions continued and Stuart succeeded only in making himself unpopular on the frontier. Arthur Campbell, one of the prominent leaders of Fincastle county, accused Stuart of favoring the Indians in all controversies.[42]

[40]C. O. 5, LXXV, 209.

[41]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 41. Patrick Henry and others had also been involved in an attempt to purchase Cherokee territories, *Calendar of Virginia State Papers, I,* 288-89; 303-304.

[42]C. O. 5, LXXV, 255.

Cameron, writing to Stuart later, had the following to say about the conduct of the frontiersmen:

> The behavior of the Virginians toward the Indians deserved from them the treatment which they commonly return for ill usage and they certainly would have got it had I not at all times agreeable to your instructions done everything to prevent it. . . . . I am certain that if the Indians committed half the irregularities the Virginians did since the conclusion of the last war, they would have been at war with them long ere now.[43]

On February 23, 1775, Stuart received word from Cameron that Pearis was having his land surveyed with the assistance of some officials from South Carolina.[44]

Stuart became convinced that the only solution of the difficulty was the interposition of Parliament. On January 4, 1773, he wrote Dartmouth suggesting that a law by Parliament would be the only effective way for controlling the situation.[45] In the letter of January 3, 1775, in which Stuart dealt with the illegal cession to Jonathan Bryan, he again suggested the necessity for a law to remedy a situation which was endangering the peace of all the colonies. Dartmouth's comment on Stuart's suggestion as to a law to prevent settlement beyond the Indian line is rather significant:

> The want of a proper law in all the colonies for preventing settlement in the Indian lands is much to be lamented; and the necessity of such a law has been often represented. None of the assemblies, except that of South Carolina, have been prevailed upon to adopt such a measure, and the present is not a time for introducing a general regulation by the authority which is competent to give it in all the colonies.[46]

A new wave of land speculation in 1773 saw the organization of the Illinois Land Company, which was composed chiefly of Philadelphians. This company, relying on the Camden-

[43]C. O. 5, LXXV, 261.
[44]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 87.
[45]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 19.
[46]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 15.

Yorke decision, made extensive purchases on the Illinois River and south of Kaskaskia on the Ohio. Similarly, the Wabash Company purchased tracts on the Wabash River. These grants were annulled by the British government, but showed very clearly what difficulties would face the authorities in trying to uphold an imperial land policy.[47]

There were such disputes as the Mohawk claim at Canajoharie, which was not finally settled until 1797,[48] and the illegal settlements in the Wyoming country by emigrants from Connecticut. Sir William Johnson found it necessary to work out a compromise between the Indians and the numerous claimants to the Kayaderosseras patent which lay between the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers.

The Vandalia project stimulated western speculators, and there was a great rush on the part of those holding military warrants to locate their claims. Since the Proclamation of 1763 did not apply to these warrants, we find surveying parties traveling far afield laying out claims for shrewd speculators. Captain Bullitt made surveys for Dr. John Connolly at Louisville, although Preston, the Virginia surveyor, refused to recognize them as legal. All through the winter of 1773-74, parties were ranging the Kentucky regions making surveys, even though they knew it would stir up the resentment of the Indians.

In December 1773 George Croghan reported that not less than sixty thousand souls were settled between Pittsburgh and the mouth of the Ohio.[49]

The rather vague definition of the western boundary of Pennsylvania as five degrees west of the Delaware River led to a serious dispute with Virginia as to the ownership of the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers, the so-called gateway of the west. Virginia claimed the disputed

[47] C. E. Carter, *Great Britain and the Illinois Country 1763-1774,* 160.

[48] *Proceedings of Indian Commissioners,* etc. (Hough editor) note 1, p. 329.

[49] Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement,* 60.

territory as Augusta County, while Pennsylvania, in 1773, established Westmoreland County north of the projection of the Mason and Dixon line and west of the Youghiogheny.[50] Lord Dunmore sent his agent to Pittsburgh to make good the claims of Virginia, and while there this agent, John Connolly, sent out warnings to the frontiersmen which would certainly lead to war. At the same time certain atrocious murders of Indians started the tribesmen on the war path, a thing devoutly hoped for by Dunmore. Although Dunmore was at this time on bad terms with his legislature, yet so great was the interest of Virginia in the land northwest of the Ohio that it loyally supported the Governor's Indian war.

A raid on the Muskingum and a pitched battle with a part of the Governor's army, commanded by General Lewis, at Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Kanawha convinced the Indians of the futility of their attempt. At the same time Sir William Johnson and his deputy George Croghan prevented the Six Nations from participating in the struggle.

At a preliminary treaty negotiated at Dunmore's camp near the Scioto the Indians agreed to abandon the land south of the Ohio, while the whites were not to cross to the north of that river. The final conference was never held because after the Governor's return to Williamsburg the Revolutionary struggle developed to such an extent that he was compelled to seek refuge in flight.

It is very evident that the Dunmore war was a speculator's war. At the same time the spirit of the Shawanees, the most redoubtable fighters near the frontier, was broken. This was of great value to the colonies in the early days of the Revolution. Another fact of importance is that hundreds of men who saw the western territories when marching with the Governor and General Lewis, became confirmed expansionists. Finally, it must be remembered that the fundamental cause of the war remained after its close, and that Indian resentment

[50]F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier,* 16.

would arise anew with the continued encroachments. Had it not been for these intrusions, it is doubtful whether the British could have aroused any very great Indian opposition against the colonies.

A survey of the Stuart correspondence in the Library of Congress shows the difficulties faced by the Indian department in the matter of trade regulations. A letter from David Taitt, Stuart's representative among the Creeks, dated September 21, 1772, mentions the fact that large quantities of rum were sold illegally to these Indians.[51]

In a letter of September 24, 1773, Taitt makes the following statement: "Galphin seems determined to observe no regulation whatsoever."[52]

A Chickasaw talking to Stuart at about the same time complained of the acts of fraudulent traders.[53]

Alexander Cameron, the commissary among the Cherokees, wrote Stuart on October 11, 1773, that Richard Pearis was smuggling rum into the Cherokee tribe; also, that Pearis was encouraging the whites and reds to bring in stolen horses which he then sold in Virginia.[54]

Finally, on May 12, 1774, John McIntosh, commissary among the Choctaws, wrote complaining of the fact that an overabundance of rum was being sold to these Indians and that more than a dozen of their young people had been killed recently in drunken orgies.[55] Thus it would seem that the colonial control of Indian trade was entirely inadequate.

On December 15, 1774, Stuart reported a very interesting development in the matter of trade regulation in the Southern district. Sir James Wright, the governor of Georgia, had adopted with some small variations the instructions by which traders were governed when trade was entrusted to Stuart's

[51]C. O. 5, LXXIV, 31.
[52]C. O. 5, LXXV, 28.
[53]C. O. 5, LXXI, 217.
[54]C. O. 5, LXXV, 13.
[55]C. O. 5, LXXV, 171.

management. Lieutenant Governor Bull of South Carolina also approved these regulations, and Stuart was hopeful that the governors of the other provinces in his district would raise no objections to them. The execution of the regulations was to be in the hands of the officers appointed by Stuart to act in the different nations. Trade would then be on the same footing as when under the control of the superintendent, and the disorder and confusion which for several years had prevailed would now be prevented.[56] It is impossible to ascertain the success of such a plan, for within six months of this time Stuart was compelled to remove to Florida because of the Revolutionary upheaval in the Carolinas and Georgia.

Stuart pointed out in a letter to Sir Henry Clinton that many of the Indian traders became agents for the Continental Congress or for the individual states.[57] Among these were George Galphin who, because of his sympathies with the rebellious party, was not considered in the division of the proceeds of the land sales from the Creek and Cherokee cessions of 1773. Although he was extremely influential in the American interests, he was not overly enthusiastic at the outbreak of the war. In a letter to Timothy Barnard, a trader among the Creeks, he had the following to say, "I was sorry Independence is declared for I was still in hopes affairs would have been settled but now all is over." A little further on, speaking of the impending battle around New York in the fall of 1776 (this letter was written early in August of that year), he added, "I wish that they were in Hell what was *(sic)* the means of so many brave men being killed and God knows when there will be an end to it now as there is an independency declared."[58]

As in the south, so also in the north the Indian superintendent found it difficult to enforce trade regulations which would

[56]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 3.

[57]C. O. 5, LXXVII, 209.

[58]C. O. 5, LXXVIII, 102. Letter of August 18, 1776, in Stuart's of October 26, 1776.

be satisfactory and fair to the Indians. In a letter to General Gage on August 30, 1769, Sir William Johnson complained that allowing traders among the tribes accounted for murders which were probably committed by the French, but which could not be prevented unless the Indian department had much closer supervision over trade.[59] Again writing to Thomas Wharton on September 12, 1769, Johnson pointed out how the withdrawal of the Indian officers from the trading posts opened the tribes to the intrigues of the French and to the abuses of the frontier settlers.[60] In a letter to Thomas Penn on January 30, 1770, he spoke of the majority of the traders in the Indian country as a "Sett of very worthless fellows."[61] These are merely some of the many instances appearing in the Johnson Papers which show how inefficiently the colonies managed trade in the northern district.

All colonial efforts to devise a system for the effective control of the fur trade were futile. The plan of having the trade regulated by commissions to be appointed by those colonies chiefly concerned had to be abandoned because of royal opposition. The Crown feared that such trade conferences might be used for disloyal purposes by the disaffected colonies.

It was also difficult to formulate any measure upon which the colonies could agree, because of divergent interests. When in 1771 the New York assembly drew up a series of regulating acts and submitted them to the council in Quebec, they were opposed by the Montreal merchants in which opposition the Quebec council concurred. All attempts on the part of colonial governors and the British ministry to secure the passage of laws designed to regulate trade failed because of the conflicting interests of the colonies most concerned.[62]

Conditions in the Indian country were intolerable for the nations, and it became necessary for the imperial government

[59] *Sir William Johnson Papers,* VII, 150.
[60] *Ibid.,* 167.
[61] *Ibid.,* 363.
[62] W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade,* 31-32.

to take some action. For this, the interests of the Canadian merchants in the territory north of the Ohio pointed the way. One reason for the passage of the Quebec Act was the desire of the British government to establish some legal authority in this territory; another reason was that given by William Knox, when speaking in favor of the act in Parliament, namely to prevent the settlement of, and to establish uniform trade regulations in the Indian country.[63] Then, too, the illegal land purchases by the Wabash and Illinois companies convinced the British authorities that the best method of establishing control in the northwest was to place this region under the government of Quebec. The extension of French law would act as an effective check in the settlement of this territory, since no Virginian would wish to live under this legal system. The problem of colonial trade regulation was avoided as well as the necessity for a meeting of the colonies to consult with regard to the establishment of trade regulations. Another consideration is that the governor was instructed that he could prescribe the regulations for the Indian trade of the regions under his control. The plan of 1764 was sent as a guide for any trade policy which he might formulate. Thus, in a way, the British government was able to put into effect here its original Indian policy which opposition to the Stamp Act had made impossible. By his instructions, Governor Carleton could also set up civil government in this Indian territory. If the carrying out of the plan of 1764 was to be left to the colonial authorities, it was excellent to have it in the hands of the colonial government least subject to popular influence.[64]

That there was opposition to the Quebec Act in the colonies which revolted is well known. There was, however, much feeling against this law on the part of the Canadian merchants, who feared that trade restrictions, which forced them to dis-

[63]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade;* See also Victor Coffin, "The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Economics History and Political Science,* I, No. 3.

[64]W. E. Stevens, *op. cit.,* 33.

continue their commerce with New York, would also cause disastrous rises in the price of commodities. This feeling was so strong that there was fear on the part of the authorities that the Montreal merchants would join the revolting colonies.[65]

In the south, the period of British control was rapidly drawing to a close. On March 28, 1775, Stuart wrote Dartmouth that Gage had warned him of the fact that the New England colonies were tampering with the northern Indians. Stuart immediately warned his agents to watch for similar attempts on the part of the southern colonies.[66]

During the spring months of 1775 Stuart had been ill, but he wrote Dartmouth on May 20 of that year that Indian affairs were progressing in a very satisfactory manner. The Creeks, however, were complaining because of the lack of goods.[67]

On July 21, Stuart was writing from St. Augustine, where he had been compelled to flee because of the attempt on the part of the South Carolina Committee of Safety to arrest him. The South Carolinians were much alarmed, for they thought Stuart was trying to stir up an Indian uprising on the frontier. However, so far as one can glean from Stuart's letters and from his conference with the Georgia Committee, he was trying only—during the summer of 1775—to keep the Indians in the King's interest and not to cause them to attack the frontier.[68]

[65] *Ibid.*, 36-37.

[66] C. O. 5, LXXVI, 81.

[67] *Ibid.*, 107.

[68] *Ibid.*, 143; also same 183. In this letter Stuart criticizes the Cherokees for aiding the Shawanees in killing Virginians—also for their land sales. C. O. 5, LXXVII, 83—in this letter Cameron discusses the letter of Stuart which caused so much furor in South Carolina and Georgia. See also Lieutenant-Governor Campbell to Dartmouth, August 31, 1775, *Public Records of South Carolina,* XXXV, 191; See also Philip M. Hamer, "The Wataugans and the Cherokee Indians in 1776," *East Tennessee Historical Society Publications,* No. 3 (1931). This is an excellent portrayal of Stuart's policy during the early period of the Revolutionary War.

The South Carolina revolutionary committee was particularly active, and its influence spread to Georgia. Many of those who had been often in conflict with the British authorities were now to be found on the colonial side. Among these were Richard Pearis, who, however, played the game safely at first,[69] W. H. Drayton, George Galphin, Robert Rae, and Edward Wilkinson. Galphin's influence was especially great with the Lower Creeks. This group had been at odds with the British authorities since 1773 and proved excellent material to be used as a center of agitation.[70]

Governor Wright reported to Lord Dartmouth on July 8, 1775, that the Charleston Committee of Safety had appointed three men to superintend Indian affairs in the Creek country and three in the Cherokee tribe. This committee was also active in the seizure of a large supply of powder destined for Savannah and another going to St. Augustine. This powder was especially valuable as a gift to the Creeks, which tribe was short of supplies because of the recent difficulties with the English.[71]

On June 26, 1775, Major Williams was instructed by the Committee to confer with Alexander Cameron, to learn his views and to assure him of the support of the colony in case Stuart should withdraw his salary. At this conference Cameron assured the Major that he had never understood Stuart's plan to be an attack on the frontier. His interpretation of Stuart's letter was entirely different from that of the Committee. He seemed willing to pledge himself never to bring the Indians into the province.[72] The Committee authorized William Henry Drayton, the Reverend William Tennant,

[69]C. O. 5, LXXVII, 108. Richard Pearis finally cast his lot with the British.

[70]As late as 1778 Galphin was able to create so much anti-British sentiment among this group that the English traders were compelled to flee to Pensacola, and Stuart was obliged to place an embargo on Indian trade in order that the tribe might be brought to its senses again.

[71]*American Archives series 4,* III, 792.

[72]W. H. Drayton's *Memoirs,* I, 308-9.

accompanied by Colonel Richard Richardson, Joseph Kershaw, and the Reverend Mr. Hart to travel through the back country to explain to the people the cause for the present dispute.[73]

In September William Henry Drayton sent a long talk to the Cherokees in which he attempted to explain the causes of the difficulties with England. He promised the Indians goods as soon as they could be procured.[74] At the same time South Carolina officials were getting ready to treat with the Cherokees who were being brought down by Richard Pearis. That Pearis was not very successful with his Indian negotiations appears in a letter from Cameron to Stuart, November 8, 1775.[75] At a conference with the Indians, where Pearis was represented by his son, Drayton's talk was read. Cameron, who was also present, reminded the Indians of the fact that Pearis was a forger and had tried to deprive them of their lands by dishonest methods. He also made a point of the fact that the King was the chief protector of their land. After Cameron completed his talk, one of the chiefs in a speech made it clear that the Indians would pay no attention to Pearis and that they would follow the advice of "Scotchie" who had been appointed by their Father, the superintendent, to take care of them.

In November the South Carolina Provincial Congress had to make a long declaration to quiet the minds of the frontiersmen—especially of those who were non-associators. This was done because of the powder which had been captured from the British, and which had been given to the Creeks by Georgia. Furthermore, in October, as a result of a meeting of the Cherokee chiefs with William Henry Drayton, the South Carolina Council agreed to furnish the Cherokees with ammunition.

[73] *Ibid.*, I, 324. Drayton had written a revolutionary pamphlet for which he lost his position as judge. This, however, did not cause him to cease his activities as a Whig and so on petition by the Council, he was suspended from that body by Lieutenant-Governor Bull, March 1, 1775.

[74] *Ibid.*, I, 419.

[75] C. O. 5, LXXVII, 140.

By this time the continental Indian department was beginning to function, and on November 13, 1775, a meeting of the Federal commissioners with the Indians was held at Salisbury.[76] At this conference the American commissioners, consistent with the policy of the Continental Congress, as will be seen later, urged the southern Indians to remain neutral in the coming struggle. They also invited them to a conference at Augusta, Georgia, the following spring.

Stuart, who had had thus far no instructions from either Generals Howe or Clinton to employ the Indians, planned to move his headquarters to Pensacola early in 1776. He was, however, called to a conference with Henry Clinton off Cape Fear. At this conference plans were made for the coöperation of Loyalists, Indians, and British regulars in any offensive which might be undertaken against the colonists. When Stuart finally got to Pensacola he found reports of an alarming situation in the Cherokee Nation.[77] The outcome of this situation will be discussed in the next chapter.

On July 11, 1774, Sir William Johnson passed away while trying to quiet the unrest among the Six Nations due to frontier clashes on the Ohio. Ever since the close of the French and Indian War he had faithfully attempted to protect the trade of the Indians and to secure to them their just claims to their lands. He had succeeded in winning the confidence of this simple-minded people as no other had won it before or has won it since. The Indians expressed their confidence in Johnson in their address to his nephew and successor, Colonel Guy Johnson, "Continue to give good advice to the young men as your father did . . . . follow in his footsteps; and as you know very well his ways and transactions with us

[76]*North Carolina Colonial Records,* X, 329-31. At the Augusta conference held at the plantation of Rae, Elbert and Company the American commissioners suggested that the Creeks drive Stuart's deputy Taitt out of the nation. They again insisted that the Indians remain neutral.

[77]Helen Louise Shaw, *British Administration of the Southern Indians 1756-1783,* 90-101.

. . . . continue to imitate them for the good of the public . . . . Take due care of them [our affairs] as that great man did."[78] For thirty-six years Johnson had been on the New York frontier. His knowledge of Indian affairs and his influence over the northern tribes was greater than that of any other individual, either English or American. His large experience had given him an understanding of Indian relations which inspired confidence both in England and among the tribes. The death of this valuable leader so close to the Revolutionary struggle was an irreparable loss for the mother country.

As in the south, individual northern colonies began to take action with regard to Indian matters very early in the controversy. Already in 1774, at a general council at Onondaga, the Six Nations reported that confusion existed among the Indians. This confusion was occasioned by reports received from the white people that the King and the Americans were at variance.[79] Early in April 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress sent an address to the Stockbridge Indians. They also sent a letter to Samuel Kirkland, a missionary to the Oneidas. He was instructed to attach the Six Nations to the American cause, and if this were not possible, at least to keep them neutral.[80] The same colony also made overtures to the eastern tribes—the Penobscot and St. Francis Indians. That they were fairly successful in this latter enterprise is indicated by the fact that the British were compelled to appoint a superintendent for Nova Scotia to offset the influence of Massachusetts. This colony had well laid plans to win the Six Nations from Guy Johnson. A delegation of Stockbridge Indians, who had already espoused the colonial cause, were sent to the Mohawk tribe of the Six Nations. The Oneidas and Onondagas were to be won over by the dissenting missionaries, Kirkland and Crosby. Finally, Joseph Brant, the brother of Sir William Johnson's Indian wife, was to be

[78]Arthur Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks,* 456.
[79]*N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VIII, 516.
[80]*American Archives, series 4,* I, 1347-49.

approached by Dr. Wheelock, whose school he had attended and for whom he entertained a very great respect.

Here, as elsewhere, encroachments were a prominent factor in making the Indians decide in favor of Great Britain. The Mohawks were in difficulties with the Albany corporation and also with one Klock over the question of land. There were also some rectifications to be made on the upper Susquehanna. The Indians were quick to call attention to the Mohawk difficulties at their first conference with the Continental commissioners.[81] Shortly after this, Brant, who had been in Canada, went to England and there during the winter of 1775-76 secured the promise of Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies, to see that all the land grievances of the Six Nations were to be redressed.[82] This made Brant an enthusiastic supporter of the British cause.

In May 1775 Guy Johnson conferred with some thirty chiefs at Oghwaga on the Susquehanna, but because of the dangerous situation, he adjourned the conference to the frontier and we next hear of him in conference with a larger group of Indians at Oswego. Many of the Mohawk tribe left with him, never to return except as raiders.

In the meantime, the New York colony had become very active with regard to Indian affairs and on June 3, 1775, the delegates from this colony to the Continental Congress wrote the New York Provisional Congress praising their zeal so far as the management of Indian affairs was concerned and promising them protection and assistance from the Continental Congress whenever it should be needed. On June 7, 1775, the Provisional Congress of New York wrote to the delegates of that colony in the Continental Congress:

The importance and the necessity of attention to Indian affairs is deeply impressed on our minds, because our public peace is

[81] *Journals of the Continental Congress* (Ford, Hunt and Fitzpatrick editors) III, 365. (Hereafter referred to as *Journals.*)

[82] Canadian Archives, series M. CV, 46. (Hereafter referred to as C. A. M.)

more endangered by the situation of the barbarians to the westward of us, than it can be by any inroads made upon the seacoast. Britain will spare the last for her own sake, and policy will teach her ministers to light upon an Indian war upon our frontier, that we may be drawn for protection to embrace the terms of slavery. To obviate such evils will, we hope, occupy a considerable share of your attention. We do not presume to dictate any measure to you, being confident of your prudence and knowledge; at the same time we submit to your consideration whether it is proper to leave the management of the numerous tribes entirely in the hands of persons appointed and paid by the crown. If it be not, then you will best be able to determine the proper remedy for this evil, and whether it will not be both politic and just to nominate a continental superintendent of Indian affairs, and to provide ways and means to defray the expense of his office, or whether we may not have greater cause to apprehend danger from such an appointment than by suffering these things to flow in their former channels, seeing that the Indians have already declared their willingness to preserve peace unless their superintendent shall be molested.[83]

A message of this character coming from a colony of such strategic importance as New York was effective and it is significant that within a very few weeks, in fact during the same month, the first steps were taken to establish a continental Indian department.

The Pennsylvania-Virginia land dispute concerned territory in the vicinity of one of the points of strategic importance to the colonists. The rivalry concerned both land and trade. General St. Clair wrote from Ligonier on July 17, 1774, that Virginia was trying to cut off Pennsylvania's trade with the Indians. This was to be done by two merchants, Simon and Campbell, who were closely associated with Connolly.[84] Lord

[83] *American Archives, series 4,* II, 1281.

[84] Pennsylvania had organized Westmoreland County in 1773. On December 12, 1774, Dunmore organized the West Augusta District, including Fort Pitt and western Pennsylvania. On November 3, 1776, the three counties of Ohio, Yohogania, and Monongalia were organized in southwestern Pennsylvania and northwestern Virginia. Virginia was much opposed to the

Dunmore was unable to come to Fort Pitt in the spring of 1775, to make his promised treaty with the Indians. His lieutenant, Connolly, conferred with some of the Delaware and Mingo tribes in June 1775, but was closely watched by the patriot group. Both Virginia and Pennsylvania organized committees of safety and correspondence—the Virginians at Pittsburgh on May 16, 1775, and the Pennsylvanians at Hannastown on the same day. The Virginia committee petitioned Congress for an Indian treaty at Fort Pitt attended by commissioners from the two colonies.

On June 24, 1775, a resolution passed the Virginia assembly appointing George Washington, Thomas Walker, James Wood, Andrew Lewis, and Adam Stephens commissioners for holding treaties with the Ohio Indians, and the treasurer of the state was empowered to pay the expenses not to exceed £2,000.[85] At the same time James Wood was directed to visit the various tribes to deliver to them an invitation to the treaty at Fort Pitt. Late in the summer of 1775 the Virginia assembly made plans for protecting the frontier and on August 7, 1775, Captain John Neville was ordered to take possession of Fort Pitt. The colony agreed to assume the responsibility for supporting these troops on the frontier.

Captain James Wood returned from his western mission on August 16, and reported that the Delawares, Shawanees, Senecas, Wyandots, and Tawas had been visited; that Hamilton at Detroit was already very busy trying to influence the Indians in the British interests by telling them that the Virginians wished to seize their lands, and that, as the Virginians were a separate and distinct people, they might safely be attacked. Wood had used his influence to counteract the stories told by Cheunsaw, the Dunmore hostage who had

land speculating projects in the western territories which she claimed. The battle between Virginia and the land companies was carried to the floors of the Continental Congress where it continued with varying fortunes until the eleventh amendment to the Constitution finally ended the controversy.

[85] *American Archives, series 4,* II, 1240.

fled from Williamsburg, and who was spreading false reports regarding the Virginians.

On August 1, 1775, Richard Henry Lee wrote Washington, very much approving the policy of Congress in attempting a general pacification of the Indians on the whole frontier. Virginia tried to coöperate with the Continental Congress when that body finally attempted to enlist Indians for the continental army. On May 1, 1776, the Virginia Convention passed a resolution to enlist Indians up to two hundred for the assistance of the regular army. The neighboring Indians were also assured that if any persons were encroaching upon their lands, such individuals would be removed by the state.

The echoes of the Pennsylvania-Virginia boundary dispute were heard for some time after the Revolution had begun. On September 15, 1775, St. Clair wrote that the garrisoning of Fort Pitt by Virginia was disconcerting to the federal commissioners, who were making a treaty with the Indians. He suggested the advisability of drawing a temporary line between the states. Richard Butler, who was the Indian agent for Congress until the appointment of George Morgan, wrote James Wilson on April 8, 1776, that the Indians were complaining because of a survey of an island below Fort Pitt made by Colonel Crawford for John Harvie and Charles Simms. This island was claimed by John Montour. Butler insisted that this would form the basis for an excellent anti-American talk on the part of the British Indian officers. Butler, of course, was a Pennsylvania partisan and the land had been surveyed for two Virginians.

Although individual colonies had made the earliest overtures to the Indians, common danger caused the development of a general policy for the Union. Already in 1754, the importance of a united policy had been impressed upon the colonies and now again in 1775 the first steps were taken toward common action. On the same day in June 1775 that Washington was informed of his election as commander-in-chief, a committee

consisting of Philip Schuyler, Patrick Henry, James Duane, James Wilson, and Philip Livingstone was appointed to consider information regarding the New York Indians and to report what steps would be necessary to preserve the friendship of the Indian tribes.[86]

This committee reported on July 12 and Congress resolved to establish three Indian departments, one in the North, one for the Middle, and one for the Southern section of the country. It should be noticed that Congress decentralized Indian affairs into three departments, whereas the British government had used only two. Military affairs were not well organized in 1775 and the interdependence of the Indian and military departments was, therefore, not so clearly seen as by the British. The early Revolutionary tendency toward decentralization was, of course, another factor. The Northern department was to include the Six Nations and the tribes to the northward; the Southern department was to extend so far north as to include the Cherokees and then all the Indians to the south of them; the Middle department was to include all the Indians between these two departments. Three commissioners were to be in charge of the Northern department, three of the Middle department, and five of the Southern Indians. In this, the Congress unwisely departed from the British policy of centralizing the control of each department in the hands of one man. These commissioners were to have the power of treating with the Indians in their respective departments, on behalf of the colonies, in order that they might be kept neutral in the coming war.

It should be noted that the chief aim of the Continental Congress during the first year of the war was to maintain the neutrality of the Indian tribes. Most of the thoughtful leaders at Philadelphia realized that the cost of the Indian as an ally would far outweigh any advantage which might be gained from such an alliance.

[86]*Journals,* II, 93. See also *American Archives, series 4,* II, 1281.

$10,000 was appropriated for the Southern department and $6,666⅔ for each of the other divisions; the commissioners were authorized to obtain the assistance of men of influence among the Indians; they were instructed to arrest British agents who were guilty of stirring up the Indians; they were to make reports to Congress as to their finances and as to Indian affairs in general. The Northern department was authorized to support the Canadian Indian youths at Dr. Wheelock's school.[87] Congress was evidently of the same opinion as Schuyler, who stated at a later period that all of the youths educated at Wheelock's school, except those under the immediate influence of the Johnson family, were loyal to the American cause.[88]

On July 13 Congress chose Benjamin Franklin and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and Patrick Henry of Virginia as commissioners of the Middle Department, and when Henry declined to serve they chose Dr. Thomas Walker to serve in his place. On September 15 a motion was passed to add an additional member to the Northern group, and General Schuyler, Major Joseph Hawley, Turbot Francis, and Oliver Wolcott were chosen—an unfinished entry in the day's journal suggests that Volkert Douw was also added to the committee.[89] The nomination of three of the Southern commissioners was left to the Committee of Safety of South Carolina. Congress chose John Walker of Virginia and Willie Jones of North Carolina as the fourth and fifth commissioners.[90] The British made much of the fact that many of the Continental commissioners were also land speculators. In this they were right, for such men as Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Walker, James Wilson, Turbot Francis, and John Walker were associated with

[87]*Journals,* II, 174-77. Congress also established an Eastern Department with John Allan as superintendent. *Journals,* VII, 38; *Journals* XXVI, 11.

[88]Papers of the Continental Congress CLIII, III, 325. (Hereafter referred to as C. C.)

[89]*Journals,* II, 183.

[90]*Ibid.,* 192.

some land speculation projects. The Southern commissioners, meeting for the first time with the Indians at Salisbury, North Carolina, on November 13, 1775, consisted of the following members: George Galphin, Robert Rae, John Walker, Willie Jones, and Edward Wilkinson.[91] As has already been said, three of these commissioners, Rae, Wilkinson, and Galphin, had been in difficulties with the British government.

During the autumn of 1775 the colonies had succeeded in securing certain advantages so far as Indian affairs were concerned. The continental Indian departments had been organized; Virginia had sent messengers through the Western tribes to invite them to a conference which had for its object an agreement with the tribes to maintain their status as neutrals. The meeting was held at Fort Pitt where representatives from Virginia and the Continental Congress met with Indians from the Seneca, Wyandot, Delaware, and Mingo tribes. At this conference the Indians agreed to remain neutral; furthermore, arrangements were made for the return of prisoners held by the tribes. This treaty was of the greatest importance, because the frontier was comparatively defenseless, lacking even such necessities as powder. At the same time it also made possible the sending of recruits from the frontier to strengthen the Continental armies.[92] John Connolly's plan for the conquest of the Fort Pitt frontier was successfully broken up by his capture during the autumn of 1775.[93]

[91]*North Carolina Colonial Records,* X, 329-31.

[92]R. G. Thwaites and L. P. Kellogg, *Revolution on the Upper Ohio,* 76-127. Virginia was represented by Thomas Walker, Andrew Lewis, James Wood, John Walker, and Adam Stephen. The Continental Congress was represented by James Wilson and Lewis Morris.

[93]Connolly, after a conference with General Gage at Boston and with Lord Dunmore off the coast of Virginia, was to travel secretly to Detroit and to gather a sufficient force to overthrow the frontier defenses and to force his way east to Alexandria, where he was to be met by Dunmore with a fleet. Thus the northern and southern colonies would have been effectively divided. Connolly, however, was captured at Hagerstown, Maryland, while on his way westward. Gage to Dartmouth, September 20, 1775. *The Correspondence of Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State, 1763-1775,* 415.

Late in the summer of 1775, the Continental Congress sent a talk to the Six Nations in which an attempt was made to explain the causes for the disagreement between England and the colonies. The Indians were asked to keep out of a "family quarrel" between the mother country and the colonies.[94]

After a preliminary meeting at German Flats, a treaty was negotiated with a part of the Six Nations at Albany, August 31 to September 2, 1775. Many of the Mohawks had gone off with Brant, and the most influential Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas were not present.[95] At this conference the representatives present promised neutrality. They insisted that the difficulties between the Mohawks and the Albany corporation should be settled. They also brought up the Connecticut-Pennsylvania land controversy. The commissioners promised to refer all matters pertaining to land disputes to the Congress at Philadelphia.[96]

Thus, by the time Thomas Jefferson's committee was ready to report the Declaration, which changed the struggle for rights within the Empire to a war for independence, British control on the frontier had collapsed. In the South, John Stuart, after a sincere and conscientious attempt to enforce the imperial land policy and to establish some semblance of coöperative control in the matter of trade regulations, had been compelled to flee to Florida. From there he made vain though expensive attempts to cause the Indian to be an important factor in the campaigns of the South.

In the North, the hand of Sir William Johnson no longer held its magic sway, and lesser men attempted to rule where he had led. His successor, Sir Guy Johnson, had fled to Canada, whence, after some preliminary negotiations, he had traveled to England to insure for himself a proper recognition.

[94] *Journals* II, 178-83.

[95] *American Archives, series 4,* III, 473-96.

[96] Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs to the Continental Congress, December 14, 1775. *American Archives, series 4,* IV, 259. The influence of the missionaries among the Six Nations is noteworthy.

At Philadelphia the importance of Indian affairs had been recognized and the new government had started a policy of federal control of these affairs. The story of this Indian policy will be the subject of later chapters.

II

THE INDIAN AS A FACTOR IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

IN this chapter we shall first attempt to describe the attitude of the American Congress toward the inevitable problem of the part which the Indian might play in the coming struggle, as this is shown by Congressional resolutions. The machinery for controlling Indian affairs must be studied. We shall then review the story of the Indian as an actual military factor in the war in the north, south, and west. Finally it will be necessary to evaluate the military importance of Indian auxiliaries.

Whether the Indian was to participate in the impending war was an open question.[1] It had been debated in Parliament by such men as Burke, Germain, North, and Pownall.[2] That it was debated in the Continental Congress is shown by the letters of the members.[3] Such leaders as Washington had to face the problem early in the war. They knew that it would be difficult to keep the tribes neutral, while at the same time the expense of maintaining their friendship would outweigh any military assistance which the Indian might give.[4] The natives had been used as allies in all previous struggles on this continent. The hesitancy concerning their use now was entirely due to a certain horror of Indian warfare in a fratricidal contest.

Both parties realized that such places as Detroit, Niagara, Michillimackinac, and Pensacola were of importance from a

[1]Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History,* VI, Chap. VIII; also Andrew McF. Davis, "The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries," *English Historical Review,* II, 709; James A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 31-35.

[2]William Cobbett and J. Wright (editors), *Parliamentary History of England 1066-1803,* XIX, 694-708.

[3]E. C. Burnett, *Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress,* I, 113, 180, 433.

[4]C. C. 153, II, 267.

commercial and military point of view and that troops could not be marched to these places without the friendly coöperation of the tribes. The only way to get this support was to have them for allies. When it was decided to use the Indians in the war, the English had a distinct advantage in being able to assume the rôle of protectors of the tribal lands against American aggressions.[5]

There was considerable opposition in Congress to the employment of Indians in the war. One can trace the change of sentiment in this body by a review of its official acts. On July 13, 1775, a formal speech was sent by Congress to the Iroquois to influence them to take a neutral stand in the coming struggle. Franklin's plan for the Articles of Confederation on July 17 proposed an offensive and defensive alliance with the Six Nations. On December 2 it was proposed to call upon the Indians of the St. Francis, Penobscot, Stockbridge, St. John, and other tribes in case of real necessity. On March 8, 1776, it was resolved not to employ Indians except with the consent of Congress and of a general council of the tribes involved. Up to this time one is safe in saying that the chief efforts of Congress were devoted to keeping the tribes neutral. However, when it was seen that Canada was hopelessly lost, a committee of Congress after consulting with Washington reported the resolution, "That it is highly expedient to engage the Indians in the service of the United Colonies." On June 3 Washington was given authority to employ in Canada a number of Indians not to exceed two thousand, and on the 6th the Indian commissioners were instructed to devise means for carrying out this plan. On June 17 Washington was authorized to employ Indians whenever he deemed it necessary.[6]

Although Congress departed from its policy of keeping the Indians neutral, this did not secure many recruits for the Con-

[5]C. H. McIlwain, *Introduction to Wraxall's Abridgement,* xxii.

[6]*Journals,* IV, 394; *Writings of Washington,* Ford (editor) IV, note 1, 31; Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History,* VI, 616.

tinental armies during the entire period of the war. Schuyler wrote Washington from German Flats on August 6, 1776, stating that it was entirely imprudent to ask the Indians to participate in the war.[7] Washington succeeded in obtaining the enlistment of a few St. John and Stockbridge Indians.[8] Later in September 1777, when Schuyler was confronting Burgoyne's invading forces, he secured several hundred Oneidas and Tuscaroras to assist his army.[9] In March 1778 Congress again authorized the enlistment of Indians in Washington's army.[10] Again Schuyler showed how impossible it was to carry out this policy. In a letter of April 15, 1778, he presented a summary of the proceedings of the northern Indian commissioners of that date. At this meeting the commissioners agreed that the only Indians available in the north were a few Oneidas, and that these could not be prevailed upon to leave their homes unprotected unless continental troops were placed on the frontiers to prevent raids. This was entirely impossible. Then, too, the commissioners pointed out that the United States could not hope to maintain friendship with the Indians unless the tribes were furnished with goods.[11]

Only two days after the authorization of enlistments in Washington's army, on March 6, 1778, the Board of War instructed Nathaniel Gist to enlist southern Indians for the continental service. This showed clearly that the Board knew very little about southern Indian affairs.[12]

Reports from the Northern department[13] urged a firm attitude with regard to the tribes of this region. Schuyler was of the opinion that an attack on the unfriendly tribes was the only remedy. On June 11, 1778, Congress definitely determined

[7]MS of General Schuyler's Order book; also C. C. 153, II, 285.
[8]C. H. Van Tyne, *The War of Independence,* 402.
[9]*Ibid.,* 402.
[10]*Journals,* X, 220-21.
[11]C. C. 153. III, 298. Report of meeting of Indian commissioners April 15, 1778.
[12]*Journals,* X, 587-90.
[13]C. C., 153, III, 268.

upon a policy of aggressive warfare against the Northern tribes and those of the West. How this policy succeeded will be considered later.[14]

Congress issued commissions to Indian leaders as a matter of form. However, the Indians valued them very highly.[15] Furthermore, in the treaty with the Delawares in 1778, an offensive and defensive alliance was made with this nation.

Summing up the chief reasons for the failure of the Americans to secure the Indians as allies, we find: (1) that the Indians preferred to fight on the winning side, and the American defeats in Canada and in the vicinity of New York in 1776 were not conducive to giving an impression of victorious warfare; (2) that such men as Brant and Butler, the British Indian agent, were very influential among the Six Nations and succeeded in securing the coöperation of the principal tribes of this league, in spite of the heroic efforts of Samuel Kirkland, a missionary among the Oneidas, and James Deane, an interpreter in the same tribe; (3) that the Americans had few effective agents among the tribes; (4) that the Americans were unable to furnish the Indians with the liberal supplies of presents and provisions demanded by the latter; and (5) that the British could always use very effectively the argument that the Americans were desirous, mainly, of depriving the Indians of their lands.

Turning now to the Congressional machinery for the control of Indian affairs, we find that during the winter of 1775-76 it consisted of special committees which made their reports and were then discharged. However, in the spring of 1776, when the retreat from Canada became inevitable, the threatening state of northern Indian affairs showed the necessity for a permanent Indian committee. On April 29, 1776, a motion was passed that a standing committee of five be appointed to

[14] *Journals,* XI, 587-90.

[15] *Journals,* XIII, 411. Resolutions concerning commissions for Indians. See also *American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, 123 (Hereafter referred to as *A. S. P. I. A.*)

supervise Indian affairs. The committee chosen on April 30 consisted of George Wythe of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut, Lewis Morris of New York, and Edward Rutledge of South Carolina.[16] On July 6, 1776, Thomas Jefferson was chosen to fill the place of Wythe, Philip Livingstone was substituted for Lewis Morris, and Samuel Huntington replaced Oliver Wolcott.[17] At the end of the year the committee consisted of six members: James Wilson, Edward Rutledge, James Duane, (appointed May 16, 1776), Thomas Jefferson, Philip Livingstone, and Samuel Huntington.[18] It can readily be seen that there would be much difficulty in evolving a consistent Indian policy with the personnel of the committees constantly changing.

Until 1779 Congress continued appointing standing committees for Indian affairs, although the appointment was a haphazard affair with the committee undergoing many complete changes in membership.

After 1779 the duties of the standing committee on Indian affairs seem to have been performed by the Board of War. On March 15, 1781, the Board made a report on the subject of Indian affairs in the Western department, a question which had been referred to it by Congress. The Board felt that:

> It is certainly expedient that there should be some person invested with authority to act as an agent for Indian affairs; that means should be put into his hands to support friendly savages, to divide those who are hostile and if any of them will wage war with the rest, it would be politic to enable them to do it. As there is no extensive business in this way to transact it seems proper that the commanding officer should be invested with the power of agent but the present state of finances appears to forbid any measure being taken for supplies to the Indians in any great amounts, and until we are in a condition better able to support them it should seem that it will not be prudent to give large

[16] *Journals,* IV, 317.
[17] *Journals,* V, 524.
[18] *Journals,* VI, 1065.

promises, a failure in which will only tend to exasperate instead of conciliating their affection.

Among the resolutions offered was one, "That the commanding officer for the time being act as agent for Indian affairs in that district and that the Board of War give him the necessary instructions on this subject."[19] This was in many ways an adaptation of the British system and should have been the best policy so long as the war continued. How far it was carried out is difficult to determine, although we do know that General Greene in the Southern department appointed commissioners in 1781 to secure a neutrality treaty with the Cherokees. This was done to make possible greater assistance for the southern army on the part of the frontier.[20]

The Americans were always greatly handicapped by the fact that there were few responsible agents from whom adequate reports could be secured or who could be depended upon to represent the federal government properly.

At the same time Sir Guy Carleton was reporting to the Secretary of War in London that there were twenty-one officials of various grade on the pay-roll of the British Indian department in the north.[21] This did not include Guy Johnson, the acting superintendent of the Six Nations, Captain Daniel Claus, who had a special appointment for the St. Leger expedition, nor Colonel John Campbell, who was superintendent of Indian affairs in Quebec. Including all these and many lesser agents who are not mentioned, one can safely say that in this district there were fifty officers devoting themselves to maintaining the friendship of the Indians for Great Britain. In

[19] *Journals,* XIX, 279.

[20] *Official Letters of the Governors of Virginia,* II, 482, Jefferson to Colonel William Christian, April 17, 1781; *Ibid.,* 143, Joseph Martin to Arthur Campbell, June 4, 1781; Indian talks at treaty held in pursuance of General Greene's commission April 28 and July 31, 1781. Photostats in the Library of Congress from the originals in the Draper Collection, University of Wisconsin, IXXX, 49.

[21] Canadian Archives, series Q, XIII, 329. (Hereafter referred to as C. A. Q.)

addition to these, the commanders of all the frontier posts were instructed to supervise and coöperate with the officials of the Indian department.

In the south the superintendent, John Stuart, was assisted by such men as Alexander Cameron among the Cherokees, David Taitt and William McIntosh among the Creeks, James Colbert among the Chickasaws, John McIntosh among the Choctaws, and Henry and Charles Stuart, the latter of whom acted as deputy-superintendent for the Mississippi regions; furthermore, there were many Scotch merchants among the tribes who were of considerable value in keeping the Indians friendly, and finally, the English found a powerful ally in McGillivray, a head man of the Creeks, who was a stern opponent of encroachments and at the same time did all in his power to check the Georgia and South Carolina fur traders, especially since his father's Charleston estates had been confiscated by the Revolutionary government of South Carolina. It must be remembered that the British could furnish goods for trade, while the colonists stood as a symbol of encroachments on the Indian lands. All of these things made for the success of the British Indian department.

The British authorities were very active in the Northern department, since much was at stake there. If the Americans should succeed in securing the alliance or even the neutrality of the Six Nations, the western fur trade would probably fall into their hands. The least that could be expected from such an event would be that the fur-trading posts would become American prizes. This was not to be tolerated, because the northwestern trade was of too much importance to Great Britain.[22]

In 1775 Massachusetts solicited the aid of the Six Nations, the Canadian Indians, and those of Nova Scotia for the impending struggle.[23] Eleazer Wheelock tried to exert his

[22]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade,* 51-52.

[23]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 2. This valuable study by a Canadian scholar is based on official records in Canadian and other archives.

influence in favor of neutrality through the boys of his school; the work of General Schuyler, James Deane, and Samuel Kirkland was directed toward securing the Indians for the colonial side of the controversy, especially among the Oneidas and Onondagas, while in the north Ethan Allen personally requested the aid of the Caghnawagas of Canada for help in attacking this latter province.

Just before Guy Johnson was forced to flee from New York, he had received instructions from General Gage, the commander-in-chief, notifying him of the fact that the colonists were employing Indians at the siege of Boston which would make their employment for harassing the insurgents entirely proper.[24] When Johnson left the vicinity of Johnstown, he took with him part of the Mohawk tribe, and about one hundred loyalists among whom were Daniel Claus, also a brother of General Herkimer, Gilbert Tice, and Joseph Brant, a young chief who was ambitious to lead the Six Nations. A short time after Johnson's arrival at Oswego on July 17, 1775, he held a council with 1450 Indians, including a deputation of Hurons from the west.[25] At this conference the Indians promised to defend the communications with the lower St. Lawrence; they were also informed of a two-fold plan of attack from the frontier and the seacoast.[26] Johnson could not stay long at Oswego, because his supplies coming up the Mohawk had been intercepted by the Provincials. He then went to Montreal, taking with him 120 Indians and about 220 rangers. At this place he held a conference with 1600 Canadian Indians. In conducting this conference, Johnson made much of the colonial interference with the Indian hunting and fishing grounds around Lake Champlain, and of the great danger in which the Indians were of losing their lands if not

[24]*N. Y. Col. Doc.*, VIII, 635-37.

[25]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers*, 25-26.

[26]*American Archives, series 4*, III, 776-77.

protected by the Crown.[27] At a conference with Carleton the Indians proposed devastating the frontiers if the Americans did not evacuate Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Carleton was not prepared to have the Indians engage in aggressive warfare, and so many of them went back to their villages, although on September 6, 1775, a party attacked a detachment of Montgomery's troops who were advancing on St. Johns, and on the twenty-fifth they assisted in the capture of Ethan Allen.[28] Guy Johnson and Claus then applied for leave of absence to go to England. On this trip they were accompanied by Brant. There we find them presenting the claims of the Six Nations, as well as those of Johnson and Claus, for preferment.[29] This left the affairs of the Six Nations in the hands of John Butler, to whom Carleton gave instruction that he should preserve their good will and retain them as neutrals. This was rather difficult, due to the influence of such men as Kirkland, Deane, and Crosby, and also because the American armies had been generally successful during the fall of 1775 in so far as Canada was concerned.

The American representatives made an heroic attempt to keep the northern tribes neutral. Deane managed to attend a general conference of the Six Nations and in that way was able to get considerable information for the American Indian committee. Early in 1776 the American leaders saw that the tide was beginning to turn against them, and Kirkland wrote Schuyler on March 12, 1776, that the British were telling the Indians that the white people, "especially the Americans were treacherous, deceitful and have no true friendship for the Indians, and are not to be depended upon for protection . . . . This indeed, is no new but the very same old tune which Colonel Johnson played so very long upon. Although he confined it chiefly to New England and Virginia

[27]Schuyler's report on this conference, C. C., CLIII, I, 362; See also Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers*, 26.

[28]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers*, 26-27.

[29]*N. Y. Col. Doc.*, VIII, 654-57.

one might think it would have become threadbare by this time. I am certain I have heard the governing notes upon the same key for several years past, but some one it seems, has lately trumpt it up so high that it sounds very briskly in the savage ear."[30] On March 10 Deane wrote Schuyler that he felt certain that Butler had won over all of the Six Nations but the Oneidas.[31] In March Butler received orders to send Indians to assist in driving the Americans out of Canada, and he responded by sending about one hundred Senecas and Cayugas. These were joined by about one hundred rangers and some regulars under Captain George Foster, and participated in the disastrous affair at the Cedars, where there was an unnecessary massacre of American soldiers.

The treaty at Fort Pitt in the fall of 1775 and the frustration of Connolly's proposed attack upon the frontier shortly after this gave the colonists a decided advantage in western Indian affairs. However, Governor Hamilton at Detroit was making great efforts to counteract whatever influence the Americans had gained by these two events. He and all his officers knew that the Americans could not furnish the Indians the continuous stream of supplies necessary to keep them faithful to their promises, and more than that, they knew how to arouse the fears of the Indians by telling them that the frontiersmen were constantly pushing on to the Indian Reservation—a movement which the strong imperial government had not been able to prevent and which the weak Continental Congress could not hope to cope with successfully. The conduct of some of the frontiersmen often was directed toward bringing on an Indian war in the hope of making possible the acquisition of more lands.

Except for some desultory Indian raids and a plan for the capture of Detroit, things were comparatively quiet on this frontier during the winter of 1775-76. An attack on Detroit

[30]C. C., CLIII, II, 97.

[31]*Ibid.*, 79.

was prevented by the lack of supplies, the hope that Quebec would be captured, the disapproval of Washington, and the opposition of the Indians to any military forces crossing their country.[32]

In the spring of 1776, George Morgan was appointed Indian agent to reside at Fort Pitt. At the same time Congress authorized the commissioners for the Middle department to employ a minister and a schoolmaster for the Delaware Indians, as well as a blacksmith for the Indians of the region. The Indians in all departments were to be informed that Congress was trying to provide goods for presents and trade; the Indians in the Middle department were to be convened for another treaty; an arbitration committee consisting of George Morgan, Captain John Neville, and Aeneas Mackay was appointed to settle the differences between Captain White Eyes of the Delawares and Bernard and Michael Gratz; all disputes between the Indians and whites were to be arbitrated; Captain White Eyes was to be given a present for his services to the colonial cause. Finally, Congress assured the Indians that they had no desire to interfere with their lands, and the Delawares were requested to get the consent of the Six Nations to the land allotment between the Muskingum, Sandusky, Lake Erie, Presque Isle, and the Ohio, made by the Wyandots to the Delawares.[33] Although Congress showed itself eager to open trade with the Indians of the west, the latter were already able to get their goods more cheaply at Niagara than at Fort Pitt.

A committee of Delawares sent a message asking for an American agent to reside with the Delaware tribe. They suggested that the commissioner have plenty of goods to pay those who were carrying messages from Fort Pitt to Coshocton. In that way an excellent intelligence service might be built up.[34]

[32]J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 42.

[33]*Journals,* IV, 267-70.

[34]Yeates Papers, in Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

Morgan, whose previous experience with the Indians gave him the most desirable qualifications for this position, made a strenuous effort to get in touch with the Indians so as to counteract the influence of Hamilton at Detroit. He felt that the only sound Indian policy was to keep them pacified by presents and considerate treatment. He was opposed to asking the Indians for military assistance, and later opposed the alliance with the Delawares in 1778. His difficulties with General McIntosh, the second commander of the Fort Pitt frontier, led to a court martial. In 1779 because of his general disagreement with the Indian policy, he resigned his position.[35]

Soon after assuming the position of Indian agent at Fort Pitt, Morgan had sent one of his representatives, William Wilson, an Indian trader, to extend an invitation to all the tribes except the Shawanees, which tribe Morgan visited personally. Wilson extended his visit to include the Wyandots at Detroit. Hamilton invited him for a personal conference, and in the presence of the Indians assembled tore up the belt which Morgan had sent, denounced the Americans, and ordered Wilson and his companion White Eyes, chief of the Delawares, to leave immediately if they valued their lives. He sent a message threatening the whole frontier if they did not at once submit to the king.[36] In writing to Dartmouth of this affair, Hamilton stated that he had torn the Morgan belt in the presence of 200 Indians from the Ottawa, Chippewa, Wyandot, Shawanee, Seneca, Delaware, Cherokee, and Pottawatomi tribes. He added that he could not then act offensively because of Carleton's letter of July 19, 1776, ordering the Ottawas to remain at home and hold themselves in readiness for the next spring. He had informed the Indians that in case the Virginians made any attack upon them he would have the Indian con-

[35]Walter Fee, *Colonel George Morgan,* Master's thesis at the University of Pittsburgh. For much of my information concerning George Morgan, I am indebted to this study. Professor Max Savelle has made a careful study of the career of this important man.

[36]J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 44-45; C. A. Q., XII, 210.

federacy attack the Americans. In this same letter Hamilton stated that it would probably be impossible to prevent border raids of small parties, "a deplorable sort of warfare but which the arrogance, disloyalty and imprudence of the Virginians has justly drawn upon them."[37] During the autumn of 1776 the United States commissioners at Fort Pitt believed that the Delaware tribe would remain loyal. They were also hopeful that the Shawanees would not enter the war on the British side. On the other hand, they felt quite certain that the Wyandots, Mingos, Chippewas, and Ottawas were going to cause trouble, although they were hopeful of preventing an outbreak before the following spring.[38]

During the late summer of 1776 the Fort Pitt frontier was much alarmed by a rumor which arose in the Shawanee towns that a general uprising was planned against the frontiers. The commissioner for the Middle department sent out a circular letter to the frontier county lieutenants to hold the militia in readiness; they also asked for assistance from Virginia and the Continental Congress.[39] Congress responded by ordering a ton of powder to be sent to George Morgan to be distributed among the Indians as he saw fit. On the same day a resolution was introduced, but was not passed, proposing the maintenance of the Fort Stanwix line against all encroachments.

The Indians finally assembled at Fort Pitt and the treaty with them was signed, probably at the end of October, for Morgan wrote a letter to the President of Congress reporting that the treaty had been successfully completed. Representatives were present from the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawanees, and Mohicans, numbering about six hundred and fifty. Such western tribes as the Chippewas, Miamis, and Wyandots were not represented. The Indians promised to remain neutral

[37]C. A. Q., XII, 219, August 29-Sept. 2, 1776 at Detroit.

[38]Yeates Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Letter of the Commissioners to William Lochry, commander of Westmoreland County, October 8, 1776.

[39]Thwaites and Kellogg, *Revolution on the Upper Ohio,* 190.

and thus stay at peace with the United States. Twelve chiefs were taken to Philadelphia to see Congress. This visit, although rather expensive, accomplished very little.[40] The western Indians and those from Pluggystown continued to raid the frontier. This latter group became so troublesome that Virginia ordered a punitive expedition against them on March 12, 1777, but through the influence of George Morgan, who feared that such an expedition would cause a general Indian war, it was countermanded.

The spring of 1777 opened ominously for the middle frontier. Carleton finally gave his consent to employ Indians for aggressive warfare. At a grand council of June 17 at Detroit, Hamilton acted as the peacemaker between the Ottawas and Chippewas. Then by skillfully appealing to their fears for their land, he succeeded in getting the promise of a large body of Indians to harass the frontier.[41] He issued a proclamation urging the frontiersmen to withdraw from American territory, and promised them protection and subsistence plus a bounty of two hundred acres for those serving in the British army.[42] This proclamation occasioned great fear on the frontier.

An Indian raid in the spring resulted in unsuccessful attacks on the Kentucky stations at Harrodsburg, Boonesborough, and Morgan's Station, which latter place was besieged until September. The constant attacks on Kentucky showed very plainly that the Indians realized where the focal point of the westward push was located.

Congress took note of the threatening condition on the frontier, and on April 9 the Board of War brought in a report recommending that rifles be sent to Fort Pitt and that the Quartermaster General furnish such things as the frontier troops needed; also, that an experienced officer be sent to Fort Pitt to embody militia not to exceed 1000 men. Philadelphia

[40]*Ibid.*, 216.
[41]C. A. Q., XIV, 74; J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark*, 51-52.
[42]Thwaites and Kellogg, *Frontier Defense*, 14.

was to send one ton of lead and Virginia was to send four tons.[43] On April 10 Brigadier General Hand was appointed to take charge of the defense of Fort Pitt and the western frontier. Congress also voted $4000 to strengthen the works at Fort Pitt and for contingent expenses there. This marks the taking over of the western frontier by the federal government. The chief posts on this frontier were Forts Pitt, Henry (near Wheeling), and Randolph, near the mouth of the Kanawha.

The British and Indians planned another raid on the frontier in the autumn of 1777. The main attack was made at Fort Henry but was unsuccessful.

The Shawanees had maintained some semblance of neutrality, but the murder of Cornstalk, the chief of this tribe, who was being held as a hostage at Fort Randolph, caused them openly to espouse the British cause. The defection of this group caused great concern on the western frontier.[44]

We left John Stuart at Pensacola, from which point he was forced to see the weakness, which had attached to his superintendency, even in peaceful times through the vastness of the area under his control, exaggerated by the outbreak of the war. Here we also meet another power which took part in the Revolutionary struggle even though not as an ally of the colonies. From New Orleans Spain launched an attack which finally resulted in the capture of Mobile and Pensacola. The Spanish officials at New Orleans were constantly trying to win the Indians away from the English.

The frontiersmen moving down the Tennessee threatened to open another route into the west and also to force their way southward along the rivers flowing in this direction until they were in possession of Pensacola.

George Galphin used his influence among the Lower Creeks to nullify anything which Stuart might attempt, and finally the defeat of the Cherokees in the summer of 1776 made this tribe

[43] *Journals,* VII, 247. Hand arrived at Pittburgh or Fort Pitt June 1, 1777.

[44] Thwaites and Kellogg, *Frontier Defense,* 157-63.

less valuable as an ally. These were some of the difficulties facing the British Indian superintendent in the south.

Stuart had received no particular instructions regarding the use of Indians until October 1775, when Gage's letter from Boston, dated September 12, 1775, reached him.[45] In this letter Gage had said, "You will now still have it in your power to hold correspondence with all the Indians which I beg you may improve to the greatest advantage and when opportunity offers to make them take arms against His Majesty's enemies and to distress them all in their power for no terms is now to be kept with them. The Rebells *(sic)* have themselves opened the door; they have brought down all the savages they could against us here who with their rifles are continuously firing on our advance sentries."[46] Stuart immediately sent Henry Stuart to Pensacola, whence he was to travel to the Creeks and Cherokees. He carried ammunition with him, and on part of the journey he was accompanied by the celebrated Cherokee chieftain, Dragging Canoe. According to some authorities the Cherokee attack on the Carolina frontier was part of a general plan by which the frontier and coast regions in the south were to be attacked simultaneously.[47] In a letter to Edward Wilkinson, Henry Stuart denied that he and Cameron had urged the attack by the Cherokees, and accused the frontiersmen of forging a letter with his and Cameron's signatures.[48] Stuart in a letter to Germain dated August 23,

[45]C. O. 5, LXXVII, 209.

[46]C. O. 5, LXXVI, 381.

[47]J. G. M. Ramsey, *Annals of Tennessee,* 147; J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 46-48.

[48]See letter of Henry Stuart to Edward Wilkinson dated June 28, 1776. This letter is found in C. O. 5, XCIV, 113. In this letter Stuart makes some interesting statements about the forged letter incident. A part of the letter is given here.

"The long acquaintance I have had with you and the confidence I have had in your candour and honor make me take the trouble of enclosing duplicates of all my correspondence with the people of Watauga and Nolechucky which I assure you upon the word and honor of a gentleman is all that I have ever had with them. I send them and Isaac Thomas's oath in

1776, stated that both Cameron and Henry Stuart were on the ground at the time of the Cherokee attack and tried to prevent it, but found this impossible because of the encroachments and land acquisitions by forgeries, frauds, and by the advantage taken of the Indians' poverty and wants. At the same time deputies from the northern tribes were among the Cherokees urging them to combine against the Americans.[49] These northern deputies used the land intrusion argument very effectively.

The Americans were warned of the impending attack by a friendly Cherokee squaw and so were not taken by surprise.

hopes that you will endeavor to expose and bring to justice those villains that can be capable of forgery in order to involve the settlements of Virginia and North Carolina in an unjust war with the Indians in support of a set of people, who we are creditably informed, have endeavored to defraud them of a country much larger than Carolina.

"The power and the laws have lately been in your hands and it had been good policy (if you had wanted to preserve the friendship of the Indians) to have seen justice done to them and prevented fraudulent purchases and encroachments and to have enforced due observance of such laws and regulations as were intended to preserve good order amongst the nations.

"Mr. Cameron and I have done all in our power to prevent their going to drive the people off their lands, we hoped that we could get them to go off quietly, till at last we had it hinted that they believed that all the white people had combined to deprive them of their lands and to destroy them from being a nation.

"The talk sent them by one of the Virginia committee had served only to exasperate them and I am informed and have reason to believe some of the members are concerned in the land. The people of Watauga have made me the author of the most horrid falsehood, but I can assure you of one serious truth, that the Cherokees are not alone in the resolution to free themselves from the unjust encroachments of their neighbors. I have been informed that copies of the forged letter have been industriously circulated. As such practices are a scandal to any cause I trust you will take some pains in undeceiving the people."

This letter was enclosed with Sir William Howe's letter of January 17, 1777.

See also P. M. Hamer, "The Wataugans and the Cherokee Indians in 1776." *East Tennessee Historical Society Publications* no. 3, 1-19. For a copy of the supposed Stuart letter see *Pennsylvania Gazette,* September 4, 1776.

[49]C. O. 5, LXXVII, 247.

The Indians were decisively defeated at the battle near Long Island on the Holston River, and were also repulsed in their attack on the fort at Watauga. The four southern colonies then proceeded to carry on a very successful Indian war—in fact, the most successful Indian war of the Revolution. Four expeditions converged upon the Cherokees. That from Georgia destroyed their towns on the headwaters of the Tugaloo and Chattahoochee Rivers; the expedition from South Carolina destroyed the Indian villages on the Savannah River; that from North Carolina carried vengeance to the headwaters of the Little Tennessee and the Hiawassee, while the Virginia expedition completed the work of destruction among the Overhill towns on the Little Tennessee. Fifty towns were burned, the crops ruined, horses and cattle were driven off, many of the Indians were killed, died of starvation, were sold into slavery, fled to the Creeks, or sought safety in Florida, where they could be supplied by Stuart. The Cherokees were compelled to sue for peace, although one faction under the leadership of Dragging Canoe refused to come to terms with the Americans and retired down the Tennessee to Chickamauga Creek. This group formed the nucleus for future British activities. Two treaties were held with the colonies. First, one with South Carolina at De Witt's Corner on May 20, 1777, by which the Indians ceded their territory upon the Savannah River, and all their lands east of the Onaka Mountains.[50] Second, on July 20, 1777, they treated with the commissioners from North Carolina and Virginia.[51] The chief tribes represented were the Middle and Upper groups, and at this treaty they ceded everything east of the Blue Ridge Mountains together with the disputed territory on the Watauga, Nollichucky, Upper Holston, and New Rivers. James Robertson

[50]*Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology,* 150.

[51]*North Carolina Historical Review,* VIII, no. 1, 52-116 for the story of the treaty negotiations of Virginia and North Carolina with the Cherokees July, 1777.

was to reside at Echota to watch the movements of the Indians, to recover captured property, and to prevent correspondence with persons unfriendly to the states. The line as later described in a decision of the Supreme Court was as follows:

> Commencing six miles above Long Island on the Holston running west with the river to the mouth of Cloud's Creek; being the second creek below Rogersville in Hawking County, Tennessee, and a few miles below that place, thence to a high point of the Cumberland Mountains a few miles below the gap.[52]

By this the road to the west was obtained, guaranteeing a steady stream of immigrants into the Kentucky country to secure it against the British and Indians.

These treaties were the first Indian treaties entered into by the new state governments. It was unfortunate that Congress was not able to appoint agents to reside in this territory. The lack of such a federal agent was a weakness during the whole confederation period so far as this section of the country was concerned.

Some of the state and federal agents in the south were not entirely sure of their allegiance, as is shown by the following letter from Joseph Martin to John Stuart. Martin was to act as the representative of Virginia and North Carolina among the Cherokees, and later he also acted as a representative of the federal government. The letter is dated February 20, 1778, and reads in part: "I take this opportunity of writing to you requesting to know whether there has been any reward offered for me by your orders. If so, I must certainly be misrepresented to you. It is too well known that I have never entered into any of the American resolutions, and that I have suffered very considerably for refusing to do so. I understand McDaniels had made some offers but can not believe that it is by your orders. If you want me, I have no objections against coming to you as I am well assured you

[52] 2 Howard p. 211.

would rather pity than punish. The Indians here are allowed no trade from you which I am sorry for. I can assure you their attachment to his Majesty is as strong as ever only their present situation will not allow them to show it. I trust you, on behalf of them, to send them traders in these towns. I assure you on the faith of a Christian that they shall be safe if Mr. Galphin doesn't prevail on the Creeks to rob the traders which I understand he attempted. I earnestly beg to hear from you as soon as possible if you will allow any goods to come here . . . I wait your answer with great impatience."[53]

The Chickamaugas were a cause of much concern for more than one reason. Patrick Henry wrote Governor Caswell of North Carolina, January 8, 1779, that this tribe, located as they were, could block one of the chief routes of communication with "our posts on the Mississippi and Ohio. Furthermore, they effectively prevent the much desired trade with New Orleans through their territories."[54] This tribe was to play an important part in Hamilton's grand plan for attacking the frontiers in 1778. Several Tory and British agents resided among them. Hamilton's plan was frustrated by his capture, and the Chickamaugas brought down the wrath of the frontiersmen upon themselves by raiding the settlements. An expedition led by Colonel Evan Shelby was sent against their towns and destroyed them, together with vast amounts of supplies and British stores amounting to $125,000 in value. The British property became the booty of the raiders.[55]

In 1780 Cornwallis urged Thomas Browne, the superintendent of the Eastern tribes, to bring about a Cherokee attack on the settlements of Watauga, Nollichucky, on the Holston, and in Kentucky. All these settlements were intruding on Indian territory, and an effective attack would cause the withdrawal of the frontiersmen from the southern American

[53]C. O. 5, LXXIX, 249. Enclosure, Stuart's letter, May 2, 1778.
[54]*North Carolina State Records,* XIV, 243.
[55]*Tenn. Hist. Mag.,* IV, 38.

armies.[56] The uprising which resulted among the Overhill Cherokees and Chickamaugas was defeated by Sevier at the battle of Boyd's Creek immediately after his return from the battle of King's Mountain. He was joined by Colonel Arthur Campbell and Joseph Martin, the Virginia and North Carolina Indian agent, after which the combined forces destroyed the Overhill towns and those on the Hiawassee. Large quantities of provisions were destroyed on this raid.[57]

In 1782 Sevier led another raid against the towns from the Hiawassee to the Coosa, which raid resulted in the destruction of the Indian towns and crops. These continual raids caused the Chickamauga group to move a little further south into the impregnable fastnesses of the Cumberland mountains, where Dragging Canoe started the Five Lower Towns of the Chickamauga. He was soon joined by enough Indians from the Cherokee, Creek, and Shawanee tribes, along with some Tories, to make up a force of 1000 men.[58]

With regard to the Creeks, Stuart labored under continual difficulties. The Americans furnished large quantities of rum to this tribe. But it must also be confessed that the Pensacola merchants showed little inclination to abide by the trade regulations of the British Indian department.[59]. The Creeks were rather independent in their dealings with the whites. They had been courted by both Spanish and French and now they were being flattered by the colonies and the British, with the Spanish soon to play a third party to the triangle. Stuart used stern measures to bring this tribe to its senses by placing an embargo on trade with them.[60] This was effective in part, and by the summer of 1778 some of the Creeks were raiding the frontiers of Georgia. Fortunately for the colony of

[56]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts*, II, 225.

[57]*Tenn. Hist. Mag.*, IV, 39.

[58]*Ibid.*, 40; *A. S. P. I. A.*, 431.

[59]C. O. 5, LXXVIII, 29, also 285 and 313.

[60]C. O. 5, LXXIX, 223.

Georgia, however, the whole tribe did not become active. During the late summer of 1778 Stuart was ill and had no opportunity to oversee personally the work of the Indian department. Germain was very severe in his criticisms of the work of the department. He did not, however, blame Stuart personally for the inefficiencies. He was inclined to put the responsibility on the agents among the Indians.[61] Stuart's death early in 1779 caused a division of the department with Cameron taking charge in the west and Colonel Thomas Browne in the east.[62] Of necessity the Indian agents were now more subject to the military rule than they had been during Stuart's lifetime.

After Stuart's death and before the government had time to take any action Governor Chester appointed a group of Indian commissioners at Pensacola, but these made only for confusion.[63] Charles Stuart refused Chester's offer to be one of the Pensacola commissioners and Cameron wrote Germain to point out the necessity of his being superintendent in order that the Cherokees might be kept loyal. Cameron was notified of his appointment by Germain in a letter dated August 5, 1779. He was instructed to do as much as possible to remove the ill effects of the Hamilton debacle, and also to straighten out some difficulties which had arisen because Stuart's executors were supposedly holding public property; he was to coöperate with General Campbell in the western district. Taitt, who acted in the Creek nation, joined Prevost with some warriors of that tribe, although Governor Tonyn of East Florida accused him of neglecting his duties.[64] Cameron was not satisfied with his position as superintendent of the Indians toward the west, because he felt that his influence was greatest with the Cherokees. For this Germain criticized him severely,

[61]C. O. 5, LXXX, 177.

[62]C. O. 5, LXXX, 465.

[63]C. O. 5, LXXX, 285 and 295; C. O. 5, LXXX, 465, Cameron notified of his appointment by Germain.

[64]C. O. 5, LXXX, 469.

pointing out that the American plans for taking possession of the Mississippi and the danger of a Spanish attack made it necessary for someone to be in charge of the west who had the confidence of the Cherokees.[65] Cameron was ordered to spend his time in the tribes rather than at Pensacola so as to avoid the heavy expense of entertaining the Indians.[66] He did not seem to be very successful in getting the Creeks to coöperate against the Spaniards. At the same time he lost several valuable assistants through death and capture.[67] The Choctaws were gradually won over by the Spaniards. The Indian department had tried to put pressure upon this tribe by cutting off its trade, but could not get the coöperation of the civil authorities.

In the fall of 1780 Cameron was prevented by a serious illness from making a trip through the Indian nations in his jurisdiction.[68] He asked leave to resign on half-pay allowance. His death occurred at Savannah early in 1781, and he was succeeded by John Graham although Farquhar Bethune, commissary to the Choctaws, had hoped for the place.[69] Thomas Browne continued as superintendent of the eastern district. These superintendents were instructed to conform to the orders of the commander-in-chief and of the general officers, and to coöperate with each other. Browne made an attempt to secure the coöperation of the Creeks but

[65]C. O. 5, LXXXI, 209.

[66]*Ibid.*, 209.

[67]*Ibid.*, 411; 467. Chas. Stuart captured at Mobile, died in prison; John McIntosh, deputy to the Chickasaws, died during February 1780; Taitt was captured by the Spaniards on the Mobile River. In November, 1786, Chevalier, royal physician to Vergennes, who was a brother-in-law of Chas. Stuart, asked aid in securing the estate. (Mrs.) N. M. Surrey, *Calendar of MSS in Paris Archives and Libraries relating to the history of the Mississippi Valley to 1803*, 1637. (Hereafter referred to as Surrey, *Calendar.*)

[68]C. O. 5, LXXXII, 221.

[69]C. O. 5, LXXXII, 556. In this letter Browne announced the death of Cameron. He told about Cameron's illness at Savannah in his letter of August 9, 1781.

found it difficult to secure assistance from or to send supplies to either the Creeks or the Cherokees. It was found practically impossible to get any coöperation from the Mississippi tribes. Browne preferred that the Indians be under the management of military men, because of their contempt for civilians.

From this brief survey, it can be seen that the British Indian department was not successful in securing efficient coöperation from the southern tribes for the armies. It must, however, be remembered that the decisive defeat of the Cherokees prevented this tribe from functioning as a unit. Furthermore, the Spaniards were tampering with the Choctaws, and a part of the Creeks were under Galphin's influence. Some assistance was given by the Indians. Their alliance was one of the things which prevented an attack on Mobile and Pensacola similar to the one made by Clark on Vincennes; their threats against the frontiers of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia served to weaken the American armies fighting nearer the coast; then, too, they actually coöperated with the British as in the case of their attack on the frontier while the borderers were fighting at King's Mountain. Superintendent John Graham reported 200 Choctaws with the garrison at Savannah.[70] A vicious attack was made on Wayne's army, which was blocking Savannah in 1781, by a party of several hundred Creeks led by Emistesigo (Guristersigo), the head warrior of the Upper Creeks. They were on their way to reënforce the garrison after having marched several hundred miles. In this attack Emistesigo lost his life.

After the evacuation of Savannah, the headquarters of the southern Indian department was moved to St. Augustine. There the officers of this department had experiences similar to those of the British officers at the frontier posts of the northwest. The Indians came with complaints of American aggressions—especially the Creeks in Georgia—and asked the British for assistance. Northern Indians also resorted to

[70]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts*, III, 30.

this center, causing additional expense for their feeding.[71] Some of the Indians here wished to migrate to the Bahamas although Carleton ordered General McArthur to discourage this.[72]

The British traders and Indian officers were withdrawn from the tribes, and, as Superintendent Graham had returned to England because of ill health, Browne was left to close up the work.

The British southern Indian department ended officially when Carleton instructed General McArthur to cease paying the salaries of the extra officers of the Indian department on December 24, 1783. This order was given on August 22 so that these men could seek new positions. They were permitted to avail themselves of land grants in Nova Scotia or in "any other part of His Majesty's American dominions." They were to be recommended for land in the same manner as the other officers.[73]

During the years 1776-79 British Indian affairs were not functioning smoothly in the north. Guy Johnson, Claus, and Brant had gone to England in the autumn of 1775. Johnson returned to New York during the late summer of 1776 and lingered there impatiently, amusing himself acting as stage manager of the theatre where the British officers gave amateur plays. He seemed eager to return to the Indian country so that he might organize the Six Nations to coöperate with the British armies in their campaign to bring about a junction of the army in Canada with that in New York.[74] Claus had suc-

[71]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts*, III, 325; IV, 119 and 165. See also *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, III, 426. Here Joseph Martin writing to Governor Harrison February 2, 1783, mentions the fact that agents from the tribes in the Detroit vicinity visited southern tribes and then went to St. Augustine.

[72]C. O. 5, LXXXII, 807.

[73]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts*, IV, 291-94. Similar instructions were given to Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Browne, *Ibid.*, 291.

[74]For a summary of Guy Johnson's activities 1775-79 see N. Y. Col. Doc. VIII, 658.

ceeded in obtaining a special appointment as superintendent of Indians for the St. Leger expedition down the Mohawk, although he had not succeeded in securing the back pay which he insisted was due him for earlier services, nor indemnification for the losses he had suffered when his property in New York had been confiscated. Carleton had appointed Butler in the place of Johnson when the latter went to England and was, therefore, displeased because of Claus's appointment, which was made without consulting him. He would, therefore, do very little to coöperate with Claus.

A third character of importance in the drama acted at this time was Joseph Brant, who had gone to Europe with Johnson to secure redress for the wrongs of the Six Nations, and who came back with the determination to put these tribes into the service of the King. He stayed in New York long enough to take part in the battle of Long Island, after which he determined to penetrate the American lines carrying instructions from General Howe and Guy Johnson. He first met the tribes of the Six Nations on the Susquehanna, telling them about his experiences in England and using his influence against that of the American emissaries.[75] Brant's position among the Six Nations, however, was not entirely secure, and this fact was recognized by the British leaders. Haldimand wrote to Germain on September 13, 1779, concerning the giving of a commission to Brant:

> But Joseph's position is very different from the idea of those who are not acquainted with it, must from his superior talents conceive. To speak in the Indian stile (*sic*) Joseph has been but lately known upon the warpath. He is now distinguishing himself in that line, but it will be some time before he is acknowledged by them even upon footing with many (as they conceive) more experienced and greater warriors. Besides the notice that has been taken of him by the English people in consequence of his connection with Sir William Johnson, his being civilized and more particularly for his services, has from a jealousy predominating in

[75]For the story of Brant by Claus see C. A. M., CV, 46.

Indians, procured him many enemies among them, as friends with us.[76]

Sir John Johnson, son of Sir William Johnson, who had been compelled to flee from the Mohawk Valley in May 1776, was another character in this drama. He allied himself with Claus in the controversy and together they used every possible opportunity to criticize Butler and his Indian policy.

During the early months of 1776, Butler and the Americans were contending for the favor of the Six Nations. James Deane was able to attend the Onondaga Council, March 21 to April 3, and reported that Butler was advocating a policy of neutrality, at least until the conciliation attempt of the British government had failed.[77] Butler's success is shown by a letter of Kirkland to Schuyler on June 8, 1776. In this he stated that Butler's influence with the Indians was growing and that if he were given reënforcements and supplies, an attack on the frontier would undoubtedly be made. He insisted that it was time to make the Indians declare definitely what they were going to do.[78] On this same day Schuyler wrote Hancock urging the necessity of taking possession of Fort Stanwix to prevent the British from doing so; he also stated that it might be wise to call a conference of the Indians, when they should be compelled to state their position, and in case they preferred to side with the British they were to be moved out of their territories into those controlled by the British.[79]

In August the Americans held a treaty with the Indians at German Flats. On August 1 Schuyler wrote Hancock that although there were only 1200 Indians present they were consuming as much food as an army of 3000 men. The Oneidas

[76]Lewis H. Morgan, *The League of the Iroquois,* I, 70; Canadian Archives, series B LIV, 151. (Hereafter referred to as C. A. B.)

[77]*American Archives, series 4,* V, 1100-1104. At the same time the Continental Congress was having troubles of its own supplying goods for trade and supplies. There was also considerable concern as to what effect the retreat from Canada would have upon the Indians.

[78]*American Archives, series 4,* VI, 764.

[79]C. C. 153, II, 192.

and Tuscaroras were the chief tribes present. Some of the other representatives were rather surly and even suggested that the Americans condole with them for their losses at the Cedars. Schuyler was very critical of those Indians who had taken part against the Americans in Canada. He did not feel that it would be expedient to ask any Indians to enter the American army or to accept pay for any prisoners brought in. As a result of the meeting, the leaders of the Americans felt that no hostilities would be committed on the frontiers immediately, although they were quite sure that some of the Six Nations would join the British.[80]

The British victories at Long Island and New York stirred Brant to great activity and he traveled through the Six Nations urging them to war. Butler was still acting under Carleton's orders for a defensive warfare and would, therefore, not encourage Brant's activities. For this he was severely criticized by Claus. Brant, however, continued his agitation and even tried to persuade certain Indians from serving under Carleton, promising them the right to make war in their own way. For this Carleton instructed Butler not to furnish Brant with powder and other materials of war for his proposed campaign.[81]

The American attack on Canada in 1775-76 had resulted in a division of the British army, which undoubtedly hindered its success around New York. Now an attempt to unite the two armies was to result in one of the most significant campaigns of the Revolution.[82]

The Americans knew of the coming attack early in January.[83] Their leaders made much of the victories at Princeton

[80]*Ibid.,* 248; 271; 276.

[81]An excellent discussion of the British side of this question is found in E. A. Cruikshank, *The Story of Butler's Rangers,* 28. See also Claus's criticisms, C. A. M. CV, 46. He accused Butler of having gotten his office by flattery, of withholding Brant's ammunition because his own inefficiency would be shown up by Brant's activity. See also *N. Y. Col. Doc.* VIII, 723-26.

[82]Channing, *History of the United States,* III, 243.

[83]C. C., 153, III, 31.

and Trenton, and also of the secret assistance which was being given by France in an effort to influence the Indians to side with them. On January 10 Kirkland wrote Schuyler that his speech and the six barrels of rum had accomplished more than a thousand dollars would have done if spent on a treaty to hold the friendship of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras.[84] The ancient council fire of the Six Nations was extinguished in January. The Senecas and Cayugas were divided but leaning toward the King, while the Oneidas and Tuscaroras were divided but chiefly American in their sympathies. A unanimous decision for the King might have insured Burgoyne's success.[85]

In February a delegation of Oneida Indians set out for Canada to prevent the Caghnawagas of that province from assisting the British in the coming offensive. The delegation was closely watched by the British officers but managed to get their message delivered at a midnight council.[86] On April 22, 1777, Colonel Elmore reported to General Schuyler that the Six Nations were making their final decision as to the part they were going to take in the coming campaign.[87]

The lack of organization on the part of the Americans was painfully evident, as is shown by a letter from Schuyler dated May 26, 1777. In it he said in part:

> As the Indians frequently inform me of certain matters said by them to be done or promised by the commissioners of the Middle department which causes some embarrassment, in giving answer to them, I therefore wish that the commissioners of Indian affairs may be directed from time to time to furnish the commissioners (in Northern department) with copies of such intelligence as may be received by Congress.[88]

[84] *Ibid.*, 71.
[85] Lewis H. Morgan, *The League of the Iroquois*, II, 195.
[86] C. C. 153, III, 114.
[87] *Ibid.*, 128.
[88] *Ibid.*, 124.

The military events of 1777 have been adequately treated by the historians of the period.[89] According to the latest researches it is evident that the chief objective of the Burgoyne expedition down the Hudson was to bring the Canadian army to Howe's assistance, in order that the latter might complete the destruction of Washington's forces. While Burgoyne with the main force was coming down the Hudson, another detachment of about 700 men commanded by General St. Leger was to make a diversion by way of Lake Ontario and the Mohawk Valley.

Burgoyne's troubles began when Carleton was unable to furnish him with an adequate number of Canadians and Indians.[90] Then, too, the lack of coöperation among the British Indian officers prevented the Indians from functioning efficiently. With Burgoyne's army they might have been of some use as scouts and to screen army movements. In spite of great anticipations and a rather bombastic speech on the part of Burgoyne, which Burke ridiculed in Parliament, the Indians failed to be of any service whatever.[91] Their atrocities did succeed in bringing down upon Burgoyne's army a large number of New England militiamen.

Daniel Claus attributed this failure to a lack of leadership. The Indians on this expedition were under the command of one of the deputies of Colonel Campbell, the Indian superin-

[89]Channing, *History of the United States,* III, 247-73.

[90]C. H. Van Tyne, *The War of Independence,* 382.

[91]By July 11, Burgoyne was beginning to doubt the value of his Indian allies, for in a letter to Germain on that date he said:

"Your Lordship will have observed that I have made no mention of the Indians in the pursuit of Ticonderoga. It is not possible to draw them in many respects from the plunder of that place, and I confidentially acknowledge this is not the only instance in which I have found them little more than a name. If under the management of their conductors, they are indulged, for interested reasons in all the caprices and humors of spoiled children, like them they grow more unreasonable and importunate upon every new favor; were they left to themselves enormities too horrid to think of would ensue; guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey. *Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne,* 162.

tendent at Quebec. This statement must be considered in the light of the fact that Carleton, who made the appointment, and Claus who was making the criticism, were not on good terms.[92]

The Indians participated more actively in the St. Leger expedition. On July 5, 1777, Butler had received orders from Carleton to collect as many Indians as possible to join St. Leger, who was advancing from Montreal to attack Fort Stanwix. He sent agents to all the Six Nations to collect warriors for this expedition. He was fairly successful in this and also prevented conferences which the Americans planned at Fort Pitt and Albany. The western Indians were also invited to participate in the eastern drive. Claus had arrived from England with a commission as Indian superintendent, which Carleton was compelled to recognize, much against his own wishes in the matter.[93] Butler served as Claus's assistant. The Indians, who were gathered by Brant and Butler at Oswego, numbered about 800, but were not inclined to enter battle immediately. In fact, some authorities maintain that at the Fort Stanwix siege the Indians were invited to be present merely as spectators. Brant, Claus, and St. Leger proceeded to lay siege to Fort Stanwix, and Butler joined them with his Indian forces about August 5. About the time of Butler's arrival, Mary Brant sent word that Herkimer's relief expedition was on its way. Butler, with Sir John Johnson and Brant, was sent to ambuscade this relief force. Claus insists that Butler was compelled to fight by Brant, but General Cruikshank, a Canadian authority, in his account of *Butler's Rangers* states that Butler was merely trying to avoid bloodshed between old neighbors and friends.[94] In the battle which followed the Americans suffered severely, many of the prisoners being

[92]*N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VIII, 718-23.

[93]For Butler's side of the question see Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 34; for Claus's point of view see C. A. M. CV, 467f.

[94]Herkimer's brother, brother-in-law and nephew were serving as officers with the English and Indians. *Butler's Rangers,* 34.

killed by the Indians. A sortie by the garrison was disconcerting to the British and Indians. The Indians lost heavily, thirty-three killed and twenty-nine wounded, one-half or more of these being Senecas. They were much dispirited by their losses, and since they had not entered the campaign with any great enthusiasm, the rumor of Arnold's expedition made it impossible to hold them any longer. In his official report St. Leger stated that after the tide began to turn against him, his Indian allies were more dangerous than his American enemies.[95] The expedition was abandoned as a beginning of the general collapse of the attack for that year. Claus felt that it might have been successful had it had a more rapid march from Montreal. This would have caught Fort Stanwix entirely unprepared. At the same time he criticized Butler's Indian policy and inferred that St. Leger was not being supplied with such information as efficient scouting should have brought him.[96]

Claus played a small part in American Indian affairs after this expedition. He retired to Canada and then to England to spend his time seeking preferment and trying to secure compensation for his back salary, expenses, and confiscated estates.

Butler proceeded with the raising of his battalion of rangers to be employed in conjunction with the Indians, and both he and Brant proposed joining Burgoyne, but the surrender of the latter prevented such a move. Brant then took much time in overcoming the disaffection which was rapidly spreading among the Six Nations, and which had actually got to the point where the Oneidas, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras had accepted an alliance with the Americans. The Senecas and Cayugas remained loyal to the British, and Butler called a conference of the Six Nations at which the Tuscaroras and Onondagas surrendered the hatchet and war belt which they had received from Schuyler.[97] During the autumn the Indians, who were

[95]G. O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution,* III, 145.
[96]*N. Y. Col. Doc.,* VIII, 718-23.
[97]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 38-39.

much exasperated at the Pennsylvania frontiersmen, raided the border settlements on the Susquehanna and also those on the Kiskiskemitas Creek.

The American victory at Saratoga fundamentally changed the Revolutionary struggle. From that time on England faced the open hostility of a combination of European nations headed by France. The treaties of commerce and alliance with France were negotiated in February 1778, and caused much rejoicing throughout the colonies. The Indians were promptly informed of the alliance, and French officers were scattered among the tribes. French leaders of prominence were often present at negotiations with the tribes, and finally delegations of Indians were sent to view the French fleet so as to be assured that the alliance was an actuality.[98]

General Hand, an efficient administrator, who had taken command of Fort Pitt in 1777, soon found that the difficulties of this position were numerous. He had to contend with the particularism of the states,[99] the reckless conduct of the frontiersmen,[100] the constant agitation among the Indians by British emissaries, and also a large disaffected population. A list of persons at the end of the war, who were then at Fort Pitt or who had been there and had fled to Detroit and who were loyalists in their sympathies, included sixty-eight men besides their families.[101] The Maryland Retaliators were organized by James Fleming and Hugh Kelly. When in 1779 the British planned the grand attack on the frontier, Kelly went

[98]See *Kaskaskia Records 1778-90*, 163-67; also 173-180. Linctot's mission to the western nations, St. Germain's mission to western and southern nations. See also *Boston Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser*, Sept. 14, 1780, for an account of the visit to the French fleet at Newport by a party of Oneida Indians.

[99]Hand Letters, Force Transcripts, I, 60. At the same time Hand asserted the authority of the Continental Congress when the opportunity presented itself. See letter to the Board of War February 12, 1778, and the letter to Gates April 21, 1778.

[100]Hand Correspondence, 1777-78, I, Letter of Lieut.-Gov. John Page to Hand Sept. 17, 1777.

[101]C. A. B., CXXIII, 489; also C. A. Q., XV, 100.

to the Redstone settlement and associated 175 men to join the King's troops when these arrived at Pittsburgh; Fleming went to Kittaning and associated seventy-five men to join the King's troops. By June 1781 this group numbered 1300, not all of whom, however, resided on the Fort Pitt frontier.[102]

It can readily be seen that the American cause did not receive the undivided support of the frontier. A dissatisfied group of such proportions could cause many difficulties for the commander. Among this group were such men as Alexander McKee and Simon Girty, who were secretly working for the British interests with considerable zeal. Early in 1778 these men, along with Matthew Elliott[103] fled from Fort Pitt to Detroit, attempting to stir up the Indians on the way. They, of course, took with them much valuable information.[104]

Congress noted the threatening conditions both as to the Indians and also as to the disaffected groups. This information was gotten in part from a letter sent from the frontier and read in Congress on November 20, 1777. As a result of this communication Congress resolved to appoint three commissioners who were to have full power to suspend and substitute for any officer who was in any way offending against the United States. In addition, they were to cultivate the friendship of the Indians and engage them in the services of the United States, and in conjunction with General Hand to work out a plan for the attack on Detroit. The states of Virginia and

[102]Historical Manuscripts Commission, *Report on American Manuscripts*, II, 46.

[103]MS., biography of Matthew Elliott by C. M. Burton in the Burton Collection, Detroit Public Library.

[104]A report of McKee on supplies furnished the Indians found in C. A. M. CV would indicate that McKee was furnishing the Indians with supplies during the years 1775-78. McKee was one of the ablest of the British Indian officers and was later offered the position of superintendent general of Indian affairs by Simcoe. During the early days of the war he labored earnestly to preserve peace between the whites and the Indians. His flight to Detroit was caused by the news that he was to be sent to Lancaster as a prisoner. (For this information I am indebted to Brigadier General E. A. Cruikshank of Ottawa, Canada.)

Pennsylvania were urged to give the commissioners authority over their militia in order that they might deal with the conspirators. The commissioners appointed were Colonel Samuel Washington, Mr. Gabriel Jones, and Colonel Joseph Reed.[105]

In February General Hand attempted unsuccessfully to raid the English military and commercial post at Sandusky. He wrote to Richard Peters of the Board of War that the expedition had been given up because of insufficient men and supplies. He had expected to raise 2000 men, but had secured 800, including the regulars.[106] Although Hand's work in establishing and unifying the frontier defense was successful, the lack of coöperation caused him to feel that he could succeed better with the regularly organized army. His request for recall was granted and General Lachlan McIntosh, an experienced frontier fighter who stood high in Washington's esteem, was chosen to take Hand's place in May 1778.[107] John Campbell wrote to Hand a year later when McIntosh was having his own troubles on the frontier, "The West country is under a bad character for quarreling with the generals sent to command them. How they may agree with the next is a problem that only time can solve . . . ."[108]

On the western frontier the commissioners, who had been sent to make a survey of conditions, reported that the solution of the difficulties was an offensive whose object would be the capture of Detroit. Congress voted $900,000 to defray the expenses and proposed to raise 3000 men. Fort Randolph at the mouth of the Kanawha River was to be the place of rendezvous. Washington had detached two regiments recruited on the frontier, the Eighth Pennsylvania and the Thirteenth Virginia, commanded by Colonels Brodhead and Gib-

[105]*Journals,* IX, 942-45.

[106]Letter dated Nov. 6, 1777 in volume of Hand letters written while at Fort Pitt.

[107]For Washington's letter to McIntosh notifying him of his appointment, see *Writings of Washington,* Ford (ed.), VII, footnote 2, p. 30.

[108]Hand Correspondence 1779-84, II, 49.

son, to join General McIntosh. The Eighth Pennsylvania was temporarily diverted because of the Wyoming invasion and did not arrive at Fort Pitt until September. Moreover, the service of supply broke down, and a rise in prices of the things necessary for the expedition made it impossible to keep within the Congressional appropriation. On July 8 Patrick Henry wrote to Henry Laurens, President of the Continental Congress, giving reasons why he thought the expedition impracticable. They were: That it was impossible to secure the necessary flour and even if it were, the transportation of this commodity would be absolutely impossible within the allotted time; horses might be had, but to purchase the five thousand necessary for the expedition would raise the price to four times the Congressional estimate; he felt that the difficulties to be met would make postponement until the following spring advisable; and suggested that Congress revise the estimates and also the time allotments for the execution of the expedition, and concluded that if after such a review Congress would still insist on the expedition, he was willing to support it. Henry preferred an expedition against the Indian tribes to an attack on Detroit.[109]

Congress resolved to give up the expedition and at the same time suggested to General McIntosh that he make a raid on the hostile Indian towns with a force numbering about 1500 men. McIntosh had abandoned many of the smaller forts on the frontier and had substituted ranging companies for these. He had also established a central storehouse at the forks of the Monongahela.

Since the Fort Pitt commissioners had proposed a treaty with the Shawanees, Delawares, and other Indians, Congress approved of this proposal and suggested that three commissioners, two from Virginia and one from Pennsylvania, proceed to Fort Pitt to negotiate this treaty. Pennsylvania neglected to appoint a commissioner, and the only Indians that

[109]W. W. Henry, *Life and Correspondence of Patrick Henry,* II, 180.

came to Fort Pitt were the Delawares. The negotiators were Andrew and Thomas Lewis for the United States, and Captain White Eyes, Captain John Kilbuck, Jr., and Captain Pipe for the Delawares. The agreement was signed on September 17, 1778.

By this treaty it was agreed that all past offenses were to be mutually forgiven, peace was established, and in case of war each party was to assist the other. The United States was granted free passage to the forts and towns of the enemy, and an army passing through the Delaware territory was to be supplied with necessary goods for which the Indians were to be paid; furthermore, the Indians agreed to furnish such warriors as they could spare to assist the army of the United States; neither party was to inflict punishment without impartial trial and neither was to protect criminals, fugitives from justice or escaped servants or slaves. It was agreed that the United States should appoint an agent for trading with the Delawares; the Delawares were guaranteed their territorial rights so long as they remained friendly to the United States, and finally, the agreement was made that in the future an Indian state might be established, which state would be entitled to representation in Congress.[110]

General McIntosh started his invasion of the Indian country by building a fort, which was named McIntosh, at the mouth of Big Beaver Creek below Fort Pitt. This served as an excellent protection for the settlers who were beginning to cross the Ohio into the Indian country. He then marched about seventy miles up to the Tuscaroras where he erected Fort Laurens. Inasmuch as his supplies had not arrived and the season had advanced too far toward winter and the term of enlistment of many of his soldiers had expired, McIntosh found it necessary to abandon the expedition. He returned to Fort Pitt, leaving about 150 men under Colonel Gibson as a garrison at Fort

[110]For treaty see *Treaties between the United States and the Several Indian Tribes 1778-1837,* 1. Also C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* I, 1.

Laurens. The Continental soldiers and the independent companies were scattered among Forts Pitt, Hand, McIntosh, and Randolph, the militia went home, and this expedition of which so much had been expected wound up as a dismal failure. This greatly encouraged Hamilton at Detroit, who felt now that he could deal successfully with Clark.

Fort Laurens was practically in a state of siege from January on. Parties carrying food were attacked and messages were intercepted.[111] When McIntosh learned of the condition at Fort Laurens he immediately arranged to send a relief expedition consisting of 200 militia and 300 Continental soldiers. With this force he also hoped to be able to push on to Sandusky. However, the depleted condition of his supplies along with the difficulties of getting across the country at that time of the year caused the officers to be unanimous in their opposition. In April McIntosh retired from the command of the western army, his request to be relieved having been sent to and acted upon by Congress on February 20, 1779.[112] The western offensive had failed but he did succeed in staving off some of the frontier raids. McIntosh had successfully faced the trying situation brought about by the Pennsylvania-Virginia boundary dispute. Finally it must be said of his work, that Washington had approved his policy of establishing posts in the Indian country. On March 5, 1779, Washington appointed Colonel Brodhead to take charge of the Fort Pitt frontier.

Pennsylvania and Virginia were rivals not only on the Fort Pitt frontier, but also in the Illinois country. The land and trading interests of Pennsylvania corporations in the western country are treated in a scholarly fashion in a recent

[111]C. A. Q. XVI, part 1, 212, 213, 217. Intercepted letters from Fort Laurens. Gibson writing to Brodhead on January 22, said, "It is to be hoped that the General will soon be recalled and things pushed with vigor in the spring."

[112]*Journals,* XIII, 213-214.

study of George Morgan, who, in addition to his many other activities, was also the Continental Indian agent at Fort Pitt until 1779.[113]

Another episode in the rivalry for the western country took place when George Rogers Clark, acting for Virginia, seized Kaskaskia in the summer of 1778 and forced the surrender of Vincennes early in 1779. At the latter place he captured Governor Hamilton, who had been active in instigating attacks on the frontier. This expedition was a brilliant stroke, even though it was inspired by land speculation.[114] Though working for Virginia, Clark received supplies from the continental stores at Fort Pitt.

Clark was unable to make his proposed attack on Detroit. The attack to be made by the continental forces also had to be postponed. It was very difficult to reconcile the views of the leaders on the frontier. George Morgan, the continental Indian superintendent, favored an attack on Detroit without involving the Indians. Most of the frontiersmen favored an attack on the Indian tribes. As has already been said, Morgan found it impossible to reconcile his views with those of General McIntosh, the continental commander at Fort Pitt, and as a result of this controversy, he resigned in May 1779. By this resignation the federal Indian department lost one of its best agents.

Clark's successful expedition greatly alarmed the British. De Peyster wrote Haldimand on March 19, 1779, telling about the general failure of the relief expedition which he had sent from Michillimackinac under the leadership of certain French Canadian officers. He was greatly alarmed because of the threatened attack upon Detroit.[115] On June 25, 1779, De Peyster wrote that the Americans were holding councils with the Indians, but since they had no goods to give, the

[113] *George Morgan, Colony Builder,* Chapters II and III.

[114] Alvord's Introduction to the Illinois Company manuscript in the Burton Collection.

[115] C. A. B. XCVI, part 1, 27.

Indians were treating them with great contempt. The British were much annoyed by the fact that some of their merchants at Michillimackinac were furnishing the Americans with supplies, and De Peyster was ordered to stay at that post until this "motley crew" of merchants should be gotten under control again.[116]

During the winter of 1778-79 another grand expedition against Detroit and Niagara was planned. In this the Americans were to be supported by a French fleet and army. This favorite project of Congress to attack Canada was now to be pressed while the British forces were divided in order that they might ward off French attacks in the West Indies. Lafayette aided in making the plan which provided for a French fleet to attack Quebec aided by a French army of 4000 men. The American army was to attack up the Connecticut River, at Niagara, and at Detroit. Congress sent the proposed plan to Washington, who disapproved of it from the military point of view because the Americans had neither the men nor the resources, because it would involve Congress in obligations it could not fulfill, and because it was a plan which was too complicated to be carried out successfully. In this he showed his usual good judgment. However, he looked much farther ahead than the capture of a few military posts. He realized the temptation under which France would be placed, should Canada be conquered. From both the commercial and military point of view it would be to her interests to stay there. The result, then, would be that the newly liberated states would find themselves surrounded by France, Spain, and the Indians who were friendly to France. This would make it possible for France to "give law to these states." Not that he mistrusted

[116]C. A. Q. XVI, part 2, 630. On October 24, Haldimand wrote to Germain warning him that the merchants might complain because of restrictions on the northwestern trade. He feared that if there were no restrictions, the supplies intended for the Indians might fall into the hands of the Americans. For French comments on this see Surrey, *Calendar,* 1589, Gérard to Vergennes June 5, 1779.

France in particular, but "No Nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its interests; no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it."[117] Although he was probably wrong in his estimate of France, Washington showed the wisdom and foresight of a real statesman.

The plan of 1779 finally resolved itself into three possible campaigns—one against Niagara, one to drive the British from the seacoast towns, and one to hold the army on the defensive except for such expeditions as were necessary to punish the Indians who had committed depredations on the frontier. The third plan was adopted,[118] because it was the least expensive of the three proposed. It was necessary that Congress should be enabled to do something to relieve the financial situation, and the season when the expenses would not be so great would be a welcome relief to that body.

Before taking up the attack on the Indians in 1779, we shall briefly review a phase of Virginia's controversy with the land companies which occurred in the spring of that year when a delegation of Delaware chiefs visited Philadelphia. This delegation sent an address to Congress and to Washington asking for trade and supplies—also for ministers, school teachers, and husbandmen to instruct their youth in the fundamentals of religion, education, and the useful arts. They returned the tomahawk, which had been given them at the treaty of 1778, insisting that they had not properly understood the provisions of the treaty dealing with their part in the war; finally, they made a statement of their claims so far as territory was concerned. The boundary as described by them was:

> From the mouth of the Alleghany River at Fort Pitt to Venango and from thence up French Creek and by La Boeuf road to Presque Isle on the east. The Ohio river including all the islands in it from Fort Pitt to the Wabash on the south; thence up the Wabash to the branch called the Opecomeecah and up the same to the head thereof and from thence to the headwaters and springs

[117] Jared Sparks, *Life of Washington,* I, 311.
[118] *Ibid.,* 316.

of the most northwestern branches of the Scioto River, thence to the head most western springs of the Sandusky River, thence down said river including the islands in it or in the little lakes to Lake Erie on the north.

They insisted that this territory had been ceded to them by the Wyandots and on it they had seated the Shawanees. The address continued: "And we propose to give to the United States such part of the above described territory as will be convenient to them and us that they may have room for their children's children to sit down upon." This address had been signed at the house of George Morgan at Princeton, New Jersey, in the presence of Lewis Morris, John Dodge, Daniel Sullivan, the interpreter, and George Morgan.[119]

Three days after this address the Virginia delegates wrote to Patrick Henry:

> These Indians are come down under the conduct of George Morgan, who is at once public agent for Indian affairs and private agent for the Vandalia company pretending to claim a large territory within the chartered limits of Virginia under purchase from the Indians. As this talk has come and the Indians with Colonel Morgan are coming to Congress, we shall endeavor to prevent the success of this manoeuvre.
>
> There is some reason to suppose that these purchasers from the Indians wish to have their right of doing so submitted to the judgment of Congress, and we conceive . . . . lands that are clearly within the chartered limits of a state have hitherto been understood to be at least in the preemption of that state; and certainly such purchases would contravene our whole system of laws respecting the mode of acquiring ungranted lands in Virginia.[120]

In her constitution of June 29, 1776, Virginia had made a definite declaration of her territorial claims. These included

[119]In Library of Congress box of miscellaneous Indian papers.

[120]E. C. Burnett, *Letters of the Members of the Continental Congress,* IV, 216.

This controversy is discussed in *George Morgan, Colony Builder,* 161-164.

her 1609 charter limits so far as the territories west of the mountains were concerned. This accounts for the great opposition to any Indian cessions to the central government. Virginia could not recognize any cession which would impair her claims to the northwest.

The operations of the main army in the east were postponed for the year 1779 so that Congress could attempt a stabilization of the finances of the country and in order that a punitive expedition might be sent against the Six Nations. Washington had always favored stern measures with enemy Indians and had preferred forcing them into submission by carrying the war into their country. General Greene was of the same opinion and wrote Washington on January 5, 1779, urging an attack on the Indian country from Fort Pitt, Wyoming, and the Mohawk. The chief objective of such an expedition would be the destruction of the crops and supplies of these Indians.[121]

Washington had made very careful inquiries concerning the Indian country, and after considering the answers received he concluded that the main expedition should start from Wyoming, in Pennsylvania. Although the command had been offered to Gates and probably to Schuyler,[122] Sullivan was finally chosen to lead the main expedition. This army was to be joined by a contingent from New York commanded by General James Clinton. Although it was impossible for any close coöperation between this army and a force attacking by the way of Fort Pitt, it was nevertheless decided that Colonel Brodhead should make a simultaneous demonstration up the Allegheny River from Fort Pitt. Washington's instructions to Sullivan dated May 31, 1779,[123] stated that there should be no peace made with the Indians until they had been severely chastised. He was hopeful that the Indians might be induced to help in the capture of Niagara. Difficulties of transporta-

[121]Washington Papers, XCV, 12,685.

[122]Rupert Hughes, *Life of Washington,* III, 485.

[123]Washington Papers, CIX, 14,469.

tion,[124] the usual delays and inefficiencies prevented the expedition from getting started until August 11.[125]

The attacking army forced its way through the now famous "Finger Lake" region of New York as far west as the Genessee River, fighting one important engagement and several skirmishes on the way. They ruthlessly destroyed crops, houses, orchards, and whatever else they could find. The Indians received valiant assistance from Butler and his rangers, although Haldimand sent no adequate reënforcements, both because he did not think that the Americans were going to make an attack in force and because he feared an attack on Canada. When he finally found out that the Americans were ravaging the Indian country, he dispatched Sir John Johnson to their assistance, but he arrived too late to be of any help. The Indians were demoralized by fear when they realized the seriousness of the attack. Some of the Cayugas asked for mercy, but their plea was scorned by General Sullivan.[126] Only about three hundred warriors joined Butler in his campaign for the defense of the Indian country, although he expected one thousand. When the Americans appeared on the Genessee all the Indians except forty deserted Butler.[127] Sullivan gave up his work of destruction at the Genessee and sent a part of his army directly to the Mohawk while he returned to Tioga with the main force.

Authorities differ as to the results of this expedition. The destruction of Indian property undoubtedly lowered the morale

[124]C. C. 155, I, 121. General Greene in discussing the question of Sullivan's provisions did not think that Sullivan was justified "in all of his complaints."

[125]Sullivan expedition sources; *Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John Sullivan against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779,* (George S. Connor, editor); Sullivan's own account of the expedition is found in the *Boston Independent Chronicle* for November 11, 1779; Brodhead's account of his raid is found in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* for October 20, 1779.

[126]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 73.

[127]*Ibid.,* 73.

of the tribes and deprived the British of an important source of supplies; the threat of an attack on Niagara would encourage the friends of America in Canada; and finally, the members of this expedition undoubtedly returned with an increased interest in the new western territory.[128]

A brief survey of the correspondence of the British officers gives us a view of the Sullivan expedition from the English side. Haldimand wrote Germain on September 25, expressing fear of an attack on Niagara (this was due to his lack of adequate information concerning the Brodhead expedition); he also made very clear his opinion that if the British expected to preserve the upper country for the fur trade, it would be absolutely necessary to send up 1000 or 1500 men with all the necessary supplies. He referred to his plan for raising grain and stock at Detroit and Niagara to avoid the necessity of having to transport these all the way from Quebec up the river to the latter place.[129] Again, writing on October 3, Haldimand praised Sullivan's efficiency and stated that 5000 rations were being issued daily at Niagara and that it might be necessary to withdraw some troops from this place so as to conserve supplies.[130]

The Six Nations were entirely dependent upon the British for supplies during the unusually severe winter of 1779-80. There was much suffering among these Indians, 2600 of whom were compelled to spend the winter in wigwams in the vicinity of Niagara. Only the fact that they were dependent upon the British for food kept the Cayugas loyal. Some of the Wyandots and the Shawanees near Fort Pitt did make peace overtures. Unfortunately for the Americans they had no means at their command to follow up this advantage.

[128]A. C. Flick, "New Sources on the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779," in *Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association,* July 1929. Quoted by Rupert Hughes, *Life of Washington,* III, 484.

[129]C. A. Q. XVI, part 2, 563.

[130]C. A. Q. XVI, part 2, 602.

The year 1780 was a disastrous one on the New York frontier. On April 6 Guy Johnson, then acting as Superintendent of the Six Nations, reported that a meeting of 3000 Indians had rejected with contempt all American peace offers. Furthermore, they were sending a belt to the western tribes to encourage them in their determination to continue the war. Numerous raiding parties were out on the New York frontier. One, which did a great deal of damage, was led by Sir John Johnson through the Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys, and was so destructive that even Washington was alarmed.[131]

Trade and politics were involved in the British plan of that year for an attack on St. Louis and on George Rogers Clark. For this De Peyster spent large sums of money in order that the Indians might be thoroughly pacified. The Spaniards succeeded in defeating the attack on St. Louis, partly because of the fact that Clark was in the vicinity and partly because of the influence of some traders with the expedition, who were interested in the lead mines.[132] The British expedition which had been sent to watch Clark was composed of about 150 whites and nearly 1000 Indians under the command of Captain Henry Bird. They took a small cannon with them which they hoped would be useful in battering down the walls of the tiny forts. They successfully attacked Ruddle's and Martin's Stations in Kentucky but ventured no farther because they feared Clark. Haldimand reported the capture of 400 prisoners, including women and children. Clark retaliated by a raid on the Shawanees at Chillicothe and Piqua. This raid would have been more successful had the Indians not been informed of it by some of the disaffected French at Vincennes.

In the meantime the Spaniards were beginning the series of attacks which gave them possession of West Florida and of

[131]Guy Johnson summed up the destruction by the Niagara Indians from February to November 1780 in C. A. Q. XVIII 212.

[132]C. A. Q. XVII, part 2, 674.

the Natchez region. At the same time the Americans began negotiations, looking toward an uninterrupted trade down the Mississippi. This, of course, meant that before the question was finally settled the Indians would frequently be used as pawns in the game.

On the Fort Pitt frontier Brodhead faced numerous difficulties because of the desertion of his troops and the disaffection of the Indians. An attempted attack on the Wyandots had to be postponed, because of the lack of troops. Brodhead led a successful expedition against the Delawares.[133] Much fur and large quantities of provisions were destroyed. After this attack the Delawares withdrew into the valleys of the Scioto and Sandusky Rivers. The friendly members of this tribe came to Fort Pitt for protection. Brodhead did not give the proper assistance to the proposed expedition by Clark against Detroit; he was accused of being too interested in land speculation and he also became involved in a controversy with his most important subordinate, Colonel John Gibson. He was ambitious to capture Detroit, and if that were not possible, to make an attack on Natchez.[134] His interest in land speculation made him rather suspicious of Virginia. He expressed himself in a letter to President Reed of the Pennsylvania Council on January 22, 1781:[135]

I sincerely wish that there was no occasion to trouble you with a further tale of misfortune. But as the United States in general and our own state in particular are immediately interested in retaining in this district all the grain that has been raised in it, it might appear criminal in me were I to remain silent respecting certain instructions lately sent by Governor Jefferson for the purchase of 200,000 rations this side of the mountains for

[133]Probably because of the inability of the United States to carry out the treaty of 1778 and also because of the British threats, the Delawares had very largely deserted the American cause.

[134]*Calendar of the Correspondence of Washington with the Officers,* III, 1739; 1932; Sparks, *Letters to Washington,* III, 323.

[135]*Pennsylvania Archives* VIII, 707.

the use of the troops under Colonel Clark for which purpose he has already advanced 300,000 pounds and promises to furnish upon the first notice any further sum that may be necessary to compleate (*sic*) the payment of that purchase. Because this contract, together with the consumption of emigrants arrived and expected in this district (chiefly to avoid militia duty and tax) will scarcely leave a pound of flour for the regular or other troops which it may be necessary to employ either offensively or defensively against the enemy for the defence of this part of the frontier settlements

It seems that the state of Virginia is now preparing to acquire more extensive territory by sending a great body of men under Colonel (whom they intend to raise to Brigadier General) Clark to attempt the reduction of Detroit. I have hitherto been encouraged to flatter myself that I should sooner or later be enabled to reduce that place, but it seems that the United States cannot furnish either troops or resources for that purpose, but the state of Virginia can.

Brodhead resigned on September 17, 1781. Civil and military affairs were in a most chaotic condition at Fort Pitt, so Washington chose Brigadier General Irvine of Pennsylvania to take charge there. He felt that Irvine had the necessary prudence and good judgment to face successfully the difficulties of this position.

Although much money was spent in gathering supplies, the delays were such that the Clark expedition did not get started down the Ohio until late. The British at Detroit were greatly alarmed at first, but Haldimand assured them that the Americans at Fort Pitt would accomplish nothing. Thompson and McKee commanders of a part of the British forces in the West[136] attempted to waylay Clark, and Brant and Girty

[136]Brant to McKee August 21, 1781, Indian Record Book, XIII in the Canadian Archives. Brant was on the Ohio ten miles below the mouth of the Big Miami. He heard Clark's detachment go by during the night. He captured a boat with seven men who informed him of Loughry's contingent which was following Clark, and the information gave Brant the opportunity to waylay this body of troops.

actually succeeded in destroying a Pennsylvania division under the command of Colonel Loughry. This division was on its way to join Clark at the Falls of the Ohio. The united party then planned an attack on Clark, but the Indians refused to join. Brant and McKee made a raid toward Boonesboro, and also succeeded in disastrously defeating at Blue Licks a body of Kentucky militia sent against them. The British rangers remained in the Indian country until the danger of an invasion was over. Clark tried to get the Kentuckians to support an expedition against Detroit, but the general concensus of opinion was that the best policy would be to act defensively by erecting forts on the Ohio at such strategic points as the mouth of the Kentucky River, the mouth of the Licking, and that of the Limestone.

The year 1781, like 1780, was marked by ruthless warfare on the New York frontier. Numerous small parties of Indians were active on the frontier of that state and of Pennsylvania; Caldwell with a company of rangers and Indians made a destructive raid which took him within a short distance of Kingston, New York; Lieutenant Clement carried destruction into the German Flats region. In September the tenth company of rangers was formed and Haldimand proposed another raid similar to the one made in 1780. The expedition this year was to be led by Major Ross and consisted of some regulars, rangers, and Indians, whom Haldimand characterized as "the dregs of the tribe." They penetrated within twelve miles of Schenectady, destroying every thing as they went. The country was aroused too, and on their retreat they were attacked by the Americans under Colonel Willett. Walter Butler, son of John Butler, was killed in one of the skirmishes. The Indians were of little service on this expedition.

As a result of these repeated raids, the Mohawk valley was practically a No Man's Land. An estimate made in Tryon county in December 1781, placed the number of buildings destroyed at 700, the number of farms uncultivated at 1200,

and the amount of wheat destroyed at 150,000 bushels. It was also estimated that there were 380 widows and 2000 fatherless children in this region.[137]

During this time the Continental Congress was busily engaged with the problems of peace, finances, and the general reorganization of the government, and so had little time to devote to Indian affairs. In fact, only two or three resolutions dealt with the Indians during the whole year.

On the New York frontier the war had practically ended because of the orders to avoid offensive warfare. In June Captain Powell and Chief Sangerachta led an expedition in the direction of Fort Pitt to relieve the western Indians who thought themselves menaced from this point. This expedition destroyed Loyalhanna on the road to Philadelphia.

General Irvine,[138] who took charge of Fort Pitt in November 1781, spent much energy in restoring order. The soldiers were mutinous and the fortifications were in a bad state of repair. There was much disaffection among the people, and Irvine wrote that he was confident that if Fort Pitt were evacuated, the Canadian boundaries would soon be extended to Laurel Hill. The general morale[139] was very low. Food was being shipped to New Orleans, but the bankrupt government could not purchase any of it for the soldiers. It took Irvine several months to restore some semblance of order. There was considerable interest in land speculation and there was much discussion among the frontiersmen as to whether improvements made beyond the Ohio might not become the basis for land titles, since no express law had been passed forbidding settlement and retroactive laws would not apply.[140]

Before Irvine's arrival the infamous Moravian massacre had taken place, an excellent example of the conduct of the frontiersmen unrestrained by leaders with some sense as to

[137]W. Stone, *Life of Brant,* II, 236.

[138]Note Irvine's interest in land speculation. Irvine Papers, VIII, 116.

[139]Crumrine, *History of Beaver County, Pennsylvania,* 91.

[140]Irvine Papers, IV, 40.

the conduct of warfare. The frontiersmen were eager to attack the British and Indian center at Sandusky, and Irvine consented to this expedition. It was led by Washington's friend, Colonel Crawford. At the same time Clark was also to attack the Shawanees. The British heard of the proposed Crawford raid and sent Captain Caldwell with his rangers and some lake Indians to check Crawford. Caldwell was joined by McKee with a contingent of Shawanees and together they administered a disastrous defeat, resulting in the capture of Crawford, who was killed in a most revolting fashion. The Indians were rebuked by the British officers for their conduct, and one of these insisted that the disastrous Clark raid on the Shawanees had been brought on by the Crawford massacre.

The Clark raid was of considerable importance in awing the Indians, who were at the same time being restrained by the British officers, because of the arrival of news that peace was about to be made. This news also caused General Irvine to abandon his proposed Sandusky expedition, thus ending the activities of the continental forces on the western frontier so far as the Revolution was concerned.

In concluding this chapter, the importance of the Indians as a military factor in the war should be noted. Since they fought almost entirely on the British side, they must be studied chiefly from that point of view.

Although in the early Revolution British commanders had planned to use Indians in connection with larger strategic movements, all of these came to grief. Thus the Cherokee uprising in 1776 came to a most disastrous end; the use of the Indians in the northern campaigns of 1777 netted the British little except expense and the undying hatred of the frontiersmen of New England, New York, and Pennsylvania. Hamilton's grand campaign never got started, although the southern frontiersmen secured considerable booty when they raided the supply depot for a part of this expedition, which supply depot was in the Chickamauga nation.

Stuart, as has already been said, spent large sums of money to keep the wavering Creeks in line and to renew the spirits of the defeated Cherokees. He also made great efforts to prevent the Choctaws from being alienated by the Spanish and, if possible, to have this tribe, along with their Chickasaw neighbors, check the trade between the Americans and New Orleans.

Because of the great expense and because of their inefficiency as allies in the more important military movements, many of the British officers had no very high opinion of their Indian auxiliaries.[141]

Before leaving this chapter it will be well to note the general background of the Indian warfare of the Revolution. We have already seen that it was more logical for the Indians to ally themselves with the British than with the Americans. This alliance was most expensive, and the letters of the British military men who had anything to do with Indian affairs are filled with complaints because of these expenses. The British leaders of importance realized that the Indian was of no great value as a regular fighter, yet that it was absolutely essential to preserve his friendship, for if he turned against the British, causing them to lose the northern posts, they would in consequence lose the fur trade to a combination of French, Spanish, and Americans.[142] It was, therefore, necessary to use the

[141]Burgoyne, C. A. Q., XII, 369; Claus, C. A. M., CIV, 212; De Peyster, C. A. B. CXXIII, 186; Alexander Cameron, C. O. 5, LXXVII, 169. See also report of Burgoyne's speech in Parliament May 26, 1778, as found in the *Boston Independent Chronicle,* September 24, 1778. In this speech Burgoyne had the following to say about Indian alliances:

"Sir, I have ever esteemed the Indian alliances at best a necessary evil. I ever believed their services to be overvalued; sometimes insignificant, often barbarous, always capricious; and that the employment of them was only justifiable, when by being united to a regular army, they could be kept under control and subservient to a general system.

"Upon this principle I heartily concurred with that gallant and humane general, Sir Guy Carleton, in the year 1776, to decline the offer and solicitations of the Indians there to be employed separately, the impossibility of completing the preparations for passing the regular troops over the lake made it impossible to employ them conjunctively."

[142]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade 1763-1800,* II.

northwestern Indians in the way in which they preferred to be used—as raiders. This would keep them loyal, prevent the Americans from securing the much coveted fur trade, and, what pleased the Indians most, it would check the American advance on to their lands. The Six Nations could also be used effectively as raiders and as such could do untold damage to the grain supply of the continental armies. In New York, the valleys of the Mohawk and Schoharie were termed the Garden of the Province. The soil was rich, easy of cultivation, and yielded enormous crops of grain. Haldimand, writing to Germain on October 24, 1779, informed him that Brant's incursions were being greatly magnified at home. His work, however, had been particularly successful and useful in destroying grain. This was exceedingly distressing to the Americans.[143] On October 25, 1780, he reported successful raids during the summer along the whole frontier from Albany to Fort Pitt. He was much pleased because of the destruction of supplies. These raids alarmed Washington, who pointed out that the territory which had just been attacked was expected to furnish the continental army 60,000 bushels of grain. In view of the difficulties of transportation, this particular source of supply was the most easily accessible to the American army in the vicinity of New York. The continual raiding would discourage recruits for the continental army from the frontier regions. In fact, Washington was compelled to detach some regiments from his army to reënforce Fort Pitt and later was compelled to postpone all major operations in the east so that a detachment of his army led by Sullivan could be sent to punish the Six Nations for their destructive activity on the frontier. The use of Indians as raiders by the British was unwise, because it took them away from the control of the more responsible white officers; furthermore, that kind of warfare inevitably led to much suffering on the part of the innocent. Hamilton at Detroit has come in for much unjust

[143]C. A. Q. XVI, part 2, 624.

criticism on the part of historians for the ruthlessness of the Indian warfare on the frontier where he commanded. Many scalps were brought to Detroit and were supposed to be paid for there.[144] At the same time it must be remembered that many unoffending and peaceful Indians were treacherously slain by the frontiersmen and that several of the states had offered rewards for Indian scalps. The whole wretched business simply proves that Sherman was right in his characterization of war.

Two great raids were made into the Wyoming and Cherry Valley settlements. At Wyoming it must be remembered that there were other things involved besides an Indian raid. First, the Indians insisted that the settlers were illegally in possession of this territory and that it was still to be purchased from them. Furthermore, this little valley had been the scene of a civil war between the Pennsylvania and Connecticut partisans, and many of the former had been compelled to fly from their homes. A considerable number had joined Butler's rangers. It is not necessary to go into any detailed discussion of this affair except to say that none were killed but men in arms. The Indians were unnecessarily cruel but were restrained from injuring non-combatants.[145]

[144]See article by Nelson V. Russell, *Canadian Historical Review,* March 1930, which presents a different view of Hamilton. This article does not agree with the accusation often made that Hamilton bought scalps.

[145]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 44-50; W. L. Stone, *Life of Brant,* I, 386, "There were no doubt, bloody outrages committed—probably on both sides—because in such contests, waged by borderers, many of whom as has been seen were previously burning with indignation against each other, it is hardly to be expected that individual combatants would always contend hand to hand with all the courtesy which characterizes gallant knights in days of chivalry. In justice to Colonel John Butler, moreover, it must be admitted that his conduct toward his prisoners at Niagara and among the Indians in that country was uniformly characterized by humanity." See also the "Diary of John Butler," edited by E. A. Cruikshank and found in Niagara Historical Society, no. 39, *Records of Niagara 1784-87,* 61-64.

At Cherry Valley the innocent were made to suffer severely, although both Major Butler and his son Walter reported that everything possible had been done to alleviate their sufferings.

A study of the attitude of the British army officers toward Indian warfare shows that most of them were humane gentlemen, who were not interested in making war on women and children or on enemies who had surrendered. We cannot leave this subject without comment by the man who probably understood the Indian better than any other military man on either side during the Revolution. Washington, writing on April 4, 1783, regarding the complaint of atrocities committed against the Indians on part of the Americans, had the following to say:

> Although the complaints of the Indians may not be perfectly candid, it will rest with Congress how far our present situation, policy, and humanity . . . prevent as much as possible the further prosecution of hostilities against these people. I have only to observe that the late acts of cruelty mentioned in the speech have not been committed under my direction or by any party of Continental troops nor have they been sanctioned by orders from me. I rather think they have been conducted with the approbation at least, if not by the authority of individual states. How far this practice is consistent with the rules of propriety or principles of policy, Congress must be the judge. For myself, I must confess *my mind revolts at the idea of those wanton barbarities of which both sides have in too many instances been the unhappy witnesses.*[146] (The italics are mine.)

[146]This letter is in volume 218 of Washington's Writings.

III

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTHERN INDIANS

THE Indians are not mentioned in the treaty of 1783, yet they were a very influential factor in the negotiations. Between the completion of the Provisional Treaty and the final negotiations, a group of London merchants made several proposals, among which we find the following: That certain of the frontier forts such as Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac should be retained by Great Britain for three years, so that the traders would have an opportunity for withdrawing their goods and property; also that after the withdrawal of the British garrisons, the traders of both countries should enjoy equal privileges with respect to transportation of goods across the various carrying places, and on the rivers and lakes of the Indian country.

The Opposition in Parliament attacked the treaty as surrendering the valuable fur trade to the Americans and at the same time delivering the friendly Indians into the hands of their enemies. The friends of the Government argued that the fur trade of the regions surrendered was not worth the expense necessary to maintain it, and, more important, that the fur trade at best was temporary in its nature, and that it was impossible to continue the same by forts and naval stations.[1]

When the propositions of the merchants were submitted to the American peace commissioners, they agreed to them in principle, but made certain counter proposals. Some of these were: That the new articles should be incorporated into a treaty of commerce; that certain liberal principles regarding

[1]Wayne E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade,* 71-88.

neutral rights on the sea should also be incorporated; and that the northeast boundary of the United States should immediately be rectified.

The result of these proposals was that the British government preferred to consider the provisions of the preliminary treaty as definitive, leaving the question of Indians and fur trade unsettled. In the words of a recent student of the problem, "The treaty of 1783 settled nothing with regard to the future of the Northwest fur trade. The struggle for commercial domination which had already been going on for more than a century simply entered a new phase."[2]

The preliminary articles of peace between the United States and Great Britain were signed on November 30, 1782. The armistice was agreed upon on February 14, 1783, and was proclaimed to the American armies on April 19, 1783.[3] Although information had reached the Indians from British sources concerning the establishment of peace, the Continental Congress, at first, made no official effort to inform them of the end of hostilities. Frontier raids were causing concern among some of the British officers.[4] The colonies with exposed frontiers clamored for action and finally, at the request of Pennsylvania, Congress passed a resolution on May 1, 1783, directing the Secretary of War to inform the several Indian nations that the preliminary articles of peace had been signed and that hostilities had ceased.[5] Ephraim Douglass, who had been an Indian trader as well as an army officer, and who had acquired sufficient knowledge of the Indian languages to act as interpreter, was chosen to carry this message to the Indian tribes.[6]

[2]*Ibid.*, 88: See also *The American Secretaries of State,* S. F. Bemis, ed., I, 214-217.

[3]E. H. Channing, *History of the United States,* IV, 148-49.

[4]C. A. Q. XX, 295; C. A. M. CVI, 221. A speech announcing peace had been sent by Major Wall at Fort Nelson to the Shawanees, C. A. B. CIII, 130.

[5]*Journals,* XXIV, 319; *Pennsylvania Archives,* X, 25.

[6]Douglass's report is in the *Pennsylvania Archives,* X, 83; also in MS in the Burton collection, Detroit Public Library. In connection with this

Douglass was instructed by Secretary Lincoln to announce the articles of peace to the Indians, and to explain those provisions pertaining to them. He was to suggest a general conference between representatives of the United States and deputies from the tribes for the settlement of difficulties. Douglass was to travel as far as Detroit with this message, while a Moravian Indian named Bull was to carry a similar message to Oswego and Niagara. In case Bull did not succeed in delivering his message, Douglass was to visit these latter places and return by the way of Albany.[7]

Douglass's report tells an interesting story of his progress through the Indian tribes.[8] Upon his arrival at Detroit, he was informed by DePeyster, the British commander, that nothing could be said to the Indians relative to the boundaries since there were no official instructions from the British government as to where the boundaries were; furthermore, DePeyster had declared to the Indians that he did not know that the posts were to be evacuated. On July 6, Douglass attended a council of the Indians at the invitation of DePeyster. The latter urged the Indians to continue in the strictest amity with the citizens of the United States. The chiefs of the Chippewas, Ottawas, Wyandots, Shawanees, Kickapoos, Miamis, Pottawatomis, Piankishaws, and part of the Senecas were present and showed Douglass marked attention.

Seeing that he could make no definite progress at Detroit, Douglass decided to go to Niagara. At Niagara he showed his instructions and the Congressional resolves to the British commander, MacLean. The latter informed Douglass that he had already put a stop to hostilities and that he would be

MS report there is a short sketch of Douglass. It must be remembered that Washington later sent Steuben to Haldimand to arrange for the transfer of the posts in August, 1783. Haldimand refused to enter any agreement, since no instructions had as yet been received. A similar demand made in July, 1784, by Major Hall, who had been sent by Secretary Knox was also refused.

[7]Copy of the instructions in C. A. Q. XXI, 361.

[8]Dated August 18, 1783

answerable for the future conduct of the Indians, provided the Americans did not molest them, but that he had no instructions permitting him to call the Indians together. He said that Sir John Johnson would arrive soon and would probably bring definite orders permitting the Indians to be assembled; he felt, however, that the objects of Douglass's message had been accomplished by the efforts of the British to dispose the Indians toward peace. MacLean informed Douglass of certain speeches which were being circulated among the Indians and which were causing much alarm—one of these was supposed to have come from General Schuyler. The Schuyler speech was given to Douglass. In a conference with Brant the latter insisted that the Indians wanted their lands secured before making a treaty.

MacLean showed to Douglass a letter which the former had written to DePeyster urging the western Indians to desist from all hostilities, and threatening them with an Anglo-American punitive expedition if they did not heed this order. Douglass sought one more opportunity for speaking to the Indians and even offered to suppress the word "compelled" in his instructions, which said that the English King had been compelled to make peace. MacLean feared that this would leave an impression that the King had been conquered, and would cause the Indians to be insolent. Douglass could get no direct answer from MacLean, who merely repeated what he had previously said in reply to the request. On July 16, Douglass asked for a written refusal to confer with the Indians, and having received this, he set out for home on the same day. His report to the Secretary of War, dated August 18, 1783, concludes as follows:

Though I bring no public answer from the chiefs owing to the motives of duty or policy which opposed it, I think myself sufficiently authorized from the many opportunities I had of learning their sentiments, both from themselves and the whites who are in their confidence, to assert that I know them to be heartily tired of war and sincerely disposed to peace.

What Douglass did not know was that already the fur traders of Montreal were protesting energetically against the treaty, which would deprive them of a valuable source of their income; that John Connolly in England was writing to Lord Shelburne, the Prime Minister, urging that the boundary should be on the Ohio; that Daniel Claus, the former deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, was protesting that the omission of the Indians from the treaty of 1783 was a gross violation of the treaty of 1768. The British government was merely waiting an opportunity for making the part of the treaty pertaining to the northern boundary null and void. This opportunity was soon presented by the weakness of the Confederation government.[9]

Before taking up the early acts of Congress for negotiating Indian treaties, it will be necessary to note briefly the attempt of General Schuyler, who was acting as an Indian commissioner in the Northern department, to get negotiations under way. On July 20, 1776, Schuyler had written to Hancock, the President of the Continental Congress, that he would prefer the position of team driver in the Green Mountains to that

[9]The Connolly letter in Canadian archives transcripts of Shelburne MSS, LXXII, 493-94; The Claus protest is in C. A. M., CVI, 233:

"What gives me much concern is that the government omitted instructing Mr. Oswald about the boundaries of the Indian country, which they have been under engagement and treaties for a century past to protect, but no later than 1768 entered into a solemn treaty with all the Indian nations on the British continent of America in the presence of deputies of the thirteen colonies, that in consideration of the Indians giving up certain large territory which should be the boundary between the whites and them, they would guarantee to them those lands of theirs beyond that line and now they are given up to those very people they were guaranteed against. It might have been easily reserved and inserted, that those lands the Crown relinquished to all Indian nations as their right and property, were out of its power to treat for, which would have saved the honor of the government with respect to that treaty which stands upon record fully and firmly concluded and ratified and signed by the King's Superintendent in behalf of the Crown and the deputies of the respective colonies on their behalf to which the American commissioners were no strangers."

of Continental Indian commissioner.[10] The difficulties prompting this outburst did not cease with the end of the war. A study of Schuyler's correspondence shows that his knowledge of Indian affairs was unusually reliable, but he, like other worthy men of that period, often suffered from Congressional inefficiency.

As early as September 1782, Schuyler had written to the President of Congress stating that the only sure solution of the Indian problem was the capture of the British posts.[11] During July 1783, he received peace overtures from the Six Nations, but was much at a loss as to what to do, because he had no idea what the Congressional policy would be. He sent to Congress his ideas regarding peace with the Indians, and to the tribes he forwarded a message asking them to send a deputation of several chiefs and principal warriors to meet the commissioners of Indian affairs. All prisoners were to be returned before any negotiations would be undertaken.[12] On September 25, 1783, Schuyler wrote the President of Congress that reports from Deane, in the Indian country, indicated that the deputation of Indians would soon be at hand, but that he had got no instructions from Congress.[13] On October 11 Schuyler wrote that the Indians seemed to be greatly surprised to know that he had not heard of the Douglass mission. Schuyler was much disturbed that he had not been informed of the action of Congress, and suggested that a messenger be sent to the Indians telling them that the negotiations would be with the commissioners of Congress and not with the northern Indian commissioners.[14] On December 16, he wrote that the deputation of Six Nations chiefs was with him and that he would keep them until Congress could send instructions regarding peace terms.[15] Brant evidently disapproved of the

[10]Schuyler's Order Book, II, 266.
[11]C. C. CLIII, 593.
[12]*Ibid.*, 613.
[13]*Ibid.*, 617.
[14]*Ibid.*, 621.
[15]*Ibid.*, 629.

delegation going to treat with Schuyler, and wrote the latter refusing a conference. Brant seemed to think that Schuyler was acting without Congressional instructions. He also inquired of Schuyler as to the message he had sent to the Indians which seemed to be causing so much disturbance.[16]

On January 7, 1784, Schuyler took occasion to reply to the speeches of the deputation of chiefs as well as to Brant's letter. He very severely condemned the Indians for violating the treaties of 1775 and 1776. He informed them that he did not know the Congressional peace terms, but stated that the terms would be such as they would be thankful to accept. To prove the fact that the Indians were not mentioned in the peace treaty, Schuyler submitted a copy of the treaty. He made it very clear to the tribes that the peace terms would be communicated to them at a general meeting, which meeting would be held when the Indians were ready for it.

In his reply to Brant, he insisted that although Brant had stated that the Indians were making peace because the King had disposed their minds to do so and because Congress had sent messengers offering peace, the latter reason was sufficient since the King no longer had any jurisdiction. He replied to Brant's criticism of Americans surveying lands beyond the Fort Stanwix line of 1768 in the following words:

> True, a line was settled in 1768, but it is not the business of the commissioners at this time to say whether this agreement and every other heretofore made is become void or not by unprovoked war which the Indians have waged against the Americans after pledging neutrality.

The new boundaries would be established at a general treaty to be held with the Indians. Any complaints as to encroachments were subjects to be dealt with by the Confederation Congress. He concluded by insisting that the Six Nations send all their messages in writing, also that since he expected instructions from Congress it would be advisable for some of

[16]C. A. B. CXIX, 246.

the Indians to remain so that they could carry such messages with them as Congress might choose to send.[17]

In the meantime Congress, although not very active, had been receiving some excellent advice on the question of making peace with the Indians. Among the Schuyler Papers is one entitled "Thoughts Respecting Peace with the Indians." Congress had the gist of this advice in a letter which Schuyler wrote late in July 1783.[18] Schuyler, as we have already seen, had received peace proposals from the Six Nations and was passing on to Congress his ideas regarding negotiation with these tribes. He was much opposed to driving the Indians beyond the borders by continuing the war, for this would be very expensive. Western settlement would not be checked if the United States and the Indians were at peace, and the Indians would retire gradually as game became scarcer. To expel them would merely mean that the United States would be giving additional strength to the British and that the Indians would continually harass the frontiers; furthermore, such an expulsion would ruin the American fur trade. He argued convincingly for peace, although he informed Congress that the temper of New York was such that the legislature would probably oppose granting any land to the enemy Six Nations within the limits of the state.

On September 7, 1783, Washington, to whom many papers regarding Indian affairs had been presented, including Schuyler's letter of July 29, wrote James Duane regarding Indian affairs and western lands. He agreed with Schuyler's ideas and, in addition, was much opposed to any haphazard settlement of the new western country, since this would be productive only of difficulties with the savages. He summed up his ideas as to an Indian policy as follows: The Indians were to deliver all prisoners as a preliminary to any negotiations; as to the land question, they were to be informed that all their

[17]C. A. Q. XXIII, 128.

[18]Schuyler Papers, Box 2.

territories had been ceded to the United States, and that exact justice would permit their being expelled from these lands. However, the United States preferred to be merciful and would, therefore, draw a boundary between their territories and those of the white people, thus allowing them to reserve some of their lands for themselves. Washington opposed the idea of driving the Indians from the country as proposed by New York, because it would mean a bloody and expensive war. He preferred the organization of an orderly westward expansion which would compel the Indians to retire. Their lands could then be purchased at far less expense than the cost of war. He favored Indian agents with duties and powers strictly circumscribed so that their services would always be in the interests of the public. Indian trade, in Washington's judgment, should be a government monopoly if at all possible—at least all traders were to be licensed and subject to strict regulation as they had been before the war. He suggested paying particular attention to the French settlers in the western country; as for the boundaries of the new states to be established, he proposed

> from the mouth of the Great Miami which empties into the Ohio, to its confluence with the Mad River, thence by a line to the Miami fort and village on the other Miami (Maumee) river which empties into Lake Erie and thence by a line to include the settlement of Detroit, which with Lake Erie to the northward, Pennsylvania to the eastward and the Ohio to the southward form a government, sufficiently extensive to fulfill all public engagements and to receive, moreover, a large population by emigrants.

He advised that Detroit might be left out to form a more compact settlement. By this procedure

> the settlement of Detroit and all the territory north of the rivers, Miami and St. Josephs, between Lakes Erie, St. Clair, Huron, and Michigan, to form hereafter another state equally large and waterbounded.

He concluded by stating that the settlement of the west and the making of peace with the Indians were subjects very closely allied, and that the best way for maintaining peace with the Indians was to purchase their lands, which, as stated before, was more economical than a war.[19]

By decision of the Supreme Court during the Federal Period it was held that the European nation discovering a territory had the sole right of extinguishing the title to all Indian land in such territory, also that individual bargains with Indians were null and void. This principle had already been established by Congress in 1781.[20]

As early as May 1, 1782, a committee which investigated the Illinois-Wabash purchases had come to the conclusion that Indians living outside the boundaries of the individual states must be under the jurisdiction of Congress, that the private purchases of land could not be tolerated, that the control and establishment of new states must be federal, and that states making conquests of new lands or being active in the protection of those lands must be reimbursed by Congress.[21]

On September 22, 1783, Congress took a definite step with regard to the protection of the Indian land by issuing a proclamation against illegal occupation of the territory reserved for the tribes.[22]

On October 15, 1783, a committee of Congress reported on Indian affairs in the Northern and Middle departments. The committee did not consider the problem of the Indians in the south because they lacked the necessary information. The report follows closely the advice of Washington and Schuyler. The committee suggested that a line should be established between the United States and the Indians,

convenient to the respective tribes and commensurate to the public wants because the faith of the United States stands pledged

[19] *Washington Writings,* Ford editor, X, 300-12.
[20] Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement,* 268.
[21] *Journals* XXII, 230-31; C.C. XXX, II.
[22] *Journals* XXV, 602.

to grant portions of the uncultivated lands as a bounty to their army and in reward of their courage and fidelity, and the public finances do not admit of any considerable expenditure, to extinguish the Indian claims upon such lands, because it becomes necessary by the increase of domestic population and emigration from abroad to make speedy provisions for extending the settlement of the territories of the United States; because the public creditors have been led to believe and have a right to expect that those territories will be speedily improved into a fund toward the security and payment of the national debt.

The line proposed was practically that suggested by Washington, and would have run from the Ohio to Lake Erie, leaving only the northwestern part of the state of Ohio in the possession of the Indians.[23]

By thus pushing forward the Indian boundary Congress expected to secure about thirty million acres of land which could be sold to relieve a treasury practically empty. Considering the fact that Congress had just faced a mutinous army clamoring for its pay and that the states were not showing any enthusiasm for giving it power to establish an independent financial system, one can readily see the eagerness with which this opportunity for securing a source of income was seized. Unfortunately, public lands never became a great source of income. However, because Congress was eager to secure the Indian land very cheaply, it did succeed in stirring up the opposition of the tribes. Elias Boudinot said ten years later: "As to originating the Indian war, so far from being originated by Great Britain, I know that it originated in the false policy of Congress in 1783; I foretold it then with all of its consequences."[24]

During all the time that Congress was debating the western land and Indian affairs, many projects were on foot looking toward the occupation of this new territory. The officers of the army petitioned to have their bounty claims located in

[23]C. C. XXX, 181; *Journals,* XXV, 680.
[24]Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement,* 237.

eastern Ohio, the lands desired being east of a line drawn north to the Maumee from a point about twenty-four miles west of the Scioto; Jefferson was proposing a state on Lake Erie and one on the Ohio; Colonel Bland proposed the erection of several districts in the northwest territory partaking of the characteristics of frontier marks, which districts were later to be admitted as states.[25] Besides these legitimate proposals, there were many illegal encroachments, all of which stirred the resentment of the Indians to a very high pitch. General Irvine reported to the Secretary of War that 400 Virginians had crossed the Ohio and were settling on the Muskingum.[26] As early as 1780 petitions were presented to Congress for the right to settle on the Ohio.[27]

The Virginia act of cession was accepted by Congress on March 1, 1784. The process of cession in the northwest was completed by 1786. Before taking up the attempts to extinguish the Indian titles to the land, it might be well to view the Congressional land and Indian policy as evolved during the period of the Confederation.

The Land Ordinance of May 20, 1785, provided for the gradual survey and sale of the northwest territory, thus following Washington's advice of 1783. In this connection the office of Geographer of the United States was created. The first systematic survey, that of the Seven Ranges, included the territory between the Connecticut reserve, the Ohio River, the western boundary of Pennsylvania, and the meridian slightly above the town of Marietta. The appearance of federal surveyors in the woods was a clear proof to the Indians that their lands would soon be in the hands of the pioneer farmers, and this would, of course, stir them to take steps for resisting the intruders.

During the summer of 1786, Congress debated the ordinance for regulating Indian affairs. On July 12 a committee con-

[25] *Ibid.*, 244.

[26] *Letters of the Governors of Virginia*, III, 528.

[27] A. B. Hulbert, *Records of the Ohio Company*, Introduction xxiii.

sisting of Monroe, Johnson, King, Kean, and Pinckney, to whom the Indian treaties had been referred, reported that intercourse could be maintained at less expense by a proper organization of the Indian Department, hence they recommended that the commissions then outstanding be revoked.[28] On July 20 the ordinance was debated, and Few of Georgia and Bloodworth of North Carolina proposed an amendment, which provided that in case of treaties held within the boundaries or limits of any of the states, the executive or legislature of such state was to be notified of the time, place, and object of such treaty; the superintendent was to have full power to negotiate and treat with the Indians.

on all matters relative to peace and war agreeable to such instructions as he may receive; provided also that the legislative right of any state be not infringed or violated, and that on all matters respecting the regulation of trade, or internal policy in which the retained sovereignty, jurisdiction, or legislative right is concerned, the superintendent shall advise, consult with and obtain the approbation of such state or some person duly authorized on the part of the state to assent thereto before any treaty or act touching the premises shall be considered valid.[29]

New York, North Carolina, and Georgia were the only states voting for this amendment, so it was lost. When the ordinance came up for the third reading on August 4, Houstoun of Georgia moved to postpone so much of the ordinance as applied to the southern Indians. Georgia and North Carolina were the only states supporting this motion, although the votes of several of the states were divided.[30] Three days later Carrington of Virginia moved

that in all cases where transactions with any nations or tribes of Indians will become necessary to the purposes of this ordinance, which can not be done without interfering with the legis-

[28] *Journals* (contemporary edition, 11, 101). (Hereafter referred to as *Journals* (o. s.).

[29] *Ibid.*, 105.

[30] *Ibid.*, 106-7.

lative right of a state, the superintendent in whose district the same shall happen shall act in conjunction with the authority of such state.[31]

This was accepted by a vote of nine states. Two states only were in opposition. The ordinance was passed with nine of the twelve states present voting for it.[32]

This new law provided for two departments—the southern to include the tribes south of the Ohio, and the northern to include all tribes west of the Hudson. All councils, treaties, and communications with the Indians were to be held at outposts occupied by the United States in the said district. The superintendent was to be appointed for two years unless sooner removed by Congress, and he was to reside within or as near his district as was convenient. The northern superintendent was to appoint two deputies who were to reside where they could be of the greatest use in trade regulation. The superintendents were to correspond with the Secretary of War, who would present the information received to Congress; they were also to receive their instructions from the Secretary of War, and all stores and provisions or other property were to be in their custody. The ordinance further provided that none but citizens of the United States were to reside in the Indian country, or to be allowed to trade with any of the Indian nations of the United States. Licenses were required for trading with the Indians; these licenses were issued by the superintendent or one of his deputies to those producing a certificate from the governor of any state testifying to the character and general qualifications of the applicant. For this license a fee of $50 was to be charged, and the license was to be in force for one year. No one was to be given permission to travel through the Indian country without first making known his business to the superintendent; traders were to give bond for $3000 to the superintendent to observe the rules and regu-

[31] *Ibid.*, 125.

[32] *Ibid.*, 126.

lations as established by Congress; the superintendents were forbidden to engage either directly or indirectly in trade; they were also to give bond for $6000 and the deputies for $3000 to discharge the duties of their respective offices faithfully; the superintendents, where necessary, were to coöperate faithfully with the authority of the state, and, finally, the salary—which Richard Butler, the first northern superintendent, considered inadequate—was $1000 for the superintendent and $500 for the deputy.[33] Richard Butler was chosen superintendent of the northern district and James White of that in the south.[34] There were several men in the south who had considerable experience in Indian affairs and who would have made better superintendents than James White.

Secretary Knox was of the opinion that the work of the superintendent, being of a highly confidential nature, would depend much more on the ability of the man than upon the minuteness of the instructions.[35] By instructions, the superintendent was to enforce the ordinance of 1786; to ascertain the causes of the frontier murders and to try to find remedies to prevent them. He was to secure information concerning the number, character, and quality of the tribes, their residence, hunting grounds, the quantity and quality of furs taken annually, the usual price at which these furs sold and in what markets, and how they were paid for. He was to supervise the trade of his district, investigate the character of the traders, to examine all complaints, to report the number of licensed traders, from what states they came and in what districts they traded. He was to obtain release of all prisoners, to establish friendly intercourse with all the head men, and was to give occasional presents; and finally, he was to report his work to the War office.[36] It is evident that this plan, based largely on English precedents, was an attempt to prevent the mon-

[33] *Ibid.*, 126-29.
[34] *Ibid.*, 136.
[35] C. C. CLI, 225.
[36] C. C. XXX, 315.

opoly of the Indian trade by foreign interests, both in the north and in the south.

Returning now to the negotiations with the Indian tribes, we find that three days after the Virginia cessions, on March 4, 1784, Congress chose George Rogers Clark, Oliver Wolcott, Nathaniel Greene, Richard Butler, and Stephen Higginson to negotiate with the Indians. Greene and Higginson declined to serve, so on April 25, Congress chose Benjamin Lincoln and Arthur Lee.[37]

These commissioners were given full power to deal with the Indians to the northward and westward, to establish peace and to draw a boundary between the Indian territory and that open to settlement. The old line of 1768 had long since been crossed by the westward surge of population, and the government chose to begin anew what proved to be a futile undertaking—to establish and maintain a definite line of demarcation between the two races. They hoped to extinguish the Indian claims to the meridian of the falls of the Ohio.

Congress had stated its policy to be that the Indians' land was to be considered conquered territory; that the frontier land was pledged for the payment of the national debt, and that the state of national finances did not admit of any great expenditures to extinguish Indian claims to the soil.[38]

At the same time the Indians were quite sure that the land belonged to them and could be acquired from them only by purchase.[39] In this they were encouraged by the British officers, who assured them that they were the sole proprietors of the land reserved to them by the treaty of Fort Stanwix; furthermore, the British were giving the Indians liberal supplies of presents to keep up their morale. Besides this they

[37]*Journals* (o. s.) IX, 113. Lee and Lincoln resigned their positions and on September 21, 1785, Samuel Holden Parsons was chosen as one of the commissioners to succeed those who had resigned. *Journals* (o. s.) X, 205.

[38]O. E. Leavitt, *British Policy on the Canadian Frontier 1782-1792,* Wis. Hist. Soc. Proc., 1915, p. 154.

[39]Irvine Papers, X, 4.

could always keep the warring tribes in line by picturing to them the American desire for their lands.

Congressional action with regard to Indian affairs was rather slow, and even Washington felt that far more could have been accomplished if action had been taken before the British had time to win the Indians back again.[40] The first meeting of the Continental commissioners with the Indians took place at Fort Stanwix late in October 1784. LaFayette was at this conference, and although his presence was the cause of some concern on the part of the British[41] and was not entirely acceptable to the American commissioners, yet because of the Indians' attachment to the French, his influence was such as to induce the Indians to accede to the American demands. The treaty which was signed on October 22, 1784, gave peace to the hostile tribes of the Six Nations and received them under the protection of the United States on condition that six hostages be delivered to the federal commissioners to remain in possession of the United States until the prisoners, white and black, were returned. The friendly Oneidas and Tuscaroras were to be secured in the possession of their lands; the western boundary of the Six Nations was defined, and the lands east and north of this boundary were guaranteed to them with the exception of a six-mile square around the fort at Oswego; certain goods were to be given the Six Nations.[42] The Iroquois also ceded to Pennsylvania the territory within its boundaries, which territory had been claimed by them. In 1790 Red Jacket in a speech to President Washington asserted that this cession to Pennsylvania had been made under duress.

The commissioners of the State of New York had already treated with the Indians, in which negotiations they seem to have had the support of Brant. Two representatives of the State who were left to observe the negotiations made them-

[40] *Washington Writings,* Ford, editor, X, 415.
[41] *C. A. Rept. 1890,* 146.
[42] C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 3-4.

selves so obnoxious that the federal commissioners were compelled to resort to drastic action to prevent interference.[43] Monroe, who was in New York at this time, planning a western journey and incidentally looking over some opportunities for investment in land, was inclined to sympathize with the state. Madison, however, in a letter to the former, gave it as his opinion that New York had a right to purchase from the Indians land within the limits of the state. In so far as this right was exerted "in contravention of the General Treaty or even unconfidentially with the commissioners she has violated both duty and decorum." Madison made the interesting suggestion that the Virginia delegates were largely responsible for the clause in the Articles of Confederation stating that the legislative rights of the states should not be infringed upon in federal regulation of Indian affairs.[44]

Monroe also carried on a correspondence with Joseph Brant. When Brant heard that Captain Aaron Hill was detained as one of the hostages, he postponed his journey to England and returned to Cataraqui (Kingston), Ontario, Canada, where he spent the winter.[45] Monroe wrote him on February 5, 1785, in reply to a letter in which Brant had expressed much indignation at what he considered a great wrong, explaining that these hostages were kept, in accordance with an old custom, until prisoners were given up. He stated that his confidence in the Indians was such that "between the Indian and the United States, I would require no other obligation than their mutual honor." He made an appeal to Brant as to whether the Indians would not be better off allied with the United States than with some European powers.[46]

[43]Craig, *The Olden Time,* II, 408-10. Evidently Brant was favorable to the New York negotiations for in a letter to Matthew Visscher Jan. 15, 1785 he expressed the hope that the Continental commissioners did not overset everything done by the Indians in their negotiations with the state. *Proceedings of the Indian Commissioners,* etc., Hough, editor, I, footnote on pages 76-77.

[44]*Madison Writings,* Hunt, editor, II, 91-93.

[45]*Proceedings of the Indian Commissioners,* etc., I, 76-77.

[46]C. A. Rept., 1890, 148.

The American commissioners expected to hold the next treaty at Cuyahoga, but the advanced season and the difficulties of transportation prevented this.[47] On January 21, 1785, they made an agreement with the Wyandots, Delawares, Chippewas, and Ottawas at Fort McIntosh at the mouth of Big Beaver Creek, by which a boundary was drawn around the land to be reserved for these Indians. In this we can see the idea of an Indian reservation, which later became a settled policy of the United States government. The line bounding the reservation began

> at the mouth of the river Cuyahoga, and run thence up the said river to the portage between that and the Tuscarawas branch of Meskingum; then down the said branch to the forks at the crossing place above Fort Lawrence; then westerly to the portage of the Big Miami, which runs into the Ohio, at the mouth of which branch the fort stood which was taken by the French in one thousand seven hundred and fifty-two; then along said portage to the Great Maumee or Ome river, and down the southeast side of the same to its mouth, thence along the south shore of lake Erie, to the mouth of Cuyahoga where it began.

That the extinguishing of the Indian title to the land was not the sole purpose of the treaty is shown by the fact that certain reservations were provided for in the Indian territory: at the mouth of the Maumee, at the portage on the branch of the Big Miami which runs into the Ohio, on Lake Sandusky where the fort had formerly stood; also a reservation on each side of the lower rapids of the Sandusky river; another at Detroit and one at Michillimackinac. Article five of the treaty gave the Indians the right to punish intruders settling upon their lands, and article nine provided for the return of Indian robbers and murderers, although there was no provision with regard to the offenders against the Indians. Finally, in a separate article, certain Indians who had remained loyal to the United States and some who held commissions from the Con-

[47]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 1.

tinental Congress were to be guaranteed their full privileges as members of the tribes.[48]

It should be noted that the Indian tribes whose names head this treaty were not fully represented and that the commissioners made no attempt to secure the territory as far as the falls of the Ohio, because such an attempt would have served only to stir up the indignation of the Indians. Furthermore, in Congress itself there was considerable doubt as to the wisdom of a policy of rapid westward extension. On the other hand the expansionists argued that the lawless emigrations would certainly bring on war unless the Indian claims to all lands as far west as the Mississippi were speedily extinguished.

The general effect of the treaty of Fort McIntosh as it was viewed by the Indians can best be gleaned from the correspondence of the British officers and Indian agents who were either at the frontier forts or in the Indian towns. McKee wrote to Sir John Johnson on May 29, 1785, sending the articles of the treaty. He stated that the belts recapitulated the injuries done by the Indians during the Revolution and the ample means which the Americans had for retaliation; also that the British were entirely unable to protect the Indians; finally, the demand was made that the Indians accept peace, relinquish their lands and throw themselves upon the mercy of the Americans. McKee stated that the Indians were disgruntled with the policy as announced by the Americans and that deputations had gone to the tribes not concerned in the treaty to strengthen alliances and to devise means for resisting the attempts to drive them from their lands. In this policy the Indians would, of course, look to the King for assistance.[49]

On June 2, 1785, McKee wrote to Johnson enclosing the minutes of a meeting of the tribes on the Ohio frontier. These indicated clearly that the Indians were prepared to defend their

[48]*American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, 11; J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 309; C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 4-5.
[49]C. A. Rept., 1890, 154.

country so long as they were able to do so. They insisted that they had never asked for peace but thought that the Americans desired it; they had listened to the Americans because the King had requested them to do so, but they had no idea that they were considered as conquered people until they were so informed by the American commissioners. They were also very certain that the Americans wanted to deprive them of their lands.[50] On May 19, at the council of Wakatomica, the chiefs of the Shawanees, Mingoes, Delawares, and Cherokees warned James Sherlock and four other Americans that the settlers would not be tolerated on the Indian lands.[51] Sherlock later accused Simon Girty, Thomas Smith, Robert Surplus, and Captain Robert Caldwell of trying to prevent Indian conferences with the Americans.[52]

One of the best summaries of the northwestern Indian question from the American point of view was given in a letter to the Secretary of War from Captain John Doughty, who wrote from Fort McIntosh on October 21, 1785, that notwithstanding the fact that the Delawares and Wyandots had signed the treaty of Fort McIntosh, he blamed the attacks made on the whites at Tuscarawas upon these tribes. He expected trouble unless the Indians would go to the next treaty, of which he had little hope "because several nations will not go to the treaty and those that do go have no idea of ceding their lands to us upon the terms of the last treaty." He stated furthermore that the Indian representation at the McIntosh treaty was so partial from those tribes appearing, the objects of the treaty so general that the western tribes did not consider it binding upon them; also, that the attempts to survey the land west of the Ohio were arousing the opposition of the Indians, who were encouraged by the British to believe that the treaty of 1783 had ceded no land but had merely put the

[50]C. A. Q. XXIV, pt. II, 476.

[51]Probably located on the headwaters of the Mad River just below the modern town of Zanesfield.

[52]C. C. LVI, 291.

Indians under the protection of the United States. This, of course, induced the Indians to believe that they should not be deprived of their lands except by purchase. He concluded by urging the distribution of presents and the constant intercourse with some of the tribes by emissaries well acquainted with their language and manners, which might offset the dangers of a general confederacy.[53] A dozen men with such insight supported by a government with some authority and able to finance an Indian department would probably have prevented much bloodshed and expense on the frontier. The lack of competent agents among the tribes was one of the fundamental weaknesses of the Confederation Indian policy.

On June 29, 1785, a resolution was passed by Congress ordering the commissioners for Indian affairs to hold a treaty either at the rapids or at the mouth of the Miami River. This treaty was to be held under the protection of the federal troops, these to be augmented by 150 militia from the state of Virginia.[54] In resolutions of March 18, and June 15, Congress had provided for supplies and rations, for the pay of officers, messengers, interpreters, and artificers, and also for the transportation of supplies.

When the mouth of the Miami was selected as the place for the treaty by commissioners Clark and Butler on October 25, 1785, it was doubtful whether any Indians would be present. On September 20, the chiefs of the Shawanees, Mingoes, and Delawares sent a message to McKee stating that they had acted on the advice of the Six Nations and would not go to the council called by the Americans, but that they would return a good answer.[55]

On November 18, 1785, Sir John Johnson made a speech to the Six Nations regretting the American encroachments and approving of certain cessions rather than the going to

[53]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 9.
[54]*Journals* (o. s.) X, 154.
[55]C. A. Rept., 1890, 164.

extremes. He stated that the Americans had no right to the Indian country except as such was secured by purchase, and urged that the Indians should represent to Congress that the land cessions at previous treaties were invalid because unauthorized, and that they should offer to make certain cessions and establish a definite boundary, and that all their actions should represent the voice of the whole confederacy.[56]

The fortress for protection of the American commissioners negotiating the Indian treaty was erected near the present site of Cincinnati. The Shawanees, who were reluctant to come to the treaty, were finally forced to do so by a threat of war. An excellent commentary on the lawless frontier was the fact that while at the treaty grounds the American commissioners were compelled to send a message to the civil and military officers of the Kentucky district asking them to stop a proposed expedition which was setting out to rob the Indians then at the treaty.[57]

On January 31, 1786, a treaty was signed by the American commissioners Clark, Butler, and Parsons,[58] and the Shawanee chiefs. The Indians hesitated to give up their lands and to surrender hostages, but finally yielded and agreed to acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States and to deliver three hostages who were to remain in the hands of the Americans until all prisoners were returned. The boundary agreed upon was described as

beginning at the south line of the lands allotted to the Wyandots and Delaware nations at the place where the main branch of the Great Miami which falls into the Ohio intersects said line, then, down the river Miami to the fork of that river, next below the old fort taken by the French in one thousand seven hundred and

[56]C. A. Q. XXVI, pt. II, 378.

[57]C. C. LVI, 255-58.

[58]Parsons was a speculator in western lands. See Knox Papers XVIII, 20 and XX, 153.

fifty-two, thence due west to the river de la Panse; then down that river to the river Wabash.[59]

Furthermore, any Indian offenders were to be surrendered for punishment and the United States also guaranteed to punish all offenders against the Indians; furthermore, the Shawanees agreed by this treaty to give notice of any designs against the United States, the United States agreeing to do the same for the Shawanees. It was stipulated, finally, that any citizen of the United States illegally settling in the territory of the Shawanees would forfeit the protection of the United States. At this treaty there is evidence again that the Americans had trade as well as land in view, for it was reported by certain Huron chiefs that the United States commissioners had privately interviewed Half King of the Wyandots desiring him to prevent all white people except those who had permission from the Americans, to come among the Indians for trading purposes.[60]

McKee reported on February 27, 1786, that the Shawanees, Wyandots, and Delawares had returned from the treaty after leaving certain hostages with the Americans and that they were much displeased with their treatment.[61]

On May 29, 1786, Major Ancrum wrote Lieutenant Governor Hope sending a copy of the treaty between the Americans and the Shawanees. He stated that the treaty was signed because the Shawanees feared that the Americans would burn their villages before they could obtain assistance. They were, however, not planning to abide by the treaty. Major Ancrum was somewhat concerned by that part of the Indians' report of the treaty which stated that the Americans were planning to take possession of the posts during the summer.[62]

[59]*A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 11; C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties*, II, 12-13, also the Journal of Richard Butler, copy of MS in the Durrett Collection at the University of Chicago.

[60]C. A. Rept., 1890, 174.

[61]C. A. Q. XXVI pt. II, 362.

[62]C. A. Rept., 1890, 175-176.

During all this time the question of illegal encroachments was causing great difficulties. The Indian commissioners when leaving Fort McIntosh on January 24, 1785, had ordered Colonel Harmar to drive illegal settlers and surveyors from the lands of the United States, "not within the limits of any particular state."[63] Colonel Harmar attempted to carry out this order, but encountered numerous difficulties. Many settlements were found, and arrangements had already been made to hold elections at the mouths of the Miami, the Scioto, and Muskingum Rivers on April 10, for members of a constitutional convention. These people had petitioned Congress, asking for an extension of time before the enforcement of the orders left by the Indian commissioners. Harmer wrote on June 1:

The honorable commissioners for Indian affairs previous to their departure left me instructions to drive off all surveyors and settlers on the lands of the United States, in consequence of which a party has been detached, who drove them off as far as seventy miles from this point [Fort McIntosh]. The number lower down the river is immense, and unless Congress enters into immediate measures, it will be impossible for preventing the lands being settled. I have written some time upon the subject, requesting particular orders how to conduct myself as it is out of my power to sweep them further than the distance of one hundred fifty miles from hence. This is a matter of so much importance, that perhaps you may judge it necessary to remind Congress of it.[64]

As a result of this letter a Congressional committee reported authorizing Harmar to remove his troops and establish a post between the Muskingum and the Great Miami. This post, Fort Harmar, was erected near the mouth of the Muskingum.[65]

[63]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 3, note 1.

[64]*Ibid.,* 6. See also *Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser,* for April 4, 1786. In this number will be found a letter from Ft. Finney describing the rapid settlement of the west.

[65]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 7, note 1.

It is necessary at this point to note briefly the British influence in northern Indian affairs during the period under discussion.[66] Although desirous of peace with the Confederation, the British authorities were very eager to retain the friendship of the Indians in order that the fur trade might be successfully monopolized. The movement for a barrier state formed by the confederated Indian tribes did not come to a head during this period, but there are evidences that it was in the minds of some of the British leaders.

We have noted the objections made to the peace treaty on the part of the merchants as well as by those close to Indian affairs. The British officers on the frontier were undoubtedly sympathetic with their Indian allies, whom they were now leaving in the lurch. On their part the Indians were genuinely alarmed at the thought of being driven out of their territories. On May 21, 1783, Brant inquired of Haldimand whether the Indians and their lands had been turned over to the Americans.[67] In a speech to the Six Nations at Niagara on July 23, 1783, Sir John Johnson made the following statement:

> You are not to believe or even think that by the line which has been described it was meant to deprive you of an extent of country of which the right of soil belongs to you and is in yourselves as sole proprietors as far as the boundary line agreed upon and established in the most solemn and public manner in the presence and with the consent of the governors and commissioners deputed by the different colonies for that purpose . . . neither can I harbor an idea that the United States will act so unjustly or unpolitically as to endeavor to deprive you of any part of your country under the pretense of having conquered it.[68]

[66]A. C. McLaughlin, "The Western Posts and the British Debts," American Hist. Assoc., *Rept. 1894,* 413ff; J. A. James, "Some Phases of the History of the Northwest 1783-86," Miss. Valley Hist. Soc. *Proc. 1913-1914,* VII, 168ff; O. E. Leavitt, *British Policy on the Canadian Frontier 1782-1792,* Wis. Hist. Soc. *Proc. 1915,* 151; S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty,* Chap. I: W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade,* Chap. IV.

[67]C. A. Q. XXVI, pt. I, 5.

[68]C. A. M. CVI, 245.

On November 27, 1783, in a letter to Lord North, Haldimand had suggested that the country between the limits of Canada as established by the provisional treaty and the line of 1768 should be considered as belonging to the Indians and that subjects of neither Great Britain nor the United States should be allowed to settle within them, but that the subjects of each should have the liberty to trade where they pleased—one of the earliest of the statements of the barrier state idea.[69]

The British influence was an important factor in the Indian relations of the northwest. Their retention of the frontier posts put them in the midst of the Indian country, where they were looked upon as protectors by the tribes. Regardless of how correct the official attitude of the government might be, the giving of presents to the Indians and the maintenance of agents among the tribes gave strong color to the suspicion that the westward expansion of the United States was to be checked.

During the period of the last negotiation between the confederation and the Indians in the north Lord Dorchester made it clear to the Indians that "This country is a small part of the King's dominion and that with us in Canada no power is lodged to begin a war nor ought we have such a power which might involve half the globe and all the seas in blood and destruction."[70] At the same time he was sounding the Indians as to their attitude toward the abandonment of the posts. The general outlook for the Confederation was not bright, and Dorchester felt that the early collapse of this weak government would make any aggressive action unnecessary.[71] It must be remembered that the northwest fur trade was at stake. To guard this the British were determined to hold the posts even at the cost of a war with the United States.[72] Unlikely as such

[69]C. A. Q. XXIII, 46.
[70]C. A. Q. XXVII, pt. I, 82.
[71]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 18.
[72]C. A. Rept. 1890, 183.

a war seemed, it was still necessary to cultivate the best potential allies in such a struggle—the Indians.

An excellent summary of the British attitude is found in a lengthy letter of Major Matthews to Joseph Brant dated Niagara, May 29, 1787:

. . . His Lordship wishes you to be acquainted, that when he arrived at Quebec last fall, it was too late to forward anything more than provisions necessary for the posts and Indians, a part of which could not proceed on account of the ice; but he did not forget the presents intended for the Indians; and had, as soon as the communications opened, ordered them to be sent up to Montreal. At the same time his Lordship was sorry to learn, that while the Indians were soliciting his assistance in their preparations for war, some of the Six Nations had sent deputies to Albany to treat with the Americans, who, it is said, have made a treaty with them granting permission to make roads for the purpose of coming to Niagara; but that, notwithstanding these things, the Indians should have their presents as they are marks of the King's approbation of their former conduct. In the future his Lordship wishes them to act as is best for their interest; he cannot begin a war with the Americans because some of their people encroach and make depredations upon a part of the Indian country; but they must see it is his Lordship's intention to defend the posts; and that while these are preserved the Indians must find greater security therefrom and consequently the Americans greater difficulty in taking possession of their land; but should they once become masters of the posts, they will surround the Indians and accomplish their purpose with little trouble. From a consideration of all of which, it therefore remains with the Indians to decide what is most for their own interest and to let his Lordship know their determination that he may take his measures accordingly; but whatever their resolution is, it should be taken as by one and the same people, by which means they will be respected and become strong; but if they will divide and act against each other, they will become weak and help to destroy each other. This, my dear Joseph, is the substance of what his Lordship desired me to tell you, and I request you will give his senti-

ments that mature consideration which their justice, generosity and desire to promote the welfare and happiness of the Indians must appear to all the world to merit.

In your letter to me you seem apprehensive that the English are not very anxious about the welfare of the posts. You will soon be satisfied that they have nothing more at heart, provided that it continues to be the wish of the Indians, and that they remain firm in doing their part of the business, by preventing the Americans from coming into their country and consequently from marching to the posts. On the other hand, if the Indians think it more to their interests that the Americans should have possession of the posts, and be established in their country they ought to declare it, that the English need no longer be put to the vast and unnecessary expense and the inconvenience of keeping the posts, the chief object of which is to protect their Indian allies and the loyalists who have suffered with them. It is well known that no encroachments ever have or ever will be made by the English upon the lands or property of the Indians in consequence of their possessing the posts, how far that will be the case if ever the Americans get into them, may be very easily imagined from their hostile perseverance even with that advantage, in driving the Indians off their lands and taking possession of them.[73]

By 1786 the Indians were thoroughly disgusted with the Congressional policy, and prepared definitely to repudiate all the engagements made since the close of the war.

Joseph Brant went to England to see what help could be obtained there. He succeeded in securing a sum to reimburse the Six Nations for their property losses during the war; in addition, he was encouraged to have the Indians defend their rights.

McKee wrote Johnson on February 25, 1786, that the Indians would not make any cessions of their lands at Fort Finney and that a number of chiefs were preparing to go to Canada to find out the sentiment toward them.[74]

[73]W. L. Stone, *Joseph Brant,* II, 270.
[74]C. A. Rept. 1890, 174.

At the Fort Schlosser conference of the Six Nations, March 27, 1786, the Cayugas announced that they were going to demand the return of the deeds given by some of their people at Fort Stanwix. They were willing to compensate the Americans for the presents given. A message was also sent to the western nations asking them to write as to the best methods of securing peace. John Dease, the British agent who presided at this conference, urged the Indians to be moderate, stating also that the new commander-in-chief and Brant might have some definite news from the King.[75]

On May 5, Cornplanter and his associates, accompanied by Generals Butler and Parsons, appeared before Congress, where he was informed that the United States was sovereign within the treaty limits; that all treaties with the Indians had been made by the order of Congress and that these treaties would be kept faithfully; that steps would be taken to open trade and that Hutchins, the geographer, would be sent to survey the lands which had been purchased.[76] Cornplanter went back to oppose the United States' efforts for peace.

An excellent view of the Indian sentiments during this period was given in a message from the tribes to Secretary Knox during the early part of the Washington administration. In part it is as follows:

At the Fort Stanwix conference your commissioners settled everything as they thought would best suit them and be most conducive to their interests. They pointed division lines and at once confirmed them without waiting to hear our opinion of it and whether it would be approved by us or not, holding that our country was added to them by the King of England. The language confused the minds of our chiefs and deterred them from making any reply; they kept saying if we did not consent to their proposals, that their warriors were at their backs and that they knew we should receive no protection from the King of England. Such has been the language of your commissioners at every treaty

[75]C. A. Q. XXVI, pt. II, 364.
[76]C. A. Q. XXVI, pt. II, 534.

held with us . . . . We are of the same opinion as the people of the United States; you call yourselves free and independent. We as the ancient inhabitants of the country and sovereigns of the soil say that we are equally free as you or any nation under the sun.[77]

On July 19, 1786, a conference was reported at Buffalo Creek. This meeting was attended by Brant and Captain Aaron Hill. At this conference, which was also attended by deputies from the western Indians, the boundary between the Indians and the Americans was discussed. Undoubtedly Brant was able to report the official British attitude as he had observed it on his trip to England. Colonel Campbell, at Niagara, described the conference, and seemed to think that Brant was an ambitious schemer interested in furthering only his own affairs.[78]

The Niagara council of the sachems of the Six Nations with deputies from the Wyandots, Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawatomis, Shawanees, Mingoes, and Cherokees was held July 25, 1786. The proceedings of the Buffalo Creek conference were reported and a council in the Shawanee country was called to consider the critical state of affairs. The meeting was convened in the Shawanee country to check encroachments more effectively. The western tribes were advised to avoid hostilities until after this meeting. Throughout all these negotiations one sees clearly that the Indian policy toward the United States was gradually evolving. Furthermore, there was considerable expectancy as to what news Lord Dorchester would bring from the British government. It was still hoped that Britain might now be ready to give open assistance to her former allies.[79]

While there were other Indian councils during the fall of 1786, it is necessary to give specific mention to just one more, the one held at Detroit late in November and early in Decem-

[77]C. A. C. CCXLVII, 124.

[78]C. A. Rept. 1890, 178.

[79]C. A. Q. XXVI, pt. II, 527: J. A. James, *George Rogers Clark,* 339.

ber. The purpose of the conference was to come to some definite decision regarding the relation with the Confederation. A message was sent to Congress criticizing the policy of holding treaties with separate tribes and insisting that all land cessions must be made by the united vote of the confederacy; the Indians proposed a treaty to be held the following spring and insisted that all surveyors and others be prevented from coming across the Ohio; they were determined to defend their rights with their united forces.[80]

Unfortunately the message of this conference to Congress was unnecessarily delayed in transmission, for Knox wrote to Brant on July 23, 1787:

> On the 17 inst., and not before, I received the favor of your letter dated from Huron town, December 18, 1786, enclosing the original speech by several Indian tribes met at the same time and place, to the United States in Congress assembled. It appears from the information of General Butler, the superintendent, that the Shawanees neglected to forward the above dispatches at the time it was expected they would; and it appears from a letter from Captain Pipe of the Delawares and the Half King of the Wyandots, dated at Sandusky the 3rd of June, that they forwarded the dispatches finally to Fort Pitt at which place and at the same time also your messengers arrived with your letters to General Butler dated Buffalo Creek, the 16th of May, 1787, enclosing a copy or translation of the speech of the chiefs, transmitted by Captain Pipe and the Half King of the Wyandots. I mention these circumstances to convince you that the result of your council at Huron village, in December, has been a long time in travelling to this city.
>
> On receipt of your papers they were submitted to Congress who has taken the same into consideration and will soon come to some decision thereon, which will be communicated to the superintendent in order to be transmitted to you.[81]

[80]C. A. Q. XXVII, pt. I, 69; See also report on western affairs made by David Duncan in a letter to Thomas Hutchins, dated March 28, 1786. Knox Papers XVIII, 148.

[81]W. L. Stone, *Joseph Brant,* II, 266.

Because of the Indian determination not to yield any land, the Confederation prepared to do that which it was least able to do—to use force. On April 6, Knox recommended the establishment of posts along the Ohio and south shore of Lake Erie, also at the headwaters of the Miami and perhaps the Tuscarawas and Muskingum. This would restrain the lawless emigrants, protect the surveyors, and encourage land sales, thus helping to carry out the Congressional policy.[82]

On May 12, 1786, Knox wrote Harmar:

> But such is the critical state of affairs between the United States and the Indians that the highest prudence is requested on the part of the commanding officer of the troops. Distinctions must be made between the predatory incursions of a banditti collected from such tribes as the Cherokees and others settled on the Scioto and the conduct of the regular tribes. An Indian war, disagreeable at all times, would be peculiarly distressing in the present embarrassed state of public finances, therefore it must be avoided if possible consistently with the dignity of the United States.[83]

It must be remembered that to perform all these duties Harmar had seven hundred or less underpaid men, and that he was expected to guard a frontier line extending from Fort Pitt to Louisville.

Harmar wrote on August 4 that he was removing the settlers in the Mingo bottoms, that he was protecting the surveyors, and was endeavoring to conciliate the Chippewas and Delawares, and that he was much disturbed by the threats of some frontiersmen to murder the friendly Indians who were bringing him information regarding the Niagara conference. He concluded:

> I believe them [the frontiersmen] in general averse to federal measures and that they would wish to throw every obstacle in the

[82]C. C. CL, I, 175.

[83]C. C. CL, I, 345. For financial difficulties of the western army see "Diary of Major Beatty," *Magazine of American History,* I, 1. MS in the Durrett Collection.

way to impede the surveying of the western territory agreeable to the ordinance of Congress. I shall take care to counteract the views of these vagabonds and to support the authority of Congress as fully as lays (sic) in my power.[84]

On October 10 he reported that on account of the threatening attitude of the Indians assembled at the Shawanee towns, the surveyors had been compelled temporarily to abandon their work.[85] On November 15 he wrote about Logan's attack on the Shawanees and the unnecessary slaying of Melonthee, who had been a friend to the States. He also mentioned the Clark expedition, doubting whether it could be successful; he stated that as a result of a letter from the Governor of Virginia, although without instructions from the Secretary of War, he had ordered Captain Finney to make arrangements for two companies at the Falls to coöperate with the militia to prevent Indian depredations.[86]

Congress prepared to defend the threatened frontiers and to protect the surveyors, who had begun to lay off the Seven Ranges. For this purpose 1340 additional troops were to be raised—1220 of these were to come from the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The radicals in these states insisted that these troops were being raised to overawe the democrats.[87]

The usually reliable Knox viewed the situation as critical, and in a report of July 10, 1787, stated:

The one side anxiously defend their lands which the other avariciously claims. With minds previously inflamed the slightest offence occasions death, revenge follows which knows no bounds. The flames of a merciless war are lighted up which involve innocent and helpless with the guilty. Either one or the other party must move to a greater distance or the government must keep

[84]W. H. Smith, *The St. Clair Papers,* II, 18.
[85]*Ibid.,* 18.
[86]*Ibid.,* 19.
[87]Joseph P. Warren, "The Confederation and Shay's Rebellion" *American Historical Review,* II, 42-67. *Journals* (o. s.), II, 186-187.

them both in awe by a strong hand and compel them to be moderate and just.

He then discussed a plan for the solution of the difficulties by strategic locations of federal troops. He considered this plan too expensive for the weak government and decided that the best possible policy would be to try to hold the line of the Ohio.[88]

On July 21, 1787, Congress passed a resolution that the Indian superintendent should inform the tribes that their message had been received and was being considered.[89] At the same time acting on Knox's suggestion, resolutions were passed to station troops at Venango, Fort Pitt, Fort McIntosh, Muskingum, Miami, Vincennes, and on the Rapids of the Ohio. These troops were to be moved as the commander of the west saw fit, and one thousand Kentucky militia were to be held in readiness to coöperate with the federal troops.

In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 the Indian was not forgotten. This was the first attempt of the federal government to prescribe a governmental system for a territory formerly under the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act. This Ordinance, it should be noted, was hurried through Congress to please a land company which had negotiated successfully for a tract of land on the Ohio at the mouth of the Muskingum. The third article of the Ordinance reads as follows:

> The utmost faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their land and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property rights and liberty they shall never be disturbed unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.

[88] C. C. CLI, 267.
[89] *Journals* (o. s.) XII, 76.

This Ordinance was reënacted by act of Congress, August 7, 1789.[90] With few exceptions the federal government has in theory attempted to carry out the spirit of the Ordinance. In practice, unfortunately, it often fell short of the ideal. This enactment sounds very much like another law passed twenty-four years before:

> And we do further declare it to be our royal will and pleasure, for the present as aforesaid to receive under our sovereignty, protection and dominion for the use of the said Indians all the lands, territories not included within the limits of our said new governments or within the limits of the territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Company . . . . ; and we do hereby forbid on pain of our displeasure, all our loving subjects from making any purchases or settlement whatever, or taking possession of any of the lands above reserved, without our special leave and license for that purpose first obtained.[91]

On October 5, 1787, Arthur St. Clair was chosen governor of the new territory, and Congress passed a resolution proposing a treaty with the northern Indians as soon after April 1 as possible. The time and place of the treaty were to be finally settled by the governor. The purpose of the treaty was to settle amicably the land and boundary questions, and to find out the causes for the uneasiness among the tribes.[92] Giving the governor so much authority in the matter of Indian relations offended Richard Butler, the northern superintendent, and only after a conference with St. Clair was Butler willing to work with him. In fact, the coolness which developed between the two men was ended only by the death of Butler at the time of St. Clair's disastrous defeat a few years later.[93]

[90]C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* IV, 1173.

[91]*Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections,* XXXVI, 14-19.

[92]*A. S. P. I. A.* I, 8; See also Knox Papers XXII, 150 for William Knox's estimate of St. Clair and Harmar as correspondents. St. Clair, "verbose but not decisive," Harmar "miscellaneous as usual": See also Archer Butler Hulbert, *Military Roads,* Vol. VIII, of *Historic Highways,* 158.

[93]C. C. CL, III, 47.

On October 12, Congress appropriated $20,000 for purposes of Indian treaties to be held whenever the same were judged to be necessary by a majority of the United States in Congress assembled. On October 22, Congress resolved that the governor of the western territory be empowered to hold a general treaty with the Indians in the spring. He was authorized to use up to $14,000 of the amount appropriated on October 12.[94]

On October 26 the governor was instructed to examine the temper of the Indians and to hold a treaty with them in conjunction with the northern superintendent; this treaty was to be as general as possible. It was to settle boundaries, trade problems, and any other difficulties which might arise; the previous treaties were not to be departed from unless a change of boundary beneficial to the United States could be obtained; the governor was not to neglect any opportunity for extinguishing the Indian rights west to the Mississippi. He might stipulate that the east and west line ordered to be run by the ordinance of May 20, 1785, should be the boundary between the United States and the Indians, providing it extended to the Mississippi; whites illegally crossing the Indian line were to be left to the Indians for punishment. The governor was to ascertain who were the real headmen, and was to try to win them for the United States; he was to exert himself to defeat all confederations on the frontier and to try to reconcile the whites and Indians.[95]

On October 31, 1787, Brant wrote Richard Butler that he was much disappointed at not receiving any reply to the Indian communication of the previous December.[96] The letter which Knox wrote on July 23 explains this delay. Brant felt that the season was too far advanced for any meeting with the Americans. On September 2, 1787, Sir John Johnson wrote McKee:

[94] *A. S. P. I. A.* I, 8.
[95] *Ibid.*, 8.
[96] C. C. CL, III, 47.

I am pleased to find that the Indians in general to the westward have so just and perfect knowledge of their present and what would be their future situation, should they suffer the Americans to establish themselves in their country—our situation in that respect would be little better—for which reasons I think it best to encourage them all in our power to draw a certain line between them and the Americans allowing as large a scope as they can with safety to themselves and attention to their hunting grounds beyond which they ought not be permitted to settle—this I much fear, though all they in reason would expect from the Indians will not be accomplished—I therefore see nothing left for them but unanimity in their councils and a steady and firm opposition to their encroachments.

From this letter it appears that the Indians were divided in their point of view as to what policy to pursue.[97]

In the meantime, during the summer of 1787, Harmar took possession of Vincennes in order that chaotic conditions there might be brought under control of the federal authorities. He treated with a party of Chickasaws at Louisville. At Vincennes he posted the Congressional resolve regarding intruders on the public lands; he also conferred with the Wabash tribes, furnishing them with whiskey and presents to the amount of $150.[98]

On November 19, in a speech to Governor St. Clair, the Indians proposed a boundary running

along the Muskingum to the Old Fort at Tuscarawa thence along said river to the south end of the Portage that leads to the Cuyahoga, from said south end of the Portage in a straight and direct line until it strikes the Old Fort at the mouth of the Venango, thence down the Ohio to the mouth of the Muskingum.

They were willing to grant the land within these boundaries without compensation.[99]

[97]Canadian Indian Papers, XVI, 72.

[98]Note letters to the Secretary of War, July 7, p. 24, Aug. 7, p. 26 and Nov. 24, p. 30. *St. Clair Papers,* II.

[99]Canadian Indian Papers, XVI, 75.

On January 27, 1788, St. Clair wrote Knox that the proposed treaty with the Indians would, according to the best opinion, be held at the Muskingum. He felt that the congressional appropriation was entirely too small, considering the large sums which the British were spending.[100]

William Wilson, who had been in the Indian country, reported on February 6, 1788, that the Indians were unwilling to sell their land north of the Ohio; that about 1000 Indians representing twenty-seven nations had been present at the Miami conference; that at this conference the Indians had denied selling any of their land to the United States and insisted that such cessions as were made were entirely unauthorized. Wilson pointed out that it would be very wise to send proper agents among the Indians to place before them the idea of ceding land to the United States; he stated that at the Miami conference 3000 guineas in gold and 3000 pounds of provisions had been given to the Indians for the losses suffered during the previous year at the hands of the Kentuckians. This money had been intended for the Mohawks and northern Indians but had been given the western Indians through Brant's influence. Brant had made a speech urging the Indians to negotiate some kind of peace with the Americans.[101]

Brant was not at all sure of the united support of the Indians; even the Six Nations were wavering. On March 20, 1788, he wrote to Lieutenant Langan, Sir John Johnson's private secretary, "As for the Five Nations, most of them have sold themselves to the Devil—I mean the Yankeys—whatever they do it must be for the Yankeys, not for the Indians or the English."[102]

[100]*St. Clair Papers,* II, 41.

[101]C. C. CLI, II, 133.

[102]W. L. Stone, *Joseph Brant,* I, 275. At the same time the Six Nations were negotiating for their lands in N. Y. with private speculators and also with the state itself. See *Proceedings of Commissioners of Indian Affairs,* etc.

On May 2, 1788, the Secretary of War pointed out that the Indians were disgusted with the principle of conquest which had been specified as the basis of their treaties with the United States. The practice of the British government and most of the northern colonies had been to purchase the right of soil from the Indians, and this was the only method of alienating their lands to which the Indians would accede peaceably. To establish claim by the principle of conquest would mean continuous warfare, and their alliance with England would prevent their submission to this doctrine. He, therefore, recommended a change of instructions to the governor and the superintendent so as to permit them to extinguish the Indian claims to the western territories described in former treaties, with such additions as said commissioners might be able to effect. He recommended that the sum to be paid the Indians be limited to $40,000, one-third of which should be paid at the time of the treaty and the remainder in instalments.[103]

In keeping with this recommendation, Congress on July 2, 1788, made an additional appropriation of $20,000 for the treaty. This $20,000 plus $6000 of the $14,000 appropriated on October 22, 1787, was to be applied solely to the purpose of extinguishing Indian claims to the lands already ceded, "by obtaining a regular conveyance for the same and for extending a purchase beyond the limits hitherto fixed by treaty."

By instructions of the same date St. Clair was to use this sum and $6000 of the $14,000 previously appropriated to secure a boundary which would be favorable, and to extinguish Indian titles, providing it could be done in a way advantageous to the United States; he might fix the east and west line at the 41st parallel rather than the line mentioned in the previous instructions; he was also to make payments on the installment plan as suggested by Knox, the first payment to be made as late as 1789, if possible.[104]

[103]C. C. CL, III, 343.

[104]*A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 9.

On July 20, James Rankin, a messenger among the Indian tribes, wrote Butler that there was little hope of doing much with the Indians, that the Wabash nations would not attend the treaty at all and that the Americans had suffered a great loss in the death of Half King of the Wyandots.[105]

St. Clair doubted the sincerity of the Indian message of December 1786, since they were so dilatory and were again counseling among themselves. He lamented the fact that the United States had no proper agents among the tribes and stated that no lasting peace could be established so long as the frontier was being pushed into the Indian country. He was also critical of New York for keeping the Six Nations for a meeting at the same time that the federal government wished them for a conference in the west.[106]

In the Indian country all was not harmonious, for Brant reported on October 7 that the Shawanees, Miamis, and Kickapoos were more interested in horse stealing than in counseling; he felt also that these tribes would prefer war to giving up their country, "which I am afraid will be the means of our separating."[107]

Because of an Indian attack on the Muskingum base, the American commissioners decided to negotiate the treaty at Fort Harmar. In his letter of July 16, 1788, St. Clair mentions the $20,000 additional appropriation, but did not approve of the boundaries as stipulated in his instructions. He objected to the limits as stated because they included the hunting grounds of many tribes unfriendly to the United States and the residence of the Wyandots, as well as the Shawanee and Delaware reserve. Such a cession could not be obtained, and

[105]C. C. CL, III, 341.

[106]*St. Clair Papers,* II, 48. Brant's letter on page 60 tells of the delays because of the land jobbers. This concluded the land deals in New York between the Six Nations and private speculators as well as between the tribes and the state itself.

[107]W. L. Stone, *Joseph Brant,* II, 277.

even if it could the Indians would not consider themselves bound by the treaty.[108]

In September St. Clair wrote Knox expressing his concern because of Sevier's raids in the south—he feared that it would have a bad effect on the Indians with whom he was planning to treat; he was much chagrined that the Pittsburgh paper had printed the Congressional resolution of July 2 making appropriations for the extinction of Indian claims; he feared this too would influence the Indians; he was most displeased because the news seemed to have got to the paper from him.[109]

In a letter of September 14, St. Clair proposed an excellent plan of attack on the Indians. This plan had real merit, and if the Confederation had been financially able it would have certainly made it possible to subdue the Indians. He proposed that a force of 1000 men should march from the Falls of the Ohio to attack Ouittanon; a force of 1400 men with two field pieces to march from the mouth of the Limestone above the mouth of the Little Miami to attack Omi or Miamitown on the Maumee; a force of 1000 to march from Beaver Creek to Cuyahoga, and one of 500 from Vincennes to attack the Piankishaws at Terre Haute and also the Kickapoos residing near the latter. This made a force totalling 3900 men with two field pieces, which force, as he suggested, might be made up entirely of Pennsylvania and Kentucky militia and the regular soldiers of the United States. St. Clair saw that the Indian ideas of a confederacy were such that a simultaneous attack would cause an immediate breakup of the western confederation if such an attack were made. The consternation caused by the Sullivan and Brodhead expeditions indicate that such a plan, carried out energetically, would undoubtedly have been successful. However, with a new government just begin-

[108]*St. Clair Papers,* II, 57.
[109]*Ibid.,* 85.

ning which needed to husband its resources, this plan was impossible.[110]

On December 13, St. Clair wrote Jay, mentioning John Connolly's presence at Louisville and the steps he had taken to secure him, if possible; he also noted that the Indians would soon be present for the treaty although he was disappointed at Brant's withdrawal with his Mohawks; he was, however, hopeful that this would cause a breakup of the Indian confederation; he was sure that there would be no peace on the Kentucky frontier until the western Indians were thoroughly chastised; he also expressed considerable concern because of the emigration into the western territories and into the Spanish possessions.[111]

The treaties were finally completed early in 1789, and on January 18 St. Clair reported this fact to the Secretary of War. It was several months before the new government began to function, so he did not send a complete report to the President until May 2, 1789. He suggested that the making of two treaties was a wise move, since it would tend to increase the jealousies existing between the Six Nations and the Wyandots, thus causing a break in the confederacy.[112]

These treaties were somewhat longer than the earlier confederation treaties. In the treaty with the western Indians it was agreed that two hostages were to be surrendered until the prisoners held by the tribes were returned. The boundary established at Fort McIntosh was confirmed and renewed. The changed congressional policy is evidenced by the fact that an additional quantity of goods to the value of six thousand dollars was granted to the Indians for the cession of the territory east, south, and west of the line established by this treaty. The theory of occupancy later to be expounded

[110] *Ibid.*, 89. See also St. Clair's letter to Knox September 15, 1788, discussing the possible leaders for the various divisions. Knox Papers, XXII, 149.

[111] *St. Clair Papers,* II, 10.

[112] *St. Clair Papers,* II, 111.

by statute and court decision was clearly implied in article three, which forbade the sale of any part of the reservation, "to any sovereign power, except the United States; nor to the subjects or citizens of the United States." The extradition of Indian criminals was provided for, as was also the punishment of offenders against the Indians. Severe measures were to be taken with regard to the crime of horse stealing—one of the banes of the frontier region—and the civil authorities of the Northwest Territory were to aid Indians in recovering their stolen horses. Only properly licensed traders were to be permitted among the tribes (licenses under hand and seal of the governor of the Northwest Territory or of one of his deputies for the management of Indian affairs). The Indians agreed to turn over to the governor or his deputies all unlicensed traders, and furthermore, in order to prevent traders with forged licenses from residing among them, they agreed to report to the governor or one of his deputies the names of all traders living among the tribes. There was a mutual agreement as to warnings of impending attacks. Intruders upon the reservation lands were to be left to the Indians for punishment. All reservations of the Fort McIntosh treaty were renewed, but two Wyandot villages within the Detroit reservation were not to be disturbed. Article fifteen explained a boundary rearrangement as follows:

> And whereas in describing the boundary before mentioned, the words if strictly constructed would carry it from the portage on that branch of the Miami, which runs into the Ohio, over to the river Auglaize; which was neither the intention of the Indians nor of the commissioners; it is hereby declared, that the line shall be run from the said portage directly to the first Miami village, thence down the main branch of the Maumee river to said village, thence down that river to Lake Erie, and along the margin of the Lake to the place of beginning.

The Wyandots agreed to dispossess the Shawanees of their territory if the latter persisted in their warlike policy. A

separate article provided for the extradition of all murderers and robbers.[113]

In the treaty with the Six Nations made at the same time, the engagements of the Fort Stanwix treaty of October 22, 1784, were renewed. The Mohawks, who were not present at the treaty, were excepted from the provisions. An additional grant of $3000 worth of goods was made for those Indians who were represented. A clause providing for extradition of criminals was included in this treaty as in the one with the western nations.[114]

These were the last treaties held under the confederation. The Indians were not satisfied with their treatment and stated that they were deceived into signing something which they had not understood.[115]

[113]C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 13-18.

[114]*Ibid.,* 18-19.

[115]W. L. Stone, *Joseph Brant,* II, 334.

Writing to Samuel Adams on January 15, 1792, George Morgan had the following to say about the Western negotiations:

"Here give me leave to remark that the speeches made at the treaties of Beaver Creek and the Miami have not been faithfully reported; and I aver that had the advice of the Indians there been attended to, the present war would not have taken place. It would have been to our true interest to have adopted their opinion; had we done so, all the western and northern nations would have been faithful friends and allies to the United States at this moment. Their advice was to withdraw our forts and settlements to the east side of the Ohio and to make that with the western line of Pennsylvania the permanent boundary between them and the United States until necessity should compel us to ask for more lands when they would not have been backward to give. On these terms they wished for perpetual peace and declared that no other would insure it for our claims of conquest, they said, were idle and they would not submit to them, and if persisted in, would flow the rivers with blood.

"After this we attempted to patch the business at Fort Harmar where but few of the natives attended and none were fully represented; here the treaty was negotiated and speeches and explanations to the Indians made by our superintendent in the French language through a Canadian interpreter who had to guess at his meaning for he can neither write nor speak the language so as to make himself understood in any matter of that importance. It is true—this is not the superintendent's fault but it was a misfortune for he could find no other medium." Morgan Papers, Library of Congress.

The Indian problem in the northwest was not settled, for those signing the treaty only partially represented the tribes of this section. The land problem alone was the basis for a general clash on the frontier. The Indians clung tenaciously to that which the Americans desired most. Undoubtedly this resistance was strengthened by the hope of British assistance should matters come to a crisis. Not until the armies of Wayne and Harrison had beaten the warriors of Red Jacket and Tecumseh into submission were these original Americans willing to yield to the inevitable. Even after this some of them lingered for many years on their rapidly shrinking but still beloved hunting grounds, and it was well past the middle of the nineteenth century before the last land cession in the Northwest Territory finally extinguished the claims of the Red Man to this region.

IV

THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE; NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOUTHERN INDIANS

THE committee studying Indian affairs in the south consisted of the following members: Beresford of South Carolina, Jefferson of Virginia, Chase of Maryland, Spaight of North Carolina, and Jacob Reed of South Carolina. It finally made its report on May 28, 1784.[1] Congress, however, was so busy with public land and financial questions that the report was not considered. In fact, Congress adjourned in June 1784 without taking any action. Then, too, the confusion over the North Carolina cession and the failure of Georgia to make any cession whatsoever gave Congress very little public land to control in this district. Many of the recommendations were similar to those of the committee reporting on northern Indian affairs during the previous October. The committee noted that Governor Matthews of South Carolina had already taken the initiative, and from his conference with representatives of the southern tribes it was clear that the Indians were ready for peace. Commissioners were to be appointed to treat with the Indians, and were to be instructed to secure the best possible boundaries for the United States. No land grants were to be legalized by the United States unless the treaty for these grants was made by a state or states and was perfectly consistent with the designs of the treaties to be held by the central government. All unauthorized persons were to be forbidden the right to trade with the Indians. The supplies for the treaty were to be furnished by South Carolina, but if that state should not do so, they were to be purchased by

[1] *Journals,* XXVII, 453. There was no quorum of states present in Congress between October, 1783 and June, 1784.

the Superintendent of Finance. The committee took note of the friendly attitude of the Chickasaw Indians, as was shown from papers and correspondence which had been reviewed; the committee also proposed that Indian superintendents or agents should be appointed, to reside at such places as the commissioners might designate and to be governed by rules and regulations of the commissioners until the wishes of Congress might be made known.

Congress was very dilatory in taking action after this report, and two of the northern treaties had already been negotiated when finally on March 15, 1785, Congress passed a resolution for the appointment of commissioners to treat with "the Cherokees and all other Indians southward of them."[2] Affairs, however, had not been at a standstill in the south. On September 20, 1782, North Carolina had appointed commissioners to negotiate a treaty with the Cherokees. Goods for this treaty were to be purchased in Philadelphia by a company of which William Blount was a member.[3]

Of unusual interest was the proposal of a southern confederacy for the management of Indian affairs as made in a letter of Governor Harrison of Virginia to Governor Matthews of South Carolina. The purposes of such a confederacy would have been to make treaties and to establish boundaries beyond which the white people could not go. "If this is not done," wrote the governor, "there is too much reason to apprehend that continued encroachments will be made on their land and, of course, the frontiers of each state laid waste in its turn in revenge for the injuries." Under the old system it was entirely possible for one state to be carrying on an Indian war

[2]*Journals* (o. s.) X, 56.

[3]*N. C. S. R.* XVI, 710. In 1781 General Greene commissioned certain men from Virginia and North Carolina to make peace with the Cherokees. The purpose of this peace was to secure the frontier so that the army might be reinforced by recruits from this region. In the treaty the Indians again recognized the line of 1777 guaranteeing to the whites the control of the road to Kentucky. For Indian talks at this treaty see Draper Collection IXXX49, Photostats of these in the Library of Congress.

while another provided the Indians with the ammunition for carrying on the war.[4] This proposal shows very clearly how far southern Indian affairs had been left to the initiative of the individual states.

George Rogers Clark, under Governor Harrison's direction, was planning to purchase from the Chickasaws land, between the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Ohio Rivers. This was to be done in conjunction with the peace treaty, if possible.[5] The land speculators were busy staking out claims in the new territory, and even the Virginia commissioners for treating with the Chickasaws took advantage of this opportunity to engage in the Muscle Shoals speculation. For this they were severely criticized by Governor Harrison, although Joseph Martin was writing to Patrick Henry at the same time inviting him to join in this speculation.[6] The Chickasaw treaty was held early in November 1783 at French Licks. Martin reported that the Creeks were not present at this treaty, although the Chickamauga seemed favorably disposed; he also gave information concerning the establishment of Spanish trading posts on the Tennessee near the mouth of Bear Creek.[7] Georgia had made a treaty with the Cherokees and a few of the Creeks on May 31, 1783, by which a tract of land between the Tugaloo River and the Upper Oconee was ceded to this state. A few members of the Creek tribe ratified this cession on Novem-

[4]*Letters of the Governors of Virginia,* III, 345.

[5]*Letters of the Governors of Virginia,* III, 425.

[6]*Ibid.,* 425.

[7]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* II, 522; A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish American Frontier 1783-1795,* 54-55.

In the instructions to the commissioners Governor Harrison made the following statement, "You are to be extremely guarded in wording the deed, that no expression may be introduced from which a plea may be made of our quitting the claim we have to the land laying (sic) within our charter and resting it on the Indian purchase, which purchase is only intended to quiet the minds of the Indians and give them a mark of our friendship and esteem, your utmost caution is necessary in this lest you give some force to the strange plea the northern states have set up to a large tract of our country as being contained in a purchase from the Six Nations."

ber 1, 1783.[8] Not to be outdone, the new state of Franklin made the treaty of Dumplin Creek with the Cherokees on May 31, 1785. By this treaty the Cherokees were compelled to cede all their lands south of the French Broad and Holston Rivers east of the divide between the Little and Tennessee Rivers.[9]

Joseph Martin, who was Virginia's agent to the Cherokees, was keeping in close touch with conditions to the southward, and in a letter of September 2, 1784, he mentioned the Spanish treaties of Mobile and Pensacola as showing how the Spanish were trying to spread their influence among the southern Indians.[10] Arthur Coody, writing to the Governor of Virginia from Chickamauga on October 8, stated that the Spanish traders were already in the nations and that there were more at Muscle Shoals and at Chickasaw Landing.[11] This started the Virginia House of Delegates to action, and on November 3, 1784, they passed a resolution instructing the Virginia delegates to urge upon Congress the importance of establishing treaties with the southern Indians. To support their suggestions they sent to Congress some papers and letters from Martin. A further resolution of November 5 requested the executive to adopt such measures as might incline the Indians to treat with the Continental commissioners, and for such purposes the treasury could be drawn upon for a sum not to exceed one thousand pounds.[12]

The Congressional resolution of March 5, 1785, provided for the appointment of three commissioners to treat with the southern Indians. These were to give due notice of the time and place of their treaty to the states of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia; they were to apply to these states for such military protection as they deemed necessary,

[8]*Fifth Annual Rept. of the Bureau of Ethonology,* 151.
[9]*Ibid.,* 152.
[10]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* III, 607.
[11]*Ibid.,* 675. Coody was a half breed living among the Chickamaugas.
[12]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* 620.

and they could draw on any of these states for $9000 to pay the expenses of the treaty, including the commissioners' salaries and $4000 for presents.

On March 21, Congress resolved to choose five commissioners, any three of whom could act as a quorum. Those chosen were Benjamin Hawkins, Daniel Carroll, William Perry, Andrew Pickens, and Joseph Martin.[13] On motion of Williamson of North Carolina it was ordered that the commissioners meet May 16, at Charleston, South Carolina, to make arrangements for the treaty.[14]

The commissioners had arranged to meet the Creeks at Galphinton and arrived for the conference in October, but found the chiefs of only two towns present for the treaty.[15] The non-appearance of the Creeks was due to the influence of McGillivray, who at this time was determined to check Georgia's encroachments as well as Georgia's fur traders. In this determination he was strengthened by Spanish ammunition and by the firm of Panton, Leslie and Company, which was trying to maintain a monopoly of the Indian trade.

At this point the American commissioners came into contact with a power always noted as a master of the art of intrigue. The Indian agent of this power was fitted by nature to play his part with consummate skill. How well he played it recent research has brought to our attention.[16] Shortly after the Americans were disappointed by the non-appearance of the Creeks, McGillivray had written to Martin Navarro, the intendant of Louisiana, mentioning the fact that the Americans were trying to bribe him by offering to pay thirty thou-

[13] *Journals* (o. s.), X, 68-69.

[14] *Ibid.*, 115. On May 16 Congress chose Lachlan McIntosh in place of Daniel Carroll who had declined to serve on the commission.

[15] *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 16.

[16] A. P. Whitaker, *North Carolina Historical Review*, V, 181-203; V, 289-309. A scholarly discussion of McGillivray and the part he played in the history of the southwest. For Spain's part in southwestern Indian affairs see also Manuel Serrano Y Sanz, *Espana Y Los Indios Cherokis Y Chactas en la Segunda Mitad Del Siglio XVIII*, (Seville 1916).

sand pounds for his property. He also referred to the British posts in the northwest as being of great assistance to the Indians, and inferred that this, plus Spanish assistance in the south, could keep up a sufficiently formidable Indian confederacy to prevent the turbulent Americans from carrying out their designs against their neighbors.[17] Spain's policy in

[17]Cuban Archives Indian Trade, I, 30. Transcripts in Ayer Collection. McGillivray's protest against the treaty of 1783 is of great interest. It is an able document that reminds one of the Indian protests in the north. Los Indios Cherokis Y Chactas, 21-23.

"In as much as we the chiefs and warriors of the Indian Nations, Creeks or Talapuche, Chickasaw and Cherokees, having been informed that His Spanish Majesty has sent an envoy with the purpose of establishing the boundaries of this territory and those of the States of America, and having reason to apprehend that the American Congress, in the discussion of these important matters may undertake to take advantage of the last Peace treaty between them and the British nation, and may try to oblige His Majesty, the King of Spain, to concede them the uncultivated territory whose lines are drawn by the said treaty and which would seriously injure and practically ruin us; it is therefore fitting that we object, and we, the chiefs and warriors of the Creek or Talapuche, Chickasaws and Cherokee nations do most solemnly protest against whatever title, pretension or demand the American Congress may establish for or against our territory, settlements and hunting grounds, by virtue of said Peace treaty between the King of Great Britain and the American states declaring that since we are not party to it, thus we are determined to pay no attention to the manner in which the British plenipotentiary has drawn the lines of the territory in question, granted to the American States, it being a fact clearly known by the Americans, known to any person conversant in any way with American affairs, that His Britannic Majesty has never possessed, either through cessions, sale or right of conquest, our territory nor that of which said treaty speaks.

"On the contrary, it is well known that from the beginning of the English colonies being established in Carolina and Georgia, previous to the date of said treaties, there never has existed any treaty—nor let His Britannic Majesty pretend that there has—to our lands, except what was obtained as a free gift or as a sale for good and just monetary considerations.

"We can prove this by citing as example the cession of territory made by us to the Carolinians and Georgians at different times, and one as late as June, 1773, of the territory along the banks of the Ogeeche River, for which we were paid no less than 120,000 pounds sterling. After this time, we have made no treaty to grant any land to any nation whatever. We, the Creek or Talapuche, Chickasaw and Cherokee nations have done nothing whatever to lose our independence and natural rights in favor of said

the southwest was the rather definite one of establishing a barrier state by means of a trading alliance with the Creeks, Chickasaws, and Choctaws.

In working out this policy Spain had the assistance of Panton, Leslie and Company, an English firm with British connections which gradually obtained a practical monopoly of

King of Great Britain, nothing which could vest him with the power to cede away our property, unless fighting on the side of his soldiers on the day of battle and shedding our best blood in the services of his nation, be adjudged such act.

"The Americans, recognizing the injustice done us on this occasion, in consequence of this pretended solicitude, have divided our territories into counties and have settled in our land as if it were their own; example of this, is the rude settlement named Cumberland and others on the Mississippi which with the last attempts in Ockonni territory are all illegitimate possessions in our hunting grounds.

"We have repeatedly warned the States of Carolina and Georgia to desist from these attempts, keeping within the limits set by them and us when we made the said cession of territory to Great Britain in 1773. To these requests we have received friendly words and replies, it is true, but while they address us with the flattering names of friends and Brothers, they are cheating us of our natural rights, depriving us of the heritage which belonged to our ancestors, and which has descended from them to us since the beginning of time.

"As His Majesty has graciously expressed his favorable disposition toward these Indian nations who sought his favor and protection, as we chiefs and warriors of the above mentioned nations did at the general congress held at Pensacola in June, 1784, receive at the same time assurances of protection for ourselves, our respective territory and hunting ground, we, trusting in them (promises) and having the greatest confidence in the good faith, humanity and justice of His Majesty, the King of Spain, hope that His Majesty will not treat with the American States in terms which may strengthen their pretensions or tend to deprive us of our legitimate inheritance, and we ask that Your Excellency may have the kindness to send this memorial and the testimonial to the feet of the throne of His Majesty, and we end by humbly begging that he deign to take it into his royal consideration, and give the said envoy any orders as to the American Congress that out of his great wisdom and kindness he may judge suitable to the plea which we have made with sincerest protestation of our firm love and gratitude for any favor that His Majesty may procure for us on this occasion. Given in the little town of Talasie, in the Creek or Talapuchie country, July 10, 1785. Through the order and through the said nation"—Alexander McGillivray.

the southern Indian trade. As a part of its policy Spain made a treaty with the Creeks at Pensacola on May 31 and June 1, 1784, and with the Chickasaws and Choctaws on July 10.[18] In these treaties the Indians acknowledged that they were under Spain's protection, and also agreed to exclude all traders not able to show Spanish licenses. Considering the fact that a large number of Indian towns lay within the territory of the United States, although this was disputed by Spain, these agreements were of considerable importance.

The American Commissioners undoubtedly realized that they were dealing with the intrigues of Spain. Information had reached Virginia and must have been in the hands of the Continental Congress as to the Spanish attempts to use the Indians as a check upon the United States. It was also strongly suspected that McGillivray was in the pay of Spain.

At the same time the commissioners were faced by the fact that they represented a weak government for whom an Indian war would be disastrous. They realized that a serious situation confronted them because of the continuing clashes between the frontiersmen and the Indians, and that it was a matter of absolute necessity to establish a line between the territories of the United States and the tribes.

Georgia needed increased population to survive. This state was, therefore, unusually interested in securing the largest possible cessions from the Indians and in making great inducements to secure additional population.[19] During the summer of 1785 the state authorities were busily engaged in trying to secure a boundary, finally recognizing the cession made by the Creeks. On June 9 Governor Elbert wrote Colonel Elijah Clark, one of the commissioners, to draw the line, urging haste, for "it is a business of the first consequence to the state and should not be delayed, especially as the commissioners from Congress will shortly be on the same errand and if we

[18]A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier,* 60-61.

[19]*Georgia Historical Collections,* VIII, 167; A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier,* 29.

get through with this before they commence, it may be a capital point gained."[20] On the same day (June 9th) Governor Elbert wrote the Georgia delegates expressing a similar wish with regard to the negotiations with the Creeks; he also stated that Georgia was greatly disappointed at not having a member on the Continental commission to treat with the southern Indians.[21] In the same letter he expressed considerable suspicion of South Carolina, evidently because this state did not favor Georgia's Indian policy. On June 21 the Governor wrote to the Georgia commissioners that reports from Timothy Barnard in the Indian nations showed that the Creeks would not meet with Georgia until the time proposed for the Federal treaty.[22] At the same time Georgia was not able to meet her quota for the Indian commissioners.[23]

Although the Continental commissioners did not succeed in negotiating the Creek treaty they did show the proposed treaty to the Georgia representatives who were present to observe the negotiations and, as we see from the council correspondence, also to negotiate a treaty of their own. The Georgia commissioners protested against the federal treaty. The nature of this protest can best be judged from a report of a committee of the Georgia assembly on February 11, 1786. This report refers to certain commissioners of the United States who attempted to treat with the Creeks and entered into a "pretended treaty" with the Cherokee and other tribes; it accused the federal commissioners of having violated the retained sovereignty and legislative rights of the state in this treaty and recommended abolition of the powers of the commissioners. The delegates to the treaties were to secure a copy of the commissioners' instructions and were to send them to the Governor so measures could be taken to preserve "the sovereign,

[20]Unbound volume of Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89, in Library of Congress.

[21]*Ibid.*

[22]*Ibid.*

[23]*Ibid.*

territorial and legislative rights and privileges to which each citizen is entitled by the confederation and the rights of the land;" the closing resolution sounds very much as though it might have been passed fifty years later: *"that all and every act and thing done or intended to be done within the limits and jurisdiction of this state by the said commissioners inconsistent of the before mentioned rights and privileges shall be and same are hereby declared null and void."*[24] (Italics mine.)

Hindered by Georgia and effectively blocked by McGillivray, the commissioners gave up trying to negotiate with the Creeks at this time. After the Continental commissioners had refused to deal with the Creeks because so few were present, the Georgia commissioners made a treaty with this group on November 12 by which the Augusta boundary line was confirmed and the new boundary obtained, which extended from the forks of the Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers to the source of the St. Mary's River. At a third treaty, which will be mentioned again in this chapter and which was held at Shoulderbone, the Creeks, or a part of them, under duress ratified the treaties with Georgia which had been made at Augusta and Galphinton.[25]

On November 18 the federal commissioners began the treaty with the Cherokees at Hopewell on the Keowee. The commissioners representing Congress were Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin, and Lachlan McIntosh. North Carolina was represented by William Blount, and Georgia by John King and Thomas Glasscock. The Indians were much relieved to be negotiating with someone who did not want their lands. They made many complaints because of encroachments on their lands and interference with their traders.

In this treaty there was a mutual agreement to restore all prisoners. The Cherokees acknowledged the protection of the

[24]*A. S. P. I. A.* I, 17.
[25]*Ibid.*, 15.

United States; the boundaries of the Cherokee territories were defined; settlers beyond the boundary, except those between the French Broad and the Holston River, whose case was referred to Congress, were to forfeit the protection of the United States after six months. The Indians agreed to deliver all offenders against the citizens of the United States, and the Confederation agreed to punish criminals who had committed major offenses against the Indians. The idea of retaliation was not to be practised in the relations between the United States and the Indians; the sole power to regulate trade was given to the United States, and until a policy could be worked out by Congress all United States traders were to have full liberty of trading in the Cherokee towns. The Indians were to notify the United States of any designs against the trade or interest of this country, and the Indians were granted the unusual privilege of sending a deputy to Congress.[26]

In this treaty no extensive cessions were provided for, but a definite policy of controlling the trade of the southwest was foreshadowed. Considering the fact that Spain was also bidding for this trade, we can see why such efforts would be made.

As had been the case in Georgia, the North Carolina commissioners protested vigorously against the Cherokee treaty. It must be remembered at this point that at the close of the Revolution the North Carolina speculators[27] had embarked on a policy of getting control of all the lands to the Mississippi. To do this they violated the rights of the Cherokees and the friendly Chickasaws, and proceeded to stake out claims in territory the title to which did not pass into the hands of the United States for another generation.[28]

[26]For description of the line drawn see *18th annual report of the Bureau of Ethnology,* 648. For negotiations see *A. S. P. I. A.,* I, 40-43; C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 6-8.

[27]Blount and his brother held title to some land in the territory relinquished to the Indians. *John Steele Papers,* I, 21.

[28]Samuel Cole Williams, *History of the Lost State of Franklin,* 13-21.

The commissioners replied to the protests of the North Carolina representatives against the Hopewell treaty, acknowledging its receipt and enclosing two articles of the treaty which they were especially eager to see enforced. One related to the return of prisoners, and the other regarded the forfeiture of protection of those people settling west and south of the Indian line—excepting, of course, those in the forks of the French Broad and Holston, whose status was to be determined by Congress. They concluded by saying:

> We are certain that a steady adherence to the treaty alone, can ensure confidence in the justice of Congress and remove causes of future contention and quarrels. The local policy of some states is certainly much opposed to the federal measures, which can only in our opinion, make us respectable abroad and happy at home.[29]

Joseph Martin, one of the Continental commissioners at the Cherokee treaty, evidently did not think that North Carolina had any just reason to protest, for he wrote to his friend Patrick Henry about the Muscle Shoals speculations, incidentally expressing his desire to be superintendent of Indian affairs for the southern department. Alluding to the North Carolina protest against the Hopewell treaty, he said:

> What I want Congress to know is that in July, 1777, Virginia and North Carolina jointly treated with the Cherokee Indians agreeable to the instructions given to the commissioners by the legislatures of both states for that purpose, who entered into a solemn treaty[30] with said Indians wherein the faith of both states was pledged; they fixed the boundaries which are agreeable to the boundaries fixed or rather renewed by the federal commissioners, which is all the treaty that has ever been held with that people since, only one by the order of General Greene on behalf of the United States when the same boundary was mentioned, the com-

[29] *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 44.

[30] This treaty is referred to by the Indians in their speeches at Hopewell. *A. S. P. I. A.*, 41. See also article by Archibald Henderson, in *N. C. Hist. Rev.*, VIII, 55-116.

missioners were from Virginia and North Carolina.[31] When North Carolina opened her land office in 1783, she agreed to give the Indians $2500 worth of goods and directed me to give the Indians notice and to lay in provisions for the treaty etc,[32] but before the treaty commenced the legislatures ceded the lands north of the Apelatchean Mountains *(sic)* to Congress and stopt the treaty and the goods. I can assure Congress that North Carolina has never treated for any lands since 1777, their own commissioners fixed the line from the mouth of Clouds Creek south and the Virginia commissioner from the mouth of said creek as far north as the Cumberland mountains though North Carolina was about to protest that the Continental commissioners have give *(sic)* up to the Indians, lands that North Carolina purchased from the Indians which is notoriously false. I speak with confidence because I have the original treaties now by me.[33]

North Carolina continued her opposition to the treaty of 1785, although its entry on the Journal seems to have prevented changes. There was, however, no official ratification of the treaties under the Confederation. This, of course, prevented an acceptance of the treaty on the part of this state and its neighbors, and necessitated a new series of negotiations when the government under the Constitution began.

The treaty with the Choctaws was signed at Hopewell on January 3, 1786.[34] The boundary described in the treaty was as follows:

Beginning on a point on the thirty-first degree of North latitude, where the Eastern boundary of the Natches district shall touch the same; thence east along the said thirty-first degree of North latitude, being the southern boundary of the United States of America, until it shall strike the eastern boundary of the lands on which the Indians did live and hunt on the 29th day of November, one thousand seven hundred eighty two, while they were under

[31]Indian talks Draper Collection IXXX49. Photostats in Library of Congress.

[32]Martin was the agent for North Carolina at this time.

[33]W. W. Henry, *Life and Correspondence of Patrick Henry,* III, 382.

[34]C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 8-10.

the protection of the King of Great Britain; thence northerly along said eastern boundary until it shall meet the northern boundary of said lands, thence westerly along said northern boundary until it shall meet the western boundary thereof; thence southerly along the same line to the beginning; saving and reserving for the establishment of trading or trading posts, three tracts or parcels of land six miles square each at such places as the United States in Congress assembled shall think proper: which posts and the lands annexed to them shall be to the use and under the government of the United States of America.

From this treaty it is clear that the land speculators were bringing enormous pressure to bear upon the Indians, for the boundary was fixed as of the day before the date of the preliminary treaty November 29, 1782, which was regarded as the earliest possible time in which the United States was in authority.[35] As in the Cherokee treaty, the importance of the southern Indian trade was fully realized. The line dividing the Choctaws and Chickasaws was to be the same one which had divided them while under British control. The commissioners in reporting the treaty mentioned the fact that McGillivray, who was working in Spanish interests, had tried to prevent the Indians from coming to Hopewell. The Chickasaw treaty was signed on January 10, 1786.[36]

This treaty was very similar to that made with the Cherokees and Choctaws. The boundaries were described as follows:

Beginning on the ridge that divides the waters running into the Cumberland, from those running into the Tennessee, at a point in a line to be run north east, which shall strike the Tennessee, at the mouth of the Duck river; thence running westerly along the same ridge, till it strikes the Ohio; thence down the southern bank thereof to the Mississippi; thence down the same, to the

[35]*A. S. P. I. A.,* I, 50.

[36]This treaty along with the one made with the Cherokees figured very prominently in the case of "Porterfield vs. Clark," *2 Howard,* 76; See also C. J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties,* II, 10-12.

Choctaw line or Natches district eastwardly as far as the Chickasaws claimed and lived and hunted in, the twenty-ninth of November, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-two. Thence the said boundary, eastwardly, shall be the lands alloted to the Choctaws and Cherokees to live and hunt in, and the lands at present in possession of the Creeks; saving and reserving for the establishment of a trading post; a tract or parcel of land to be laid out at the lower part of Muscle Shoals, at the mouth of Ocochappo, in a circle, the diameter of which shall be five miles on the *(not in the original)* river, which post, and the land annexed thereto, shall be to the use and under the government of the United States of America.

The commissioners were especially pleased with the conduct of the Chickasaws as well as with the fact that they had secured reservations for trading posts which were strategically situated for getting in touch with both the Chickasaws and Choctaws. The shortage of money and supplies put the commissioners into the embarrassing position of having to discharge their guards before the treaty was over; they felt that they had succeeded in doing what the English once thought they had accomplished—to draw a boundary between the territory of the Indians and the white people—for they said:

> the boundary of the lands allotted to the respective tribes is closed from every side; from the south fork of the Oconee around northerly and westwardly; and we believe if the adjoining states were disposed to carry the treaties into effect, the Indians would be happy in the new change of sovereignty, and in constant amity with us.[37]

During the summer of 1786, Georgia was trying to secure more land from the Indians. This colony was trying to obtain assistance from other frontier groups to carry out her plans. In August a commission consisting of two men was sent to the

[37]The first official definition of an Indian boundary was found in the Intercourse Act of 1796, *I Stat. L,* 469. It was redefined in 1799. In 1802 the last law defining an Indian boundary was passed. L. F. Schmeckebier, *The Office of Indian Affairs,* 25.

Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians. After completing this mission they were to explain Georgia's plans to the settlements on the Holston, Nollichucky, and Watauga. The before mentioned settlements were to be informed of the reasons for Georgia's demand for satisfaction of the Creeks; to Sevier the commissioners were to report the fact that the attack on the Creeks would be made about December 1, if necessary.[38] On the same day Governor Telfair wrote Sevier that he had postponed consideration of the territory on the Tennessee until the following January. From the correspondence it is evident that Georgia was trying hard to make an alliance with Franklin to carry out her purposes. To hold the interest of the Franklin leaders it was necessary to encourage the Muscle Shoals speculation. At about the same time a special agent was appointed to the Choctaws to act with the commission previously sent. This agent, Benjamin James, was informed that Georgia was to have a force of fifteen hundred men to attend the commissioners at the Creek treaty. James was to secure the assistance of the Chickasaws and Choctaws against the Creeks. If this were possible, these tribes, especially the Choctaws, might be furnished with powder. Although nothing is said about furthering the land policy of Georgia on the Mississippi, it is probably true that this particular problem was also in the minds of the Georgia officials when they sent the negotiators to the Indian tribes.[39] At the same time a communication was also sent to Joseph Martin, Georgia's agent to the Cherokees and Chickasaws, asking him to use his influence to make these tribes support Georgia's policy against the Creeks.[40] A commissary was appointed to the Choctaws who was to work with the other officials to secure the friendship of this tribe. From this it can be seen that Georgia was building up an elaborate Indian department in order that her land policy could be car-

[38]Unbound volume of Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89.
[39]*Ibid.*
[40]*Ibid.*

ried out successfully. It is a matter of speculation as to how this state expected to finance its undertakings.

The Creeks, however, secure in the hope of Spanish support and furnished with arms by Spain, were not so easily intimidated. In fact, they took the offensive against Georgia.[41] In September, the chairman of the committee for negotiating with the Creeks recommended the necessity of preparing for war because of the threatening attitude of affairs in the Indian country. Somehow Georgia was able to make the best of a bad bargain by signing a treaty with a small number of Creeks on November 3. This treaty has already been mentioned (see page 148). On November 28 the governor wrote to the Indian agents, informing them that their activities could now cease, for the state's purposes were accomplished. To Sevier he wrote on the same day that it was no longer necessary to continue warlike preparations. To the special diplomatic mission to the western Carolina and Virginia settlements, the governor wrote as follows:

> This measure [the treaty] will render your stay where you are no longer necessary. Previous to your departure I wish you to assure the gentlemen who appeared disposed to aid and coöperate with the state in the case of open hostilities on the part of the Creek Indians that I have viewed their laudable designs with great pleasure and the state will at all times retain a due sense of the same.[42]

The Georgia-Franklin combination had won a victory, and if they could get the support of the federal government, it might be possible to hold what they had attained. A hope was expressed by Governor Matthews on February 14, 1787, that White, the federal superintendent, might be satisfied with what Georgia had done.[43]

The failure of the federal Indian policy in the south alarmed

[41]A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier 1783-95,* 61.
[42]Georgia Council Correspondence.
[43]*Ibid.*

Patrick Henry, who wrote to the Virginia delegates in Congress as well as to the President of Congress, urging action.[44]

The state of Franklin had forced another land cession from the Cherokees at Chota Ford in July 1786, and the lawless frontiersmen from this state were goading the Indians into desperation.[45] Georgia and the Creeks were carrying on a desultory warfare which might at any time become dangerous to the Confederation.

The superintendent of the Southern district was instructed to repair to North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia as per the resolution of October 6, to investigate and report to Congress the causes for uneasiness among the Indians, so that the proper measures might be taken for the safety of the citizens of the states; if the Indians were not willing to treat, it would then be necessary to take drastic action.[46]

Joseph Martin's letter to the Governor of Virginia on March 25 pointed out the way in which the Franklinites were unlawfully engrossing the cornfields. He informed the Governor that he had carried to Franklin a proclamation of the Governor of North Carolina ordering them off the Indian lands, but that these people had definitely disobeyed it and in the meantime the Spanish influence was increasing among the Choctaws.[47] On February 24 Governor Caswell wrote McGillivray assuring him of North Carolina's intention to live peaceably with the Indians.[48]

Joseph Martin informed Governor Caswell of North Carolina on March 25 that the Indians were in confusion because Franklin had opened a land office for all of the land which the legislature of North Carolina had ceded to the Indians north of the Tennessee River. He also gave the information that the French traders at Muscle Shoals were finding it difficult

[44]W. W. Henry, *Life and Correspondence of Patrick Henry,* III, 350-353.

[45]*Fifth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology,* 152.

[46]*N. C. S. R.* XVIII, 760.

[47]C. C. LXXI, 567.

[48]*N. C. S. R.* XX, 619.

to get goods from Detroit because the Americans were stopping their boats on the Mississippi. They were, however, able to furnish knives, tomahawks, guns, and ammunition. Whether they were getting these supplies from the Spaniards was not stated.[49]

Georgia was having troubles of its own, for the soldiers hired to guard the Creek hostages deserted and the governor found it very difficult to secure others to take their places. James White arrived in the Indian country[50] and on April 4 wrote McGillivray, sounding him out on the difficulties between the Creeks and Georgia.[51] The Georgia authorities were hoping to secure a ratification of their treaties through the agency of the federal superintendent, but, of course, failed to reckon with McGillivray.[52]

On April 8 McGillivray replied to White's letter, presenting a lengthy argument as to why the Georgia treaties were not binding upon the Creeks. He aspired to the position of the defender of his country just as the leaders of the American Revolution had done in the states; he expressed the hope that much would come from the proposed meeting of the Creek chiefs, because he felt that the attitude of the Confederation was such that peace would soon result.[53]

In reporting his conference with the Creeks to Knox, White stated that his arrival in the Indian country had a tranquilizing effect upon the Creeks. He criticized the taking of hostages by Georgia to insure the enlargement of her boundary, since these had all come from the friendly Cussitah group. He pointed out that any restraint which the hostile groups were exercising was due only to their respect for the United States. The Creeks greatly resented the Georgia encroachments and were restrained from action by McGillivray, who had pro-

[49]*Ibid.*, 653.
[50]A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier*, 83.
[51]*A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 21.
[52]Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89.
[53]*A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 18.

posed to White the establishment of an Indian state south of the Altamaha—probably expecting a better arrangement for import of goods than by way of Pensacola. This, of course, could be used as a club to induce more liberal treatment by the Spaniards. White warned Secretary Knox that the Indians had 6000 well-armed men who had the Spanish resources and territories to fall back upon; also, that Georgia's financial assistance would be nil, since the paper currency of the previous year had already depreciated 100 per cent. He again reviewed the causes for the unfriendly disposition of the Creeks, noting their natural reluctance to part with their lands, the purchases made without the consent of the tribes, and the encroachments, and stated finally, that McGillivray, who was in Spanish pay, was the key point in the opposition to Georgia, against which state he seemed to cherish a special animosity.[54]

On April 26 Governor Matthews wrote Brigadier General Jackson that White had returned from the Indian nations reporting that the Indians agreed to an armistice to last until August.[55] At the same time the Governor expressed some concern as to the state's ability to supply the troops in the coming campaign. A few days before this he had written to the delegates, expressing the hope that Congress would see the necessity for making war on the part of the United States. Georgia again turned to the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws for assistance as appears in a letter from Governor Matthews of April 28 to Joseph Martin, the Georgia agent to the Cherokees and Chickasaws.

On July 21, 1787, as a result of a Congressional resolution, Secretary Knox reported a plan for the protection of the frontier of Georgia. This could be done only by organizing a force of sufficient strength to carry aggressive warfare into the Indian country. The secretary concluded that to be

[54]*Ibid.*, 20-21. On pages 19-20 McGillivray reviews the difficulties with Georgia and points out that surrounded as the Creeks were, they would be compelled to fight.

[55]Georgia Council Corr. 1782-89.

adequate any expedition would cost four hundred fifty thousand dollars. Considering the condition of the finances of the Confederation and those of the state of Georgia such an expedition was impossible.[56]

On July 18 Knox made a rather complete report on the Indian disputes between Georgia, North Carolina and the Indians. He pointed out the fact that the Creeks were not a part of the state of Georgia, yet the state was exercising legislative jurisdiction over the territories in dispute, and according to its interpretation of the Confederation the federal government was effectually excluded from interfering in any of these controversies. The United States would not be able to interfere in these disputes unless by virtue of one of three principles. First.—Such an explanation by Congress of the before-mentioned part of the Articles as would enable the United States to regulate the necessary boundaries for the independent tribes of Indians notwithstanding they might be comprehended within the limits of any state; Second.—An interference on the part of the United States on request of the state authorizing the United States to act as judge in any existing dispute and to enforce its judgment on the parties; or Third.—A liberal cession of a part of the territory claimed by the states of Georgia and North Carolina for the use of the United States, whereby they might be enabled to restrain the Indians. He went on to say that the latter would probably be the preferred plan so far as the states were concerned. His recommendation was that the states be informed of the threatening conditions both in the north and south, because of the reckless conduct of states so far as Indian affairs were concerned. His conclusion was that it was absolutely necessary for the United States to possess the right to regulate all affairs with the independent tribes of Indians, and to enforce all treaties and treaty obligations so that an uprising of the tribes might be prevented.[57]

[56] *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 25.
[57] C. C. CLI, 275.

On August 3 the Indian question was the order of the day in Congress. Representative Few of Georgia moved that a treaty with the Creeks be held by the southern superintendent. The causes for the existing difficulties were to be examined. This treaty would, however, have confirmed the Georgia treaties already made. The motion was postponed for the report of a committee consisting of Kearney of Delaware, Carrington of Virginia, Bingham of Pennsylvania, Smith of New York, and Dane of Massachusetts. Certain papers relating to southern Indian affairs had been referred to this committee.

The report of the committee[58] is an excellent statement of the case for centralized control of Indian affairs, and can be only briefly summarized here. The report pointed out that the Indians had real causes for complaint against the frontiersmen, and that it was the duty of the government to see that impartial justice was done to the frontier. A painful absence of coöperation and efficiency was evident; the contentions of the two states, North Carolina and Georgia, were such as to leave the federal power as practically a nullity. The committee then continued by asserting that in dealing with the Indians,

> The powers necessary to these objects appear to the committee to be indivisible and that the parties to the confederation must have intended to give them entire to the Union or give them entire to the states. However, these powers before the Revolution were possessed by the King and exercised by him nor did they interfere with the legislative right of the colony within its limits.

The report then continued with the statement that the Indian tribes were considered as the common friends or enemies of the United States and that no particular state could have an exclusive interest in the management of affairs with any of the tribes except in some uncommon cases. To get out of the difficulty the committee proposed that the two states either

[58] *Journals* (o. s.) XII, 81.

make liberal land cessions to the United States or that they grant to Congress the exclusive management of all affairs with the Creeks and Cherokees, the first of these alternatives being the preferable one. This report was referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Worcester *vs.* Georgia.[59]

[59]6 *Peters,* 515. In the case of *"Worcester vs. Georgia,"* Chief Justice Marshall referred to the Congressional dilemma as follows:

"Congress was therefore considered as invested with all the powers of war and peace and Congress dissolved our connexion with the Mother country and declared these united colonies to be independent states. Without any written definition of powers they employed diplomatic agents to represent the United States at the several courts of Europe; offered to negotiate treaties with them and actually did negotiate a treaty with France. From the same necessity and on the same principles, Congress assumed the management of Indian affairs; first in the name of the United Colonies and afterward in the name of the United States. Early attempts were made at negotiation and to regulate trade with them. These not proving successful, war was carried on under the direction and with the forces of the United States and the efforts to make peace by treaty were earnest and incessant. The confederation found Congress in the exercise of the same powers of peace and war, and in our relations with Indian nations as with those of Europe.

"Such was the state of things when the confederation was adopted. That instrument surrendered the power of peace and war to Congress, and prohibited them to the states respectively unless a state be actually invaded 'or shall have received advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state and the danger so imminent as not to admit of delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted.' This instrument also gave the United States in Congress assembled the sole and exclusive right of 'regulating trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any states; provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.' The ambiguous phrases which follow the grant of power, were so construed by the states of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself. The discontents and confusion resulting from these conflicting claims produced representations in Congress, which were referred to a committee who made their report in 1787. Their report does not assent to the construction of the two states, but recommends an accommodation by liberal cessions of territory or by admission on their part of the powers claimed by Congress.

"The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing constitution. The instrument confers on Congress the powers of war and peace, of making treaties and regulating

On August 17, 1787, Governor Matthews of Georgia wrote Timothy Barnard in the Creek nation in an optimistic fashion regarding the coming war with the Creeks. Franklin would aid with a force of two thousand men; the Choctaws and Chickasaws were friendly, and there might also be some support from South Carolina. He regretted very much having to attack the Lower Creeks, who had given Georgia so much support during the Revolution, but felt that the fault was theirs since they had been led into this by the Upper Creeks; he concluded with the interesting suggestion that if McGillivray would petition for citizenship in Georgia, the property of his father and uncle not sold might be returned and a compensation granted for that which had been sold. He felt that such a measure would receive the support of the Georgia Council and several of the leading citizens; he hinted that McGillivray might still apply for such action through Matthews.[60]

On August 9 the Governor wrote to the Georgia delegates that the state was determined to establish peace with the Creeks. In spite of the fact that there was fighting on the frontier the Governor was unable to secure a prompt meeting of the legislature to vote supplies and provisions for the war, and the state undertook to secure from the Spaniards a promise to refuse supplies to the Indians while the war was going on. When the legislature did meet, the problem of finances and supplies was a real one, and one solution proposed was to provide that those desiring exemption from military service should furnish 100 pounds of powder and 200 pounds of lead. The Governor also sent an appeal to the Continental war department for supplies. The dependence on the support of Franklin was felt very greatly and a commissioner was sent to that community to see when the promised assistance would arrive; provisions were also made to give the Franklin troops bounty

commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and with the Indian nations. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians."

[60]Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89.

lands in the territory of "Bent of the Tennessee"; special commissioners were appointed to carry messages to St. Augustine and New Orleans. Finally, on November 15, Governor Matthews wrote the President of Congress, appealing for aid in supplying the troops to be furnished by Franklin and Georgia for the Creek war. Early in January 1787 the Governor requested the attention of the legislature to the matter of public credit, pointing out that the expenses of the Indian treaty of 1786 had not been paid, and that some provisions would have to be made for the militia called out. He seemed eager to resign his office.[61]

It must be remembered in this connection that already in May 1787 Miró had advised McGillivray to work for reconciliation with the Americans. He promised to supply the Creeks with ammunition until November, but such ammunition was to be used for defensive purposes only. He wrote again in December advising negotiations with Georgia and the United States.[62]

Returning now to Congress we find that this body, before it lapsed into one of its periods of inactivity, passed on October 26, 1787, a resolution for treating with the southern Indians. This resolution provided that the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia each appoint representatives to meet with the southern superintendent to treat with the Indians. Any two commissioners either with or without the superintendent were to be eligible to negotiate with the tribes. Six thousand dollars was appropriated for this treaty in addition to the goods left over from the previous one. The time and place of the Cherokee treaty was to be determined by the superintendent and the executive of North Carolina, and the time and place of the Creek treaty was to be determined by the superintendent and the executive of Georgia. The $6000 was to be furnished in equal parts by Georgia, North Carolina, and

[61] *Ibid.* See also note in *Virginia Gazette and Weekly Advertiser* for August 9, 1787, on conditions in Georgia.

[62] *A. H. R.* VII, 728-33; *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, XII, 165-68.

South Carolina, and was to be credited to their requisitions; the commissioners might call on these states for 200 militia to guard the stores and goods.[63]

When news of the action of Congress reached Georgia, Matthews was appointed as commissioner to represent the state, and Rock Landing on the Oconee was selected as the place for the meeting. The state authorities seemed very eager to coöperate in securing a treaty at the earliest time. Undoubtedly the collapse of the Franklin movement, the condition of the state's finances, and the unwillingness of the Confederation to engage in an Indian war had much to do with this attitude.[64]

In the meantime James White, the southern Indian superintendent, who had been in close touch with Gardoqui, preferred his Spanish intrigues to the Indian superintendency and resigned his position. His work had been comparatively ineffectual; he had devoted most of his time to the Creeks and knew very little about affairs in the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw territories. The Virginia leaders felt that the superintendent or his deputy should have his residence on the Tennessee in order that he might be closer to the heart of Indian affairs. The delegates from this state worked for the appointment of a special agent for Indian affairs to reside among the Cherokees or Chickasaws, since the Ordinance of 1786 made no provision for a deputy in the Southern department.[65] When one considers the number of agents working for Stuart in the Southern department under the British regime it is readily seen that one man could do very little in this large territory. In compliance with the wishes of Virginia, Congress appointed Joseph Martin agent to the Cherokees and Chickasaws by a

[63]*Journals* (o. s.) XII, 144.

[64]A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier,* 109-110. In this connection it should be noted that Georgia was receiving offers of recruits from Botetourt County in Virginia to assist in the war with the Creeks. The only inducement the state was able to offer was bounty lands. See letter of George Handley to I. Preston and others, Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89.

[65]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* IV, 266.

Congressional resolution of June 20, 1788.[66] In this capacity he was to act as a subordinate to the southern superintendent.

On Friday, February 29, 1788, Richard Winne was chosen to take the place of White as southern superintendent of Indian affairs.[67] Georgia and South Carolina appointed commissioners to act with the federal superintendent, but Governor Johnson of North Carolina did not feel that he could take any action until the legislature met in the fall.[68] It was therefore decided to postpone the treaty until autumn.

The delay in treaty negotiations was very alarming to Georgia and much was expected from the mission of George Whitefield, who went into the Indian country as a representative of Pickens, the South Carolina agent, and Matthews, the Georgia representative, to attempt to arrange for a cessation of hostilities. The importance of the Panton store as a factor against Georgia was fully realized, as is shown by a letter from Governor Handley to the Georgia delegates dated April 26, 1788. This state was, however, very eager to hold all that had been gained since the Revolution, and the treaties with the Creeks and Cherokees were submitted to superintendent Winne as a basis for negotiations with the Indians. By August the Governor realized that so far as the state of Georgia was concerned no treaty was possible, for he could hardly get any meeting of the legislature to make the necessary appropriations for the treaty, and he knew also that even if the legislature did meet there were no resources upon which to draw. He suggested a postponement of the treaty until the following year, giving as the chief reason the fact that the government was changing. For the remainder of the Confederation period Georgia was trying to make some kind of a

[66]C. C. CL, III, 505. *Journals* (o. s.) XIII, 30. Martin was eager for the position of superintendent of the Southern department but frontier opposition prevented the realization of his hope.

[67]*Journals* (o. s.) XIII, 14.

[68]C. C. LXXI, 597; *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 26.

peace arrangement which would last until the Federal government could take over the Creek affairs.[69]

Early in January 1789 the state sent messengers to the Creeks to assure them of the friendly disposition of the people of Georgia, and also to inform them of the coming treaty with the United States.

McGillivray had written the commissioners appointed to negotiate this treaty (Pickens of South Carolina, Matthews of Georgia, and Winne, the southern superintendent) that there could be no treaty unless Georgia repudiated her treaties. In September he replied to Winne's letter requesting a postponement of the treaty, agreeing to this proposal; he also took that opportunity to complain of the American violations of the armistice.[70]

McGillivray had been in Pensacola during the month of May, where he had discovered that Miró was sincere in his policy of reconciliation. After this he tried to frighten Panton and Miró into furnishing him unlimited supplies of ammunition by threatening to accept the American offers. He did accept some powder from Bowles, the British adventurer, and in this way succeeded in frightening the Spaniards into giving him additional ammunition.

The news of the continued encroachments of the Franklinites caused Congress to take action, and on September 1, 1788, a proclamation was issued forbidding encroachments and ordering the removal of those settling upon the Cherokee hunting grounds. There was also a proviso that nothing in the proclamation should affect the territorial claims of North Carolina. This proclamation did not affect the settlers between the forks of the French Broad and the Holston Rivers.[71] It was resolved that federal troops were to be transferred from the Ohio to protect the Cherokees' hunting grounds; the proclamation was to be forwarded to the Governors of

[69]Georgia Council Correspondence 1782-89.
[70]*A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 30.
[71]*N. C. S. R.* XXI, 498.

Virginia and North Carolina, who were to see that it went into effect; finally, North Carolina was enjoined to apprehend Sevier and his raiders.[72]

Although North Carolina did not at this time know whether she was in or out of the Union, she did attempt to make some kind of peace arrangements with the Indians. As a result of Winne's letter of August 9, Governor Johnson had ordered Sevier's arrest.[73] Winne was particularly anxious to stop the Franklin raids and made a personal appeal to the officers there to discontinue hostilities until he had time to get sufficient supplies for negotiating a treaty. He felt sure that peace could be established upon an equitable basis.

The legislature of North Carolina adopted a strongly anti-federal report on Indian affairs in November 1788. However, the state did appoint John Steele as its agent to assist in the negotiation of the treaties, and the Governor ordered all hostilities with the Indians to cease. On the same day he wrote a friendly letter to McGillivray, assuring him of the state's desire to live in peace and amity with the Indians.[74]

On December 2 Alexander Dromgoole was commissioned as a special peace messenger to the Cherokees; he was also to go to the Creeks with a friendly talk from the governor to McGillivray.[75]

The particularistic attitude of the state is brought out in a letter from William Blount to John Steele, the North Carolina commissioner, written on January 17, 1789. In this letter Blount tries to make it clear to Steele that North Carolina was interested only in the Cherokee treaty and that it was Steele's duty to get that treaty arranged before the goods were exhausted, even if it were necessary to resort to some sharp practices.[76]

[72] *Journals* (o. s.) XIII, 93-94.
[73] *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 45.
[74] *N. C. S. R.* XXI, 507.
[75] *Ibid.*, 508.
[76] *John Steele Papers*, I, 27.

At a meeting of commissioner Steele and the superintendent of Indian affairs on February 2, it was decided that because of Georgia's impoverished condition an immediate treaty with the Creeks was impossible. On February 19, 1789, John Steele wrote Governor Johnson inquiring whether there was not enough gold to furnish the money voted by the legislature. He also asked for instructions, because the legislature had asked for an extension of the boundary to the divide between the Little and Tennessee Rivers, and the Congressional instructions forbade any cessions.[77] The Governor replied on March 14 enclosing a warrant on the treasury for the $3333⅓ which he thought might be useful since the treaty was to be held in the state. He stated that there was no specie available. As to the boundary, the Governor urged the securing of anything favorable to North Carolina but "by no means embarrass the negotiations by making demands which may create—and protract the negotiations without a probable prospect of success."[78]

Steele wrote again on April 9 from Halifax, informing the Governor that the superintendent and the commissioner from South Carolina would give no receipt for currency unless 50 per cent. were added to make it equal to gold and silver; he made it clear that of the $10,000 to be spent much would have to be spent because of North Carolina's difficulties with the Indians, and that the state's quota would be nearly used up just for feeding the Indians at the treaty. He also stated that the legislature had appropriated £2500 to make the same purchase which he was to make now, which money, however, had never been given to the Indians. He urged that a similar sum might again be appropriated, but if the legislature was not willing to do this it should at least make its appropriation equal to specie. Unless this were done there could be no treaty for "Georgia hath no money and nearly one-half of South Car-

[77] *N. C. S. R.* XXI, 527.

[78] *Ibid.*, 535.

olina's quota is already expended and the commissioners say that some must be reserved for the Creeks."[79]

Governor Johnson wrote Steele on April 11, 1789, that he would lay the matter of finances before the council as soon as it could be convened. However, the council had already decided that the Governor could not draw for greater sums than the assembly had voted, although they were aware that the sum voted was not equal to that intended by Congress, "but as long as the Assembly hold the delusive idea that 8s currency is equal to a dollar it will not be in the power of the executive to speak a language different from that of the Acts of the Assembly which are to carry into execution and not to amend."[80]

In a long letter to Steele dated May 5, 1789, Blount pointed out that although South Carolina was now acting as a restraining influence in the matter of land cessions from the Indians, this state had obtained very liberal cessions in 1777. Blount was not friendly to Pickens, the agent from South Carolina. He discussed the treaty of Hopewell, pointing out the opposition of the delegates from North Carolina and Georgia; this opposition had convinced Congress that the treaties could not be carried out and that it would be necessary to hold another treaty. At this new treaty the commissioners were to be appointed by the states and to act under federal control, thus barring any opposition on the part of the states to any treaty which the commissioners might make. He insisted that Steele should agree to no treaty which did not recognize the line established in 1783, and that he should consider Blount's motion in the North Carolina legislature on November 29, 1788, as instructions. He concluded with the statement that Georgia's new agent, Osborne, would be willing to coöperate with Steele since the two states had much in common.[81]

[79] *Ibid.*, 544.
[80] *Ibid.*, 545.
[81] *John Steele Papers*, I, 34.

On June 7 the commissioners (Steele, Osborne, and Pickens) sent a talk to the Cherokees from the Upper War Ford of the French Broad River, stating that they had already waited for twelve days and were now obliged to go to the Oconee to meet the Creeks. The treaty which was to have been held was now postponed until some time convenient for both sides.[82] The commissioners were doubtful as to holding a federal treaty in North Carolina, because at this time the state was not a member of the Union. Steele was still hopeful and remained for some time. He even sent word to the Cherokees asking for some of them to meet him and promising them safety if they came. However, nothing came of this treaty because the Cherokees refused to attend.

In the meantime, on June 7, Panton wrote McGillivray urging him not to doubt his friends the Spaniards, insisting that no cessions be made east of the Oconee. He stated that the Americans could not give an advantage unless it would be cheaper trade, and that would be a very little one if Spain would agree to his (Panton's) trade proposition. He felt sure that if Spain would make the proper regulations he could sell as cheaply as the Georgians; he therefore asked McGillivray to decline a commercial treaty until the policy the court of Spain would determine upon with regard to trade were known. He concluded, "Your connexions with the Spanish government is far more safe and respectable than it can be made by those Republican Gentry and merits your attention beyond anything they can offer."[83]

By this time the new government was already under way, and at its head was a man of whom Madison wrote, "It is fortunate that to the other qualifications of the President is added a more than common knowledge of western and Indian affairs which will enable him to make the best of all information relating to them."[84] The Indian question immediately

[82] *Ibid.*, 50.
[83] *Ibid.*, 51.
[84] Wayne Papers, XIX, 84.

became one of the important problems facing the federal government, and already on July 7, 1789, Knox reported, "The disgraceful violations of the treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokees deserve the serious consideration of Congress." Knox, although a military man, had an unusual comprehension of the problem of the Indian. In this report he summarizes the problem as follows:

Although the disposition of the people of the states to emigrate into the Indian country cannot be effectually prevented, it may be restrained by postponing new purchases of Indian territory, and by prohibiting the citizens from intruding on the Indian lands. It may be regulated by forming colonies under the direction of the government and by posting a body of troops to execute their orders. As population shall increase and approach the Indian boundaries, game will be diminished and new purchases may be made for small considerations. This has been and probably will be the inevitable consequence of cultivation. It is, however, painful to consider that all the Indian tribes, once existing in those states now the best cultivated and most populous, have become extinct. If the same causes continue, the effects will happen and, in a short period the idea of an Indian this side of the Mississippi will be found only in the pages of the historian.[85]

[85] *A. S. P. I. A.*, I, 53.

Knox said in part:

"As the great source of all Indian wars are disputes about their boundaries, and as the United States are, from the nature of the government, liable to be involved in every war that shall happen on this or any other account, it [the power to control Indian affairs] is essential to all measures for the consequence of which they are responsible.

"No individual state could with propriety complain of the invasion of its territorial rights. The independent nations and tribes of Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not as subjects of any particular state. Each individual state, indeed, will retain the right of pre-emption of all lands within its limits, which will not be abridged; but the general sovereignty must possess the right of making all treaties, on the execution or violation of which depend peace and war.

"How different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to reflect, that, instead of exterminating a part of the human race by our modes of population, we had preserved, through all difficulties, and at last had imparted our knowledge of cultivation and the arts to the aborigines of the

country by which the source of future life and happiness had been preserved and extended. But it has been conceived to be impracticable to civilize the Indian of North America. This opinion is probably more convenient than just.

"But to deny that under a course of favorable circumstances, it could be accomplished, is to suppose that human character [is] under the influence of such stubborn habits as to be incapable of melioration or change—a supposition entirely contradicted by the progress of society, from the barbarous ages to its present degree of perfection."

V

TOWARD AN INDIAN POLICY

TO characterize as an Indian policy anything which the federal government ever did so far as Indian affairs are concerned may be open to criticism. It is, however, true that during the period under discussion the Continental Congress held to a theory which would have given it practical control over the destinies of the tribes. A committee on August 3, 1787, stated the question as follows:

> The committee conceived that it has been long the opinion of the country, supported by justice and humanity, that the Indians have just claims to all lands occupied by, and not fairly purchased from them; and that in managing affairs with them, the principal objects have been war and peace, purchasing certain tracts of their land, fixing the boundaries between them and our people, and preventing the latter settling on lands left in possession of the former. The powers necessary to these objects appear to the committee to be indivisible and that the parties to the confederation must have intended to give them entire to the union, or to have given them entire to the state: these powers before the Revolution, were possessed by the King, and exercised by him, nor did they interfere with the legislative right of the colony within its limits.[1]

The only thing omitted in this statement, the matter of trade regulation, was covered in the federal constitution by the clause, "Congress shall have the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes."

The Continental Congress and the Congress under the Confederation are usually considered, and rightly so, as not having much authority. Yet these bodies did represent the power of

[1] *Journals* (o. s.) XII, 83.

the union, weak as it was. This power had reality, for James Clay, a Georgia merchant, wrote to Abraham Baldwin on June 27, 1789, regarding Indian affairs, "We have not the smallest means to go to war with the Indians but the Indians will be cautious how they draw down the forces of the Union."[2] Although this was written after the new government had gone into action, yet no one was able then to determine whether it would have more strength than the one it had displaced.

There was a group of men either in Congress or influencing this body, who saw the Indian problem in its true light. Among these were Generals Washington and Schuyler, Patrick Henry, John Marshall, and Secretary of War Knox. One thing which was very clear to this group was that the Indian problem would eventually be solved very largely by the mere pressure of civilization upon barbarism, and that the economy of the savage would not be able to survive against that of the white man. The Indian would be forced to retreat by these conditions, and wars and bloodshed would be unnecessary. Of course, to carry out such a policy would have required a powerful central government able to do exact justice to the children of the woods.

In the early days of the Revolution, when a common danger and the first enthusiasms made for union, the Indian policy of the Congress was not challenged. Soon, however, the old particularism which had caused so many difficulties for the imperial government began to assert itself, and throughout this and the early federal period the policy of the central government was challenged by the states, who insisted that in the conduct of Indian affairs their sovereignty had been infringed upon. This was the case especially when the federal policy interfered with what the frontiersmen considered to be their property rights. It was considered a mark of aristocracy (Federalism) in frontier states to advocate an ameliorative

[2]*Georgia Historical Collections,* VIII, 214.

policy with regard to the Indians. One of the reasons for John Steele's defeat when running for Congress in North Carolina was the fact that he was not stern enough in his attitude toward the Indians on the frontier. Steele had been one of the commissioners under the old Congress and was inclined to favor some justice for the tribes.[3] In spite of a jealous regard for their sovereign rights and in spite of a certain scorn for the weak government of the Confederation, the states were always ready to call for assistance from that despised power when in danger, especially when the Indians, as in the south, were assisted by some foreign power.

In his study, *The Navy of the American Revolution,* Dr. Paullin points out that there were two factions with regard to the question of the proper organization of the executive departments. He designated these as the "dispersive school" and the "concentrative school."[4] The dispersive school was very much in control of the situation until 1780. Single heads were established for the departments of foreign affairs, war, and finance at about that time. During the earlier period Indian affairs were controlled by a committee or a series of committees. Members leaving Congress, and the reorganization of Congress after such a move as that from Philadelphia to York and then to Baltimore, caused frequent changes in the personnel of the Indian committees. Letters and papers were regularly referred to the Indian committee, but one can detect little evidence of a consistent policy. Such a policy would have been practically futile, for the authority of Congress was declining rapidly. The last committee for Indian affairs was appointed May 4, 1779, and consisted of James Duane, John Armstrong, Thomas Burke, Henry Laurens, and Roger Sherman.[5] By this time it had become evident that most of the dealings with the Indians would be along military lines, and so one notes that Indian matters were largely referred to the

[3] *The John Steele Papers,* I, note 1 on page 127.
[4] C. O. Paullin, *The Navy in the Revolution,* 211.
[5] *Journals,* XV, 1446.

Board of War and reported from the Board to Congress.[6] Under the direction of the Board commissions were given to friendly Indians of the Oneida, Tuscarora, and Delaware tribes and also to a Seneca who rendered services at Fort Pitt.

A report of the Board of War on March 15, 1781, regarding the western affairs contained the very practical suggestion that it would be advisable to have someone invested with the authority of Indian agent and that the commanding officer could do this under instruction from the Board.[7] The committee for making peace with the Indians reported on April 21, 1783, recommending that the general superintendence of Indian affairs should be annexed to the Board of War.[8] What action was taken on this resolution does not appear in the Journals. The early commissioners appointed to make peace with the Indians acted under instructions from Congress. However, under the plan of 1786 the superintendents were to receive their instructions from the Secretary of War and were also to correspond with him. He would then report the information received from the superintendents to Congress.[9] When the Department of War was created under the Act of August 7, 1789, among the duties assigned to it were all those relating to Indian affairs.[10]

In the draft of the Articles of Confederation as submitted by Franklin, the Indians are referred to in article ten, which provided that no colony was to engage in an offensive war with any nation of Indians unless the consent of Congress or of the Executive Council had been obtained. Such consent was to be obtained in order that the justice or necessity of the war could be considered. Article eleven provided that an offensive and defensive alliance should be entered into with the Six Nations.

[6]*Journals,* XI, 829; XIII, 411; XIV, 693; XVI, 162; XVIII, 1067. For the final disposal of Indian commissions, those granted the Oneidas during the Revolutionary War—see *A. S. P. I. A.,* I, 123.

[7]*Journals,* XIX, 279.

[8]*Journals,* XXIV, 264.

[9]*Journals* (o. s.), XI, 127.

[10]F. W. Hodge, *Handbook,* pt II, 106-7.

A boundary was to be drawn around the territories and no encroachments were to be permitted, nor were any private or colonial land purchases to be tolerated. Land purchases were to be made only as an agreement between the Great Council of the Six Nations and the Congress. The boundaries of all other tribes were to be similarly ascertained and, when necessary, agents were to be supplied at the general expense of the Confederation.[11]

In the Dickinson draft[12] article fourteen provided for a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance with the Six Nations and other neighboring tribes of Indians. The provisions regarding boundaries and encroachments were similar to those in the Franklin draft. All purchases made hereafter by the colonies or private persons were to be considered valid until the limits of the colonies were ascertained; all purchases outside of state limits were to be made by the United States or its agents from the general councils of the Indians for the benefit of the United Colonies. Article eight, discussing the powers of Congress, gave to that body the right of regulating trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, as well as the right of disposing of territory purchased from the Indians for the general benefit of the United Colonies. By article thirteen no state was to carry on war unless among other things it had received advice of an invasion to be made by neighboring tribes.

Article nine of the final draft[13] gave to the United States the power of regulating the trade and managing all affairs of the Indians not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits was not infringed upon. As already stated, James Madison gave it as his opinion that the clause safeguarding state rights was largely the work of the Virginia members of Congress (cf III, 18).

[11] *Journals, II,* 197-98.
[12] *Journals,* V, 549.
[13] *Journals,* IX, 919.

To preserve the balance (sic) between us and the French is the great ruling principle of modern Indian politics. The Indians frequently repeat that trade was the foundation of their alliance or connexion with us and that it is the chief cement which binds us together and this should undoubtedly be the first principle of our whole system of Indian politics.[14]

This statement made by Wraxall concerning the period before the French and Indian war was entirely valid for this period.

A new phase in the struggle for the fur trade of the northwest had begun in 1763. Before that time it had been between the French and the English. After that date it was between the settlers and traders from the southern colonies, and the Canadian merchants, with the Spanish and French traders from across the Mississippi playing no insignificant part. The Revolution was only one phase of the struggle which continued a long time after that event, and, as has been pointed out, had it not been for the intervention of other factors, the United States would have been decisively defeated in its race to control the northwest.[15]

In the south during the Revolution a large part of the Indian trade was in British hands. Even before the war the trade had been shifting to Pensacola and Mobile. The flight of British agents and traders to Florida served to aid this change. We have seen that the British Indian department in the south was discontinued, with the advice to the tribesmen that they might find the Spanish ready and willing to assist them. The recent struggle between the Americans and Indians would make the latter all the more willing to trade with the Spaniards.

Because of an unenlightened commercial policy Spanish merchants were unable to furnish the Indians with their necessary goods and supplies. At the same time such articles as they could furnish were greatly inferior to what the English had sold them. It became necessary, therefore, after the close of

[14]McIlwaine, Introduction to Wraxall's *Abridgment*, 1.

[15]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade 1763-1800*. Chapter I, gives a careful summary of conditions before the Revolutionary war.

the war, for the Spanish in the south to use the English firm of Panton, Leslie and Company as their agent for Indian trade. In securing control of the trade, it is necessary to note that the influence of Alexander McGillivray, leader of the Creeks, was a prominent factor in Spain's favor.

During the war American traders faced British opposition in the south. After the war it was still British traders, but now working for Spanish masters, who tried to prevent the development of trade and the western expansion of the new nation.[16]

In the northwest the British were determined to maintain the monopoly of the fur trade. Although Americans were interested in securing this trade, their inability during the Revolution to capture any of the strategic points made it impossible for them to progress along this line.

By holding the fur trading posts, by controlling the line of supplies to Quebec and across the ocean, by their ability to bring economic pressure upon any wavering tribe, and because of the inability of the Americans to furnish goods the British were successful in keeping control of the trade situation.[17]

The attitude of the British merchants toward the peace treaty has already been mentioned. After 1783 the purpose of British and Canadian merchants was to prevent, if possible, any American competition in trade. In this they were greatly assisted by the retention of the northern posts. Great care was taken to prevent goods from the United States from being brought into the Indian territory. Similarly, the Canadian government made every possible effort to prevent furs from being exported by way of American ports. In spite of the care which was taken, furs were smuggled south by way of Lake Champlain.[18] Although the Americans were not inactive during the later period, their progress was only very slight so far as the control of trade was concerned.

[16]A. P. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier 1783-95*, 25-26; 36-41; 43-46.

[17]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade*, II.

[18]*Ibid.*, IV, 100.

Turning now to the attempts of Congress to develop the Indian trade, we find that the importance of goods and presents was impressed upon the American commissioners dealing with the Indians so soon as they began to negotiate. Therefore, the securing of Indian goods became one of the early problems of the Continental Congress.[19]

In a resolution of June 12, 1775, the supposition was that "the Indians depend upon the colonists for arms, ammunition and clothing," and certain appropriations were made to the commissioners of each department for defraying the expenses of treaties and presents for the Indians.[20] Since the Six Nations at their treaty had expressed a desire for trade to be opened at Albany and Schenectady, it became necessary for Congress to try to secure the goods, and to put the trade under suitable regulations so as to satisfy the Indians and the traders.[21] Three members, James Wilson, Silas Deane, and Francis Lewis, were added to the committee making this report, and this enlarged committee was to devise a plan for carrying on trade with the Indians and for securing goods suitable for this trade.[22] The committee reported on December 29, although the details of the report are not mentioned in the "Journals."

On January 27, 1776, a report on Indian trade was presented. It proposed that £40,000 worth of Indian goods be imported at the risk of the United Colonies; these goods were to be divided among the three Indian departments and were to be sold to the Indians by licensed traders under the supervision of the commissioners. Certain rules as to fair prices, fair dealings with the Indians, restriction of trade to certain designated posts, and the giving of bond for the observance of these rules,

[19]At the Albany and German Flats conference in 1775; also Commissioners to Indians at Pittsburgh October 26-29, 1776. Yeates Papers, Pa. Hist. Soc.

[20]*Journals,* II, 175.

[21]*Ibid.,* III, 366.

[22]*Ibid.,* III, 366.

were presented by Congress. Private individuals were not to be debarred from importing Indian goods under such restrictions as the "Associations" entered into by the Continental Congress would impose. The secret committee of Congress was authorized to make contracts for the importation of the necessary goods.[23]

The question of goods continued to be one of vital importance to the Americans. Besides tobacco, powder, flour, and whiskey they were able to furnish very few of the things which the Indians demanded, since they were cut off from the greatest center of the fur trade—London. The English had the advantage of access to that market although handicapped by the long distance which their goods had to travel and by restrictions which military necessity put upon trade. They were also not sure of the French Canadian traders and they always faced the danger of an attack from Louisiana, where the Spanish were awaiting an opportunity of extending their influence commercially and politically. Since the fur trade was the chief interest of the British leaders of the northwest, one is not surprised to note how closely it was supervised, especially during the period of the war. This was done, of course, to prevent the diversion of supplies and furs to the Americans.[24]

Congress continued its interest in the trade, and on May 6 it resolved that the northern commissioners assure the Indians that Congress was attempting to secure Indian goods.[25] At the same time Schuyler found it necessary to shut off trade with the Upper Mohawk country. Congress passed a resolution ordering the purchase of certain Indian goods said to be at Fort Pitt, and also that goods up to the value of $10,000 be purchased at Montreal.[26] The poor financial condition of

[23]*Journals,* IV, 96. At the same time the British were importing goods by the way of Quebec. C. A. Q. II, 166.

[24]W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade,* II.

[25]*Journals,* IV, 260.

[26]*Ibid.,* 329-30.

the American Canadian enterprise at this time makes it rather doubtful whether this was carried out. Congress also voted $10,000 to be spent in each department for Indian presents. In this connection one must realize that profiteering was one of the problems facing the Continental commissioners when they came to purchase Indian goods with their limited appropriations. In a letter from Jasper Yeates, one of the commissioners of Indian affairs for the Middle department, to James Wilson, dated January 30, 1776, he says, "We shall be forced to exceed greatly the $10,000 voted by Congress for the Department. I could never have conceived the exorbitant prices demanded for Indian goods. No patriotism in trade, methinks."[27]

In July, 1776, the debate on the control of Indian trade took place in Congress.[28] On July 26, in the debate of that day, Rutledge and Lynch of South Carolina opposed giving the power of regulating the trade and management of all Indian affairs to Congress; Gwinnet of Georgia favored such action; Braxton of Virginia favored including such nations as were tributary to any state; Jefferson explained this to mean the Indians living within the colony; Wilson of Pennsylvania insisted that the colony had no rights over Indians whether within or without the real or pretended limits of any colony. He stated, furthermore, that the Indians would not allow themselves to be classed according to colonial boundaries and that grants made 3000 miles to the eastward had no validity with the Indians. Pennsylvania's Indian trade was greater than that of her neighbors. Walton of Georgia stated that this trade was of no assistance to any colony and that it must be a monopoly; if the trade were free it would produce only jealousy, animosities, and wars. South Carolina considered the trade as contributing to her grandeur and dignity; deerskins constituted a large part of this trade, but there was a

[27]Yeates Papers, Pa. Hist. Soc.

[28]*Journals,* VI, 1077-79.

great difference between Carolina and Georgia, because Carolina was in no danger from the Indians since Georgia was a frontier state and acted as a barrier. Georgia would therefore be overrun and destroyed before Carolina was hurt; Georgia was not equal to the expense of giving such presents as would be necessary to keep peace; the profits of trade were not equal to the expense of the presents. Rutledge replied that he differed from Walton on many points. He insisted that Carolina had spent great sums on Indian wars in 1760 and later had spent 5000 guineas; that they had forts in the Indian country and were connected with them by treaty. Lynch continued by saying that Congress might regulate the trade if they would indemnify Carolina for the expense of keeping peace and for defending the frontier against the Indians. Witherspoon of New Jersey pointed out what seemed to him to be very significant—that two provinces situated almost alike with respect to Indian affairs differed very greatly in their point of view. Chase of Maryland argued that since South Carolina claimed to the South Sea and since Virginia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts did the same, South Carolina could therefore not insist on being the only one to regulate the trade with the Indians, but must share it with the others. Sherman of Connecticut moved that Congress might have the superintending power to prevent injustice to the Indians and the colonies. Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that no lasting peace could be made with the Indians unless it was made with some one body. There ought to be no language like this, "We are stronger, we are better than another colony; no power ought to treat with the Indians except the United States. The Indians already know the value of confederation and were much impressed in previous years by the idea of colonial union." He insisted that none should trade with the Indians unless licensed by Congress; if everyone were allowed to trade with the Indians a state of perpetual warfare would result. Stone of Maryland insisted that this centralized control was

worse than either alternative and that the colonies would claim the right first. Congress would not interpose until the evil had happened, and disputes would occur when Congress did not interpose. Our record ceases at this point. The only result on record is the clause in the Articles of Confederation giving the United States the power of regulating the trade with Indians not members of any state.

On February 17, 1777, Congress appropriated $10,000 from the military chest to the commissioners of the Northern department for goods to be distributed in order that peace might be preserved. The goods were to be purchased within the states, care being taken that there be no bidding against those purchasing goods for the United States.[29] On July 12 of the same year Congress approved a plan of the Northern commissioners to purchase Indian goods at Boston.[30] On the afternoon of May 4, 1778, after considering the French treaties all morning, Congress passed a resolution appropriating $10,000 from the military chest of the Northern department to purchase goods for opening trade with the friendly Indians of the Six Nations. In 1776 Schuyler had proposed to secure goods for this trade by preventing the Montreal traders from making their westward journeys. Their goods might then be used at Albany and Schenectady.

In keeping with the Congressional resolution an attempt was made to carry on trade at Albany, Schenectady, and Fort Stanwix, but with no great success. On October 16, 1778, John Hausman, who was the storekeeper at Fort Stanwix, wrote General Schuyler that the goods sent him were much less in weight than the invoices had stated. The Indians also had been dissatisfied with the prices and had demanded that the goods be sold at the rates of 1771. He had, therefore, closed the store until further notice.[31]

After the British raids on the Oneidas, the friendly mem-

[29] *Journals,* VIII, 127.
[30] *Ibid.,* 550.
[31] C. C. CLIII, IV, 370.

bers of this tribe were furnished with supplies at the expense of Congress and an attempt was made to support them until the end of the war.[32] Schuyler mentioned the removal of these Indians in a letter to Congress dated October 10, 1780. He stated that there were about 400 of them and that they were complaining because of their supplies.[33] On December 2 he wrote that he had the Indians removed to the vicinity of Saratoga, where they might be better supplied. In this letter he had the following to say about them:

> In the late incursions of the enemy they joined with our troops with alacrity and behaved with a spirit which drew the admiration of the officers under whose command they fought and bled, but I fear their virtue will at last yield to a continuation of distress which no human being can endure and that they will renounce an alliance which has exposed them to such abuse.[34]

On March 29, 1781, he wrote that the state of New York had been compelled to purchase supplies and that unhappy quarrels between the soldiers and Indians had resulted in the death of one Indian and the serious injury of another. It had, therefore, been necessary to remove the Indians to temporary huts for which boards had been furnished them.[35]

On June 20, 1778, $10,000 was to be spent to procure presents and goods for the Indians at Fort Pitt. The commissioners were authorized to draw upon the military chest at Fort Pitt for any contingent expenses connected with the approaching treaty.[36]

The question of a Congressional ordinance for the control of Indian trade was before Congress in 1783-84. No definite action was taken.[37]

Much time was spent during the next two years with peace negotiations, financial problems, the public land question, and

[32] *Journals*, XVII, 1067.
[33] C. C. CLIII, 541.
[34] *Ibid.*, 551.
[35] *Ibid.*, 547.
[36] *Journals*, XI, 626.
[37] *Journals*, XXV, 692.

the negotiation of Indian treaties. By 1786 Congress had decided that its conduct of Indian affairs was expensive and not productive of real results. The appointment of temporary commissions for special negotiations left Congress completely out of touch with Indian affairs. The necessity of using trade as a means of maintaining friendly relations with the Indians was axiomatic, but along that line no progress had been made. In fact, as has been pointed out, the southern trade was in danger of being absorbed by the Spanish, while in the north it was being monopolized by the British.

In the plan of 1786, Congress tried to overcome the difficulties. The enforcement of trade regulation was to be in the hands of two superintendents. Trade in the northern department was to be conducted at posts. None but citizens of the United States could reside among or trade with the Indians, and all traders had to be licensed by the superintendent. The person securing a license, which was to last for one year, had to give bond for the faithful observance of all rules prescribed by Congress for the conduct of Indian trade.

From the time of the earliest years of the Revolutionary War until the treaties with the southern Indians in 1785, Congress made little effort to control southern Indian trade. In the Northern department it attempted to evolve and supervise a sane trade policy which, however, it lacked the authority and the goods to carry out. The plan for controlling the trade was based upon British precedents and certainly was not improved upon when a government of some authority took control of Indian affairs in 1789. The fact that the best men in Congress were overworked was of considerable importance so far as Indian affairs were concerned. At times men who were on the Indian committee of Congress were so busy with other matters that this duty was neglected.[38]

[38]George Morgan stated on September 16, 1776, that Wythe, Jefferson and Rutledge of the Indian committee had been absent and no business had been done. Two of them had returned and he hoped that something would now be done by the department. Yeates Papers.

Then, too, the men who acted as agents were frequently not of the highest type. The work of George Morgan at Fort Pitt is a good example of what could have been accomplished had the Continental Congress been represented by able men.[39]

It is rather difficult to determine how much trade was carried on in the period under discussion. In the south, Stuart complained that turning the control of Indian trade back to the colonies had made certain Indian traders influential among the tribes. Some of these used this influence against the Crown when the war broke out. Among them was George Galphin, who had not been favorably considered in the allotment of damages and debts collected from the Indians by the land cessions of 1773.

The Americans with headquarters at Augusta and Charleston, the British centering at St. Augustine, Mobile, and Pensacola, and the Spanish at New Orleans, later shifting to Mobile and Pensacola, were all striving to control the Southern Indian trade.

The Americans at first secured supplies from the captures made by privateers. However, with these they were unable to meet even a small part of the Indian demands.

That the Americans were getting some of the Indian trade in this section is shown by the interest of Spain and the Spanish-supported Panton, Leslie and Company, in attempting to check the traders from South Carolina and Georgia. The Americans made an effort to secure control of the trade immediately after the war, for McGillivray wrote O'Neill, the commander at Pensacola, on March 26, 1784, that the Americans had sent goods for trade and he was permitting them to carry on this trade until after the coming Indian conference with the Spaniards.[40]

[39]In this connection one should note also the work of James Deane the interpreter among the Oneidas, and Samuel Kirkland, missionary to the same tribe.

[40]Cuban Archives—Louisiana and Florida Indian Trade, I, 12. Transcripts in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library, Chicago.

When the war was over many of the Scotch merchants who formerly worked for the British remained in the tribes. Joseph Martin, writing to Patrick Henry on September 19, 1785, mentions Mr. McDonald, an old British agent who was residing twenty-five miles south of Chickamauga and who was then trading at Pensacola.[41] In 1788 Martin wrote to the Secretary of War that McDonald and Scott were carrying on an extensive trade among the Cherokees and were encouraged in this by certain gentlemen from South Carolina who furnished the goods. Martin complained that they were not observing the rules prescribed in the plan of 1786.[42]

On July 19, 1785, Sevier wrote Patrick Henry with regard to certain Chickasaw chiefs who had come seeking Martin, but because of the latter's absence, had conferred with him. He stated that these Indians were soliciting trade and that he was having a "few honest people return with them and take a few goods. This can be done because there is a very large store opening at the North Fork two miles below Great Island by merchants from Baltimore."[43] A group of Baltimore merchants sent Lewis Brantz, later to become one of the leading citizens of that city, to look over trading possibilities on the Tennessee. Reporting from the Nashville region either late in 1785 or early in 1786, he had the following to say about the trading conditions:

> Furs are the sole production of this region, with which the people supply their wants. The traders who supply them with merchandise are Frenchmen from Illinois or the Post Vincennes. The Illinois traders obtain their goods from Michillimackinac or Lake Michigan and their liquor from New Orleans, while the St. Vincennes people purchase their articles of traffic (which are generally of a substantial character) from Detroit between Lakes Erie and Huron and transport them up the Miami (Maumee), thence

[41]W. W. Henry, *The Life and Correspondence of Patrick Henry,* III, 321.

[42]C. C. CL, II, 449.

[43]W. W. Henry, *Life and Correspondence of Patrick Henry,* IV, 268.

nine miles by land to the Wabash, and then down the Wabash to the post at Vincennes.[44]

Joseph Martin also noticed this trade between Detroit and the Muscle Shoals group.[45]

Evidently the trade which Sevier proposed opening with the Chickasaws did not materialize, for in a talk to Colonel Joseph Martin by Piomingo, the Chickasaw chief, February 15, 1787, he stated that no goods had been received from the Americans since the treaty, and that the Spaniards were the only ones who had furnished any goods. In this talk he suggested that the treaty had been seemingly held for the sole purpose of getting the Indians' land.[46] The interest in this trade did not cease, for Colonel Arthur Campbell wrote Governor Randolph, April 15, 1787, on the occasion of the visit of the Choctaw chief, Toboca, that here was a splendid opportunity for extending Virginia's trade by complying with that chieftain's request for a trading post on the Tennessee near Muscle Shoals. Such a trade would win the friendship of the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, and would accomplish more toward keeping open the navigation of the Mississippi than all the Kentucky threats; furthermore, it would draw large sums in hard dollars and vast quantities of rich furs into Virginia, besides acting as a restraining factor on the predatory Creeks and Cherokees. Campbell concludes this letter with the statement that if the Continental superintendent had made a trip throughout his whole district he would have found that it was necessary for the superintendent's residence to be somewhere on the Tennessee.[47] Just how successful an American trading post in the Muscle Shoals region would have been is rather problematical, for it would seem that the French traders who were getting

[44]Samuel Cole Williams, *Early Travels in the Tennessee Country,* 285.
[45]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* IV, 176.
[46]C. C. LXXI, 569.
[47]*Calendar of Virginia State Papers,* IV, 268.

their goods from Detroit were under selling the Americans who were getting theirs from Augusta.[48]

Not only was William Blount, a land speculator, energetically protesting the Federal treaty with the Cherokees, but he was also trading. He imported part of the goods for the proposed treaty of North Carolina with the Indians at Hopewell. In this instance he was acting for the state and imported his goods through Charleston.[49] In a letter written in July, 1786, Blount mentioned that his agent had delivered about 4000 skins and had more to deliver, although he was having greater difficulties because of the outbreak among the Creeks. These skins were shipped to Philadelphia.[50]

It is safe to say that from 1774 to 1796 the northwestern trade was practically in the hands of the English. The British, with a well organized Indian department, kept the tribes peaceful by the distribution of presents and by promising them aid against the encroachments of the Americans. The Indians were very largely dependent upon the British for supplies both in the north and in the south—a fact which the Indian superintendents made use of most effectively in time of crises. The British merchants had access to the principal fur trading center of the world; they had the services of many American merchants who preferred English employers to ruin; possession of the posts brought them into close contact with the Indians and, finally, the Canadian merchants were more efficient than any others in the field. Even the Spaniards admitted this.[51] The British traders worked from such centers as Detroit and Michillimackinac, Grand Portage and Sandusky. The Detroit center was the one coming most actively into contact with the Americans. The amount of fur sold at Detroit during this

[48] *Ibid.*, 185.
[49] *N. C. S. R.* XVIII, 554.
[50] *Ibid.*, 767.
[51] W. E. Stevens, *The Northwest Fur Trade*, 114-116.

period was constantly declining, owing to the war and westward push of the Americans.[52]

The chief routes of trade into the west from the thirteen states were by the way of Albany and Fort Pitt. The former was blocked throughout the war. Attempts were made to reopen the trade in this direction immediately after the war, although the possession of the posts by the British would hinder any large amount of trade going over this route.

It is difficult to determine how much trade was carried on through Fort Pitt. The French, who considered the new nation as a defunct corporation of which they were acting as receivers, had consuls and special agents in various parts of the Confederation, and their reports to the Foreign Secretary, on affairs in the States, give an excellent picture of conditions as they were. One such report from Marbois dated Philadelphia, August 1782, stated that the Fort Pitt trade was ruined. Flour, however, was being sent to New Orleans.[53]

On July 14, 1784, Marbois reported from Philadelphia that New York was seeking the fur trade, but that it was going from the western coast to Quebec.[54] In September Bourgoing reported to Vergennes from Madrid that the Americans in the west were carrying on an active trade with the Spanish colonies.[55] On March 16, 1785, Marbois again reported from New York that the Americans were carrying on some trade with the Hudson's Bay Company.[56]

[52]A letter from James McGill, merchant, to Governor Hamilton, dated August 1, 1785, points out that the Americans were at a great disadvantage in competing with the British for the trade of the northwest. C. A. Q. XXV, 111.

The Miami Company was formed in 1786 to exploit the Wabash valley trade. *John Askins Papers,* I, note on page 275.

[53]Surrey, *Calendar,* 1607.

[54]*Ibid.,* 1617.

[55]*Ibid.,* 1719.

[56]*Ibid.,* 1628.

At Fort Pitt there were a number of firms trading before the war. One of these, Duncan and Wilson, was able to tide over difficult times by acting as contractors for the army.[57] From the correspondence of John Askins, a merchant of Detroit, with David Duncan of the firm of Duncan and Wilson, one gleans that the latter was doing some trading with the Indians for furs and a rather extensive trade in cattle and provisions for Detroit. The cattle were collected from the many isolated frontier farms and driven overland to Detroit to be delivered to purchasers at that place. Duncan and Wilson did not always fare well, for in 1786 the firm of Caldwell and Elliott, with whom the Pittsburgh firm had been doing business, failed. They owed a large bill for cattle sold them, and the Pittsburgh merchants spent some time trying to recover a part of their losses.[58]

From Fort Pitt sources one gets some information of the New Orleans trade, for Duncan wrote Irvine in 1786 that the people would oppose a stoppage of the trade down the Mississippi since it was the only source of money for the purchase of salt, iron, and specie necessary for buying certain supplies from New Orleans.[59] Thomas Irwin invited General Irvine to participate in a New Orleans trade adventure, May 20, 1789. He suggested flour, cheese, butter, millstones, and grindstones as a possible cargo.[60] John Wilkins, writing to General Irvine shortly after the close of the period under discussion, suggested that they form a partnership for trading at Pittsburgh and Presque-Isle. He stated that the chief requirements as far as

[57]*John Askins Papers,* I, 242. David Duncan of the firm Duncan and Wilson was closely associated with General Irvine and used the influence of the latter to secure army contracts. Irvine Papers, IX, 105 also 55; X, 4.

[58]*Ibid.,* 242.

[59]Irvine Papers, IX, 50.

[60]*Ibid.,* 28.

trading products were concerned, were salt, flour, and whiskey.[61]

The exports of the United States so far as furs were concerned during the early years of the Constitution gives some idea of the importance of this commodity. During the first year of the Constitution the export to Great Britain was valued at $35,899; to France $1769; to Portugal $200; to Holland $10,360, and to the German States $11,614. For the years 1791-92 Georgia exported 50,765 pounds of deerskins, South Carolina 34,675 pounds, North Carolina 54,867 pounds, Virginia 12,858, and Pennsylvania 4,881 pounds.[62]

The government had been too weak during this period to evolve any consistent trade policy. There was also considerable opposition on the part of private individuals to the government's taking any very large part in the control of trade. In spite of all these handicaps the experiences of the period were such that only seven years after the adoption of the Constitution, steps were taken to make the Indian trade largely a government monopoly.

The problem of financing an Indian department had proven itself a very difficult one for the British government. An elaborate plan for the management of Indian affairs, devised in 1764, was dropped because it was found that the estimated expenses of £20,000 annually could not be met at a time when colonists were rebelling against all tax laws. In 1767 John Stuart wrote Shelburne, suggesting that the expenses of the Indian department be borne by an export tax on fur.[63] In the Northern department between 1755 and 1774 Sir William Johnson spent £146,545.[64] The outbreak of the war greatly

[61] *Ibid.*, 48. See also report of Lieutenant McDowel to Secretary Knox dated July 25, 1786. Knox Papers, XIX, 2. Indians traded peltry for clothing and whiskey. They secured provisions from the commanding officer of the post.

[62] *American State Papers, Commerce and Navigation,* I, 24-25; 161.

[63] Louise Shaw, *British Administration of Southern Indians 1756-1783,* 59.

[64] C. M. Andrews, *Guide to the Materials for American History to 1783 in the Public Record Office of Great Britain,* II, 100.

increased expenditures. Thus during the two years, 1776-77, the British Indian department in the south spent between $140,000 and $150,000.[65] These expenses were rigidly curtailed after 1779.

For the United States the problem of financing was a more difficult one, due to the fact that there were no adequate financial agencies during the entire period of this study. It is impossible to get an exact estimate of the expenses because of the difficulty of determining how much individual states spent for Indian affairs. A report of the Secretary of the Treasury in 1819 gives a summary of the expenditures of the federal government for the period under discussion.[66]

Year	Appropriations	Expenditures	Treaties	Goods	Total
1776	$261,783.44	1776	$42,928.64	$218,854.80	$261,783.44
1777	107,929.15	1777	57,622.29	50,306.86	107,929.15
1778	55,082.11	1778	10,322.11	44,760.00	55,082.11
1779	3,520.47	1779	3,326.45	194.02	3,520.47
1780	3,409.20	1780	2,337.79	1,071.44	3,409.20
1781	2,836.05	1781	2,195.60	640.45	2,836.05
1782	10,267.05	1782	905.00	9,362.05	10,267.05
1783	5,608.57	1783	1,718.00	3,890.57	5,608.57
1784	19,402.37	1784	4,534.58	14,867.89	19,402.37
1785	43,249.56	1785	8,738.88	34,510.68	43,249.56
1786	37,598.23	1786	27,092.85	10,505.38	37,598.23
1787	16,381.74	1787	750.00	15,631.74	16,381.74
1788	4,747.10	1788	4,747.10		4,747.10
1789	8,288.37	1789	2,638.27	5,638.27	8,288.37

Total expenditures to March 4, 1789, $580,103.41.

From this it can be seen that the heaviest expenditures were made during the first three years, before the depreciation of the Continental currency had made it worthless. There is also a decided revival of expenditures for the years 1785, 1786 and 1787. The latter is of considerable interest, for not only were these years critical so far as Indian relations were concerned, but they were also critical in the financial affairs of the Confederation. In 1786 the annual income of the Confederation

[65]Louise Shaw, *British Administration of Southern Indians 1756-1783*, 67.
[66]*Senate Document No. 15.* (16th Congress, 2d session.)

government was about $371,052, which was approximately sufficient to maintain the federal government on the most economical basis in times of profound peace. A sum equal to more than one-tenth of this approximate income was spent for Indian affairs during this year. Beginning in 1787, the interest and capital requirements for the foreign debt would mean $1,000,000 per year. At the same time the states were unwilling to give the federal government the right to make itself independent financially.[67]

The problem of education for the Indian had been considered in the colonial period. Harvard, Dartmouth, and William and Mary made provisions for the education of Indian boys; in fact, Dartmouth started very largely as an Indian school. Eleazer Wheelock's Indian school, the forerunner of Dartmouth college, had a very interesting experience. As early as 1743, when at Lebanon, New York, it attracted attention by the successful way in which the Indian children were educated there. It received financial support from England, and the King himself subscribed £200. Wheelock was eager to secure a large land grant on the Susquehanna for this school, but this was opposed by Sir William Johnson, who held that no Indian school could be successful unless remote from tribal influences. Wheelock eventually came to Johnson's point of view regarding Indian education and removed his school to New Hampshire, where land was offered the school to encourage its removal.[68]

When the war broke out, Wheelock had at his school several youths from the Canadian tribes and from families in these tribes who were rather prominent. At the same time his London patrons began to withdraw their support. Wheelock felt that these boys were a strong insurance for friendship with the Canadian tribes, and that both Connecticut and the Continental Congress could afford to give the institution financial sup-

[67]A. C. McLaughlin, *The Confederation and the Constitution,* 80.

[68]F. W. Halsey, *The Old New York Frontier,* 69.

port.[69] The Continental Congress voted $500 for the support of these boys on July 12, 1775.[70] Again on January 31, 1778, the Board of War reported that the commissioners of the Northern department be authorized and directed to comply with requests from Wheelock for financial support.[71] On February 12, 1780, the Board of War reported that in the interest of the security of the settlements on the Connecticut River, it would be entirely advisable to issue a warrant on the Treasurer of the United States in favor of the Treasurer of Dartmouth college for $3000 toward the expense of supporting and instructing several Indian youths of the Caghnawaga and other northern tribes at said college. From this it can be seen that the Board felt that the friendship of the Canadian tribes was largely due to the fact that these boys from prominent families of the tribes were at the American Indian school.[72] In all of the above-mentioned cases it was difficult to determine how much assistance actually was given.

In 1779 three Indian boys of the Delaware tribe, George White Eyes, John Kilbuck, and Thomas Kilbuck were sent to Princeton for an education. It was understood that if the United States were successful in the war, the Delaware tribe would cede a portion of its territory as a compensation for the education of these boys.[73] In the summer of 1783 George White Eyes and John Kilbuck were ready to enter the college, but Thomas Kilbuck lacked either the ability or the desire for an education and was eager to return to the tribe. John Kilbuck wished to contract a marriage with a servant girl in the house of George Morgan (under whose guardianship these boys had been placed). Morgan recommended that Thomas be sent back to the tribe, that Congress make some provision

[69] *American Archives, 4th series,* II, 582-83.

[70] *Journals,* II, 177.

[71] *Journals,* X, 106.

[72] *Journals,* XVI, 162.

[73] V. Collins, *The Continental Congress at Princeton,* 148. Also footnote on the same page. *Journals,* XXV, 660-61.

for John and his family, and that George White Eyes be allowed to continue with his studies. A committee consisting of Hawkins, Ellery and Mercer thought it unwise to send these youths back at this time and therefore recommended that George Morgan should apprentice Thomas Kilbuck to a blacksmith, since he had shown some talent in that line, and that he also make the necessary provisions for the maintenance of John Kilbuck and George White Eyes. Thomas petitioned Congress at various times for permission to return to his tribe, but this was not granted him until 1785, when he and his brother were permitted to return. George White Eyes entered Princeton but did not complete the work necessary for graduation.

Not much was done during the period under discussion so far as any government efforts toward Christianizing the Indians were concerned. The difference in influence between the Established church and the dissenting sects at the beginning of the Revolutionary War is significant. Among the Six Nations, the Mohawks had been ministered to by the Reverend Mr. Stuart, an Anglican. This tribe remained faithful to the British cause. The Oneidas and Onondagas, whose missionaries were Congregational ministers from New England, leaned toward the colonial side of the controversy. The missionary influence, of course, was not the only factor involved, but it was an important one.[74]

Congress, early in the war, promised to furnish the Delawares with a minister, when chief White Eyes of this tribe requested it. In this matter they played no favorites, for when the Indians of Nova Scotia asked for a priest, he was furnished by the colonists.[75]

Although the frontier was not inclined to give the Indians justice, there were many men of prominence in the states who had rather advanced notions with regard to their treatment.

[74]E. A. Cruikshank, *Butler's Rangers,* 16-18.

[75]Hist. MSS Comm. Rept., *Rept. On American MSS,* II, 1.

Among these were Patrick Henry, John Marshall, and George Washington. In 1784 the Countess of Huntington, who was engaged in philanthropic work in England, made an interesting proposal to Henry regarding the Indians. Her plan, in brief, was to settle groups of industrious and religious people on the frontiers near or among the Indians. Incidentally, she suggested, that in bringing these people over, care might be taken to include many who were skilled in manufacturing and thus lay the basis for the establishment of the nation industrially. Chiefly, however, this plan would be that the example of these settlers would lead the Indians to become Christians and to adopt civilized methods of making a livelihood. To make such a plan workable, grants of land would have to be made on the frontier located near the Indian tribes and within easy communication of them to stimulate intercourse between the settlers and the Indians. In the lands set apart for these settlers farms of various sizes were to be blocked off, none larger than five hundred acres. No one could settle on a grant unless possessing recommendations from the Countess or from the trustees she would appoint in England, Scotland, and Ireland. Persons with such certificates were to be granted warrants for their land by certain commissioners appointed by the state for that purpose. This land was to be subjected to a state tax after a certain number of years, the amount to be determined after the experiment was under way. Places were to be set apart for cities and towns; and finally, some of the farms and city lots were to be reserved for the support of public schools and the clergy and for other forms of public enterprise.

Henry was much in favor of this project and, in order to secure Congressional coöperation, sent a letter to the delegates from Virginia urging them to use their influence in favor of the project. In this letter he gave it as his opinion that the civilization and Christianization of the Indians were two matters of the greatest importance.[76] Washington also wrote a

[76]Outline of this proposal in *Life and Corr. of Henry,* III, 256.

letter to Richard Henry Lee, President of Congress, in support of the plan.[77] Lee replied to Henry's request, that there were two objections to taking favorable action on the proposals of the Countess. These were, first, that they considered the lands pledged for the payment of the debt; and second, that the settlers might be too sympathetic with Great Britain and thus exercise a dangerous influence over the Indians. Henry, however, presented his plan to the legislature, which body did not feel at liberty to take any action.

In the fall of 1784 the Virginia extradition bill, giving the state the right to punish any citizen committing a crime in the territory of a Christian or Indian nation which might at that time be in friendship with the United States, was before the legislature. Henry supported this measure, but, as Beveridge points out, not because of its strong nationalistic tendencies, but because of his friendship for the Indians.[78] At the same session of the legislature Henry introduced a bill which provided that every white man marrying an Indian woman should be paid ten pounds, with five pounds additional for every child born of such a marriage; the Indian husband of a white woman would receive ten pounds and an annuity for his clothing, and education at state expense for all children between the ages of ten and twenty-one. This bill passed the first and second readings and would probably have become a law had Henry not been elected to the governorship before the third reading. John Marshall supported this bill.[79]

A general survey of the period under discussion shows that the American Congress drew on the experiences of the British government when preparing to deal with the frontier tribes. Although at the beginning of the period there was a tendency to decentralize control, centralization of control in the hands of two superintendents responsible to the Secretary of War was the plan of action when the Confederation ended.

[77] *Life and Corr. of Henry,* II, 273.
[78] *Ibid.,* 274.
[79] A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall,* I, note on page 239.

The hatreds and prejudices engendered by a long period of cruel border warfare made it difficult to secure justice for the tribes even though there were men of vision and honor in the councils of the nation. Anyone familiar with the difficulties of reëstablishing a sane world order because of the stupidities of the war period, can readily understand this.

As during the period of British control, there was a clash between the federal and local interests. This clash brought forth one definite statement from a Congressional committee that the power to control Indian affairs could not be divided and that it must rest either with the central government or with the states. This was so clearly stated that Chief Justice Marshall referred to it in one of his famous decisions.[80]

The Indians occupied valuable western land. This land was coveted by speculators and frontiersmen. Furthermore the sale of the western territories would furnish income for the bankrupt government. To secure the Indian territories in a legal fashion, Congress recognized the tribal claims until these were extinguished by purchase. In the opposition of the Indians to the westward push of the young nation and its attempt to secure the trade of the tribes, the latter received the support of Spain in the south and England in the north.

The plan of 1786 based upon imperial precedents was an attempt to put the United States into competition for the Indian trade as well as to put the control of Indian affairs on a more efficient basis. The central government assumed the right to control trade, to make treaties and to establish boundaries. It chose to recognize the tribes as independent nations and to treat with them as such.

In the nature of things the relations with tribes were mostly warlike, for which reason Indian affairs were put under the control of the War department.

Little was done in the way of providing educational opportunities for the Indians. The government was unable to meet

[80]In the case of *Worcester vs. Georgia,* 6 Peters, 515.

all of the Indian requests for religious teachers. The relations with the tribes were economic and military. Religion is mentioned much less at the end of the period than at the beginning.

The new government in 1789 assumed the same responsibilities with regard to Indian affairs as had Congress under the Confederation. The management of the tribes went into the hands of the Secretary of War, who was none other than the genial Knox, under whose control they had already been since 1786. Then, too, George Washington, the newly elected president, had an unusual grasp of the Indian problem, the result of his experiences as Commander-in-Chief of the American army during the Revolutionary War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. GUIDES

Andrews, Charles M., *Guide to the Material for American History to 1783 in the Public Record Office of Great Britain.* 2 vols. Washington, 1912 and 1914.

Andrews, Charles M., and Davenport Frances G., *Guide to the Manuscript Materials for the History of the United States to 1783, in the British Museum, in minor London archives, and in the Libraries of Oxford and Cambridge.* Washington, 1908.

Bolton, Herbert E., *Guide to the Materials for the History of the United States in the principal archives of Mexico.* Washington, 1913. Carnegie Institution Pub. No. 173.

Brigham, Clarence, *A Bibliography of American Newspapers 1690-1820.* American Antiquarian Society *Proceedings,* n. s. XXIII part 2 and succeeding volumes.

Bulletin of the New York Public Library, V, no. 7. 1901. A list of the manuscripts in the collection of the New York Public Library.

Bulletin of the New York Public Library, XIX, no. 2. A supplement to the list compiled in 1901, including the principal accessions to the end of 1914.

Calendar of the Samuel Adams Correspondence, MSS division of the New York Public Library.

Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1789-1909, compiled under the direction of the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, 1911.

Clark, Edith E., *Guide to the use of United States Government Publications.* Boston, 1918.

Corbitt, David L., *Calendar of the MSS Collections in the Collection of the North Carolina Historical Commission.* Raleigh, 1926.

Day, Richard E., *Calendar of the Sir William Johnson MSS in the New York State Library.* Albany, 1909.

Fitzpatrick, John C., *Calendar of the Correspondence of George Washington, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army.* 4 vols., Washington, 1906-15.

Fitzpatrick, John C., *Calendar of the Correspondence of George Washington with the Continental Congress.* Washington, 1906.

Green, Evarts B., and Morris, R. B., *A Guide to the Principal Sources of Early American History, 1600-1800 in the city of New York.* New York, 1929.

Griffin, Appleton P. C., *Bibliography of the American Historical Societies,* A. H. A. *Rept,* 1905, II.

Griffin, Appleton P. C., *List of References on relations of the Indians to the United States Government.* MS in the library of the University of Wisconsin, Washington, 1902.

Handbook of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress. Washington, 1918.

Hasse, Adelaide H., *Bibliography of the Public Archives of the Thirteen Original States to 1789.* A. H. A. *Rept.* 1906, II, pt. 2.

Ingram, John V., *Checklist of American 18th Century Newspapers in the Library of Congress.* Washington, 1912.

Jameson, John F., *Guide to the items relating to American History in the reports of the English Historical MSS Commission,* A. H. A. *Rept.* 1898.

Kellogg, Louise P., *Report on Materials in the Burton Collection, Detroit Public Library,* Wisconsin Historical Society Proceedings 1910, 1911.

Manuscripts in Public and Private Collections. Washington, 1924.

Parker, David W., *Guide to the Materials for United States History in the Canadian Archives.* Washington, 1913. Carnegie Institution Pub. no. 172.

Parker, David W., *Guide to the Documents in the MSS room at the Public Archives of Canada.* Ottawa, 1914. Archives of Canada Publication no. 10.

Perez, L., *Guide to the Materials for American History in the Cuban Archives.* Washington, 1907. Carnegie Institution Pub. no. 83.

Report of the Royal Historical MSS Commission. *Report on American MSS in the Royal Institution in Great Britain,* 4 vols. Calendar of the papers of the successive British commanders-in-chief. London, 1904.

Report on the Manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville of Drayton House, Northhamptonshire, 2 vols. Volume 2 contains the letters of Lord George Germain, while Secretary of State. London, 1904-1910.

Robertson, James A., *List of Documents in Spanish Archives relating to the history of the United States, which have been printed or of which transcripts are preserved in American Libraries.* Washington, 1910, Carnegie Institution pub. 124.

Shepherd, William R., *Guide to the Materials for the history of the United States in Spanish Archives.* Washington, 1907. Carnegie Institution pub. no. 91.

Surrey, Nancy M., *Calendar of the MSS in Paris Archives and libraries relating to the history of the Mississippi valley to 1803.* 2 vols. Privately published 1928. Carnegie Institution, Dept. of Research. Valuable for a summary of reports of French consuls in America to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and also as a guide to the French transcripts in the Library of Congress.

Thwaites, Reuben G., *A descriptive list of Manuscript Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin together with Reports on other Collections in adjacent states.* Madison, 1906.

Trotter, R. G., *Canadian History, A Syllabus and Guide to Reading.* Chicago, 1926.

Winsor, Justin, *Narrative and Critical History of America,* 8 vols., Boston and New York, 1889. Vol. VI, Chap. VIII deals with frontier wars and gives a critical evaluation of the earlier works dealing with Indian affairs.

Wrong, G. M., Langston, H. H., and Wallace W. S. (editors), *Review of Historical Publications relating to Canada,* 1895-1897, University of Toronto Studies in History, 22 vols., published, then continued in the Canadian Historical Review, 1920-

II. SOURCES (MANUSCRIPT)

Library of Congress.

Indispensable as a supplement to the Journals of the Continental Congress are the Papers of the Continental Congress. Those found most useful in this study were: Nos. 13 to 16—Letterbooks of the Presidents; No. 18—Letterbooks of Chas. Thomson, Secretary of Congress, Nov. 20, 1779—May 1, 1789; No. 20, Reports of Committees on "State Papers" (Letters from Governors of States to the President of Congress, from 1777 to 1788), 2 vols.; No. 30—Reports of Committees on Indian Affairs and Land in the Northwest territory, 1776-1788, 1 vol.; No. 56—Letters relative to Indian Affairs 1765-1789, 1 vol.; No. 67—New York State Papers, 1775-1788, 2 vols.; No. 69—Pennsylvania State Papers, 1779-1781, 2 vols.; No. 71—Virginia State Papers, 1775-1789, 2 vols.; No. 72—North and South Carolina State Papers, 1776-1788, 1 vol.; No. 73—Georgia State Papers, 1777-1788, 1 vol.; No. 147—Reports of the Board of War, 1776-1781, 6 vols. (The close relationship of the Board of War with the management of Indian Affairs makes the materials in these volumes very valuable); No. 148—Letters of the Board of War, 1780-81, 2 vols.; No. 149—Letters and Reports of General Benjamin Lincoln, Secretary of War, 1781-83, 3 vols.; No. 150—Letters of General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, 1785-1788, 3 vols. (Knox's relations to the Indian Department especially after 1786 makes his correspondence a very important guide to the study of federal control of Indian affairs); No. 151—Reports of General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, 1785-1788,

1 vol.; No. 153—Letters of Major General Philip Schuyler to the Continental Congress, 1775-1785, 3 vols. (Schuyler's leadership in New York Indian Affairs and his correspondence with such important Indian agents as Deane and Kirkland makes this correspondence a valuable source.)

Force Transcripts of Georgia Records.
Volume of Indian Affairs 1751-1825.
" " Miscellaneous items.
" " Council Correspondence 1782-89.
" " Indexes 1754-89.
" " Proclamations by Governors Oct. 31, 1754—Jan. 29, 1778.
" " Acts passed by the General Assembly.

Force Transcripts of Hand Papers.
Letters to Jasper Yeates 1775-82.
Correspondence 1777-78.
" 1779-84.
Letters 1777-78. Copies of letters written at Fort Pitt.

British Transcripts.
Letters of John Stuart, Alexander Cameron, Thomas Browne and John Graham, Southern Indian superintendents, found mostly in P. R. O. C. O. 5, LXXIV, LXXV, LXXVI, LXXVII, LXXXVIII, LXXX, LXXXI, LXXXII, XCIV.

Canadian Archives.
The two excellent guides prepared by Dr. Parker are great timesavers for any one working in the Public Archives of Canada.
Series M contains correspondence and papers of Daniel Claus. For this study vols. 104 to 108 were used. The Claus Papers are a mine of information. Claus had been associated with the Indian department for a long time. During this period he was in the position of a non-participant most of the time. His advice and criticism are valuable if one remembers that his judgments of such men as Sir Guy Carleton and John Butler are not always correct.
Indian Records MSS. Vol. 11. Minutes of Indian Councils held by Sir Guy Johnson, Vol. 13, Minutes of Detroit Indian

Councils April 26, 1781 to May 19, 1790. Vol. 16. Papers relating to Western Indians, 1771-1875.

Series C. Military Papers.

Volumes 247 and 248 used in this study. These papers give some insight into the British administration of the northwest.

Series Q. State Papers.

Volumes 9 to 42 inclusive used; also vol. 56, pts 1, 2, 3. Quebec was the important center of the north after 1774 and the correspondence of the governors, lieutenant governors and other officials gives an excellent view of Indian affairs in the north and northwest.

Series B. The Haldimand Papers.

These papers are calendared in the Canadian Archives reports. As commander-in-chief of the British forces at Quebec, Haldimand had supervision over Indian affairs in the northern department. His correspondence with the Indian superintendents, the agents among the tribes, and the officers at the posts gives much valuable information. For this study it was very helpful to have a connected record of Indian affairs from the British side because American records are lacking in many instances.

New York Public Library (Manuscripts Division).

General Schuyler's importance in Northern Indian affairs makes his papers a valuable quarry for the student of Indian relations. Several volumes of his letters have already been mentioned as a part of the Papers of the Continental Congress.

In the New York Public Library there is a MS calendar of the letters of Schuyler for the years 1761-1803. This calendar in two volumes was made in 1851 by M. E. Allison.

The papers most useful for this study were two boxes of Indian papers consisting of about 550 items. These cover the period 1764-1794 and deal very largely with Schuyler's work as Indian commissioner. In addition to these, a letter-book containing instructions from General Washington and the Continental Congress for the period 1775-1778 and 3 letter-books containing copies of letters from Schuyler to General

Washington, the Continental Congress and others on the conduct of the war in the north are valuable.

The Draper Collection. (Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison).

Series V, Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina Papers, 1 vol.

Series IXX, Tennessee MSS, Martin Papers, 1771-1786.

Newberry Library, Ayer Collection (Chicago).

Spanish Transcripts.

The volumes used were:

Cuban Archives—Louisiana and Florida. Indian trade Vol. I, 1783-92.

This is a blue print transcript and is excellent for information on the Spanish attempts to keep control of the southwestern trade.

Archives of the Indies (Transcripts).

Estevan Miro to Antonio Valdes 1787-1789; 1789-1790. 2 boxes.

Burton Collection, Detroit Library.

Illinois—Wabash Co. MS. Introductory note by C. W. Alvord.

Miami Company Journals—May, 1786-Sept. 30, 1788. 2 vols.

This company was organized by John Askins and other Detroit merchants for the purpose of exploiting the trade in the Wabash region.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

The Wayne papers. Vols. 18 and 19 used. Gen. Wayne was in command of the army which was blockading Savannah when the war ended. He fought and also negotiated with the southern Indians.

The Yeates Papers. Jasper Yeates was one of the Indian commissioners at the early negotiations near Fort Pitt.

The Irvine Papers, especially vols. 9 and 10. Gen. Irvine was the last commander of the federal forces at Fort Pitt during the period of the Revolution. From his correspondence an insight is gotten into Indian affairs, trade, land speculation and the westward push which took

place immediately after the Revolution. Irvine was rather close to David Duncan of the firm of Duncan and Wilson of Pittsburgh.

Virginia State Library (Richmond).

Box of Executive Communications, 1785-87, 183 pieces; Box of Executive Communications, 1787-89, 203 pieces; Box of Executive Communications, 1787-90, 218 pieces; Box of Executive Communications (Thomas Jefferson) 1779-June 9, to Dec. 11, 1780, April 7 to Dec. 20, 1781, Jan. 3 to July 25, 65 pieces; Box of Executive Communications, 1781-83, 213 pieces; Box of Executive Communications, 1782-86, 210 pieces.

Box of Executive Papers 1783-84, Continental Congress, 226 pieces; Box of Executive Papers 1784-86, Continental Congress, 207 pieces; Box of Executive Papers 1787-88, Continental Congress, 160 pieces; Box of Executive Papers 1786-87, Continental Congress, 178 pieces.

South Carolina Historical Society Library (Charleston).

Indian talks and letters of George Galphin in folder of papers of Henry Laurens—Indian Affairs 1777-79. Contains copy of Galphin's speech to the head men of the Creek nations at the treaty held on the Ogeechee River, June 18, 1777; also some letters of Galphin to Henry Laurens. The last of the Galphin-Laurens letters in this group is dated March 18, 1779.

Library of Charleston Library Society (Charleston).

Package of Indian talks and letters including letters of Alexander McGillivray and Andrew Pickens. Some of these letters deal with the last attempt of the Confederation to negotiate with the southern Indians. In these negotiations Pickens acted as the federal agent from South Carolina.

Collection of the South Carolina Historical Commission (Columbia).

South Carolina Council Journal 1783-84.

Journal of the House of Representatives of South Carolina 1779-80.

South Carolina Council Journal 1784-86.

An index to 36 vols. of Public Colonial Records of South Carolina. Also to North Carolina records relating to South Carolina with an appendix to *River's History of South Carolina.*

North Carolina State Historical Library (Raleigh).
Letter Books of Governor Burke. (Letters to) 1774-81, 1781-82; two boxes of papers of Thomas Burke, 1769-1782 and 1774-1783; Box of MSS entitled Continental Congress, contains a copy of the Fort Charlotte negotiations, April 15, 1776.

Governors' Papers, State series.
VII Thomas Burke 1781 June 21, Aug. 3.
VIII 1781-82 Sept. 1—April 24.
IX 1781-82 June 7—Sept. 17.

Governors' Papers, State series, Vol. XI.
Richard Caswell
1. January 18, Dec. 15, 1785.
Vol. XII.
Richard Caswell
2. Jan.,—Aug. 6, 1781.
Vol. XIII.
Richard Caswell
3. 1786-1787 (Aug. 7—March 31).
Richard Caswell
4. April 1 to Nov. 26, 1787.
Vol. XVI.
Samuel Johnston
1787-1788. Dec. 31—Aug. 9.

Photostats of Draper MSS.
Kentucky MSS Vol. I and IICC, 1768-1855.
Frontier Wars MSS U.
Vol. 2. Original papers relating to the defense of the border, 1777-78; Shelby's Chickamauga campaign; and notes on Crawford's expedition.
Vol. 14. Original papers concerning the Hopewell treaties 1785-86.

Vol. 15. Original papers concerning the Holston treaty, 1791.
Tennessee MSS XX.
Vol. 4. Robertson, Blount and Daniel Smith Papers.
Vol. 5. Miscellaneous material on the pioneer history of Tennessee.
Preston, MSS QQ 1757-1780.
North Carolina MSS, KK. Vol. 1, 1768-1813.

Boston Public Library (MSS Division).
Saugrain's Diary, 1788 (Translation by E. F. Bliss, Cincinnati, 1875). Diary of a journey from the Falls of the Ohio to Philadelphia, May, June, and July, 1788. Saugrain, a French mineralogist, had been captured by the Indians while on a voyage down the Ohio. Later he was a member of the Gallipolis colony from whence he went to Lexington and finally to St. Louis, where he died.

Massachusetts Historical Society (Boston).
Knox Papers. 55 large folio volumes, 11,464 papers. To get a complete view of Knox's activities in the war department for the period of this study it is necessary to use the Knox material in the Papers of the Continental Congress.

III. SOURCES (PRINTED)

Public Documents

Acts of Privy Council, Colonial series, 1613-1783, edited by Jas. Munro and Sir Almer W. Fitzroy, 6 vols., Hereford, 1908-1912.

American State Papers, Indian Affairs. Selected under authority of Congress, edited by Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, Vol. I. Washington, 1832-34.

Calendar of Virginia State Papers and other Manuscripts, preserved at Richmond, 1652-1869, edited by W. P. Palmer and others, 11 vols., Richmond, 1875-93.

Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 1732-1774, 1904-16; *Revolutionary Records 1769-1784,* 1908. A. D. Candler editor.

Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 1683-1790. 16 vols., Philadelphia, 1852-53.

Pennsylvania Archives, First Series, Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1853-55.

Colonial Records of North Carolina, 1662-1776. 10 vols. edited by W. L. Saunders, 1860-90; *State Records, 1776-1790,* 16 vols., edited by Walter Clark, 1895-1906. This includes three volumes of the laws, 1715-1790. Index volumes 28, 29, and 30, edited by Stephen B. Weeks, 1909-1914.

Journals of Congress containing their proceedings, contemporaneous edition, 13 vols., Philadelphia, 1777-1789; reprint, 13 vols., Philadelphia, 1800-1801; another reprint with additions as *Journals of the American Congress,* 4 vols., Washington, 1823.

Journals of the Continental Congress, edited from the original by W. C. Ford, Galliard Hunt and John C. Fitzpatrick, I-XXIV, 1774-1784, Washington, 1904.

Journals of the Assembly of South Carolina, Sept. 17, 1776-Oct. 20, 1776, edited by A. S. Salley, Jr., Columbia, 1916.

Journals of the House of Representatives of South Carolina, Jan. 8, 1782-Feb. 26, 1782, edited by A. S. Salley, Jr., Columbia, 1916.

Laws of the United States of America from the 4th of March, 1789 to the 4th of March, 1815, including the Constitution of the United States the old Act of Confederation, Treaties and many other valuable ordinances and documents, John Bioren, W. J. Duane and R. C. Weightman, editors, Washington, 1815, 5 vols. The first volume of this series contains the negotiations of the State of New York with the different tribes of the Six Nations for their land.

Laws of the State of New York, 1777-1801, 5 vols., Albany, 1886-87.

Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, 4 vols., Boston, 1821.

South Carolina Statutes, The Statutes at Large of South Carolina, 9 vols., Thomas Cooper, editor, Columbia, 1836-41.

Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 1682-1801, compiled by J. T. Mitchell and Henry Flanders, vols. II to XIII, 1700-1790, Harrisburg, 1896-1908.

Statutes at Large of the United States, Boston and Washington, 1850- Vol. VII contains the early Indian treaties.

The Statutes at Large being a collection of all laws of Virginia, 1619-1792, William Waller Hening, editor, 13 vols., Philadelphia and New York, 1823.

Treaty Collections

Hamilton, Samuel J., *Indian Treaties and laws and regulations relating to Indian Affairs,* to which is added an appendix containing the proceedings of the old Congress and other important State Papers in relation to Indian affairs. Compiled and published under orders of the Department of War of the 9th of February and the 6th of October, 1825, Washington, 1826.

Indian Treaties between the United States and the Indian tribes, 1778-1837, compiled and annotated under the supervision of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Washington, 1837.

Kappler, Chas. J., *Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties.* Vols. I and II to 1902, Senate Document 452, 57 Congress, 1st session; 2d edition Senate Document 319, 58th Congress, 2d session; Vol. II, 1902-1913, Senate Document 719, 62d Congress, 2d session; Vol. IV, 1913-1927, Senate Document, 53, 70th Congress, 1st session.

Unofficial Collections

Alvord, Clarence W., and Carter, Clarence E., editors, *The New Regime,* Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. XI, British series, Vol. II, Springfield, 1916.

Alvord, Clarence W., and Carter, Clarence E., editors, *Trade and Politics,* Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Vol. XI, British series, Vol. II, Springfield, 1921.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alvord, Clarence W., editor, *Kaskaskia Records,* Collections of the Illinois Historical Library, Vol. V, Virginia series, Vol. II, Springfield, 1909.

Ayer, Edward, Collections of historical documents, an excellent collection of Americania, both printed and MSS. In the Newberry Library, Chicago. This material is more suitable for studies of later periods. Some valuable works concerning the northwestern Indians and the fur trade are found in this collection.

Bigelow, John, editor, *Works of Franklin,* 10 vols., New York, 1887-89.

Burnett, Edmund C., letters of members of the Continental Congress, Vols. I-IV, Washington, 1921-1928.

Carter, Clarence E., *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State 1763-1775,* Vol. I, New Haven, 1931.

Connolly, John, "A narrative of the transactions and sufferings" of, *Pa. Mag. of Hist. and Biography,* Vols. XII and XIII, 1888-1889.

Conover, G. S., editor, *Journal of the Military expedition of Major-general John Sullivan against the Six Nations of Indians in 1779 with records of the centennial celebration,* Auburn, 1887.

Craig, Neville B., *The Olden Times,* 2 vols., Pittsburgh, 1846-47.

Cruikshank, E. A., editor, Niagara Historical Society, *Records of Niagara, no. 39.*

Cruikshank, E. A., editor, *Petitions for grants of land reprinted from the Ontario Historical Society's Papers and Records,* Vol. XXIX, 1927.

Drayton, John, editor, *Memoirs of W. H. Drayton,* Charleston, 1821.

Force, Peter, *American Archives, 4th series, 6 vols.; 5th series, 3 vols.,* Washington, 1837-53.

Ford, P. L., editor, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* New York, 1894.

Georgia, *Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Vol. VIII,* Savannah, 1873.

Hastings, Hugh, editor, *Public Papers of George Clinton,* 8 vols. and index A to F, Albany, 1904.

Hough, Franklin B., editor, *Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs appointed by law for the extinguishment of Indian titles in the State of New York,* Albany, 1861. Of great value for a study of the negotiations between the state of New York and the Six Nations.

James, James A., editor, *George Rogers Clark Papers,* Va. series Vol. III. Ill. State Hist. Lib., vol. VIII, 1912; Virginia series vol. IV, Ill. State Hist. Lib., Vol. XIX, 1926.

Kellogg, Louise P., *Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-79,* Madison, 1916.

——— ———, *Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-81,* Madison, 1917.

Kidder, Frederic, editor, *Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during the Revolution,* chiefly compiled from the journals and letters of John Allan, Albany, 1867. John Allan was the Indian superintendent for the Eastern Department.

Henry, William W., *Patrick Henry, Life, Speeches and Correspondence,* New York, 1891.

McIlwaine, H. R., editor, *Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia,* 3 vols. to date, Richmond, 1926, 1928 and 1929.

Moore, F., *The Correspondence of Henry Laurens,* New York, 1861.

Morison, Samuel E., *Sources and Documents illustrating the American Revolution 1764-1788 and the formation of the Federal Constitution,* Oxford, 1923.

O'Callaghan, E. B., editor, *Documentary History of the State of New York,* 4 vols., Albany, 1849-51.

O'Callaghan, E. B. and Fernow, B., editors, *Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York,* 15 vols., Albany, 1856-1887.

Royce, Charles C., compiler, "Indian Land Cessions in the United States" in 18th annual *Report* of the bureau of American Ethnology, 1896-97, 1899.

Salley, A. S., Jr., editor, *Documents relating to the History of South Carolina during the Revolutionary War,* Columbia, 1908.

Smith, William H., editor, *Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair with his Correspondence and other papers,* 2 vols., Cincinnati, 1882.

Smyth, Albert H., editor, *Life and Writings of Franklin,* 10 vols., New York, 1905-1907.

Thwaites, Reuben G. and Kellogg, Louise P., editors, *Documentary History of Dunmore's War, 1774,* Madison, 1905.

Thwaites, Reuben G. and Kellogg, Louise P., editors, *Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio,* Madison, 1912.

Thwaites, R. G. and Kellogg, L. P., *The Revolution on the Upper Ohio 1775-1778,* Madison, 1908.

White, George, editor, *Historical Collections of Georgia,* third edition, New York, 1855.

IV. BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

This is not an exhaustive list.

Abel, Annie H., "Proposals for an Indian State in the Union, 1778-1878," American Historical Association *Report,* 1907, I, 89-102.

Alvord, Clarence W., *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics,* 2 vols., Cleveland, 1917.

Ashe, Samuel A., *History of North Carolina,* 2 vols., Greensboro, 1908-

Bausman, Joseph H., *History of Beaver County, Pennsylvania,* New York, 1904.

Bemis, Samuel F., *Jay's Treaty—A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy,* New York, 1924.

Bemis, Samuel F., *Pinckney's Treaty,* Baltimore, 1926.

Brown, Vera L., *Anglo-Spanish Relations in America in the closing years* of the Colonial Era, 1763-1774, 1923, Bryn Mawr, Ph.D., thesis.

Burton, Clarence M., "Ephraim Douglass and His Times" with "Journal of George McCully," extra no. 10 of *The Magazine of History,* 1910.

Carter, Clarence E., *Great Britain and the Illinois Country 1763-1774,* Washington, 1910.

Carter, Clarence E., "Some Aspects of British Administration in West Florida," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* I, 364-375, 1914.

——— ———, "British Policy toward the American Indians in the South, 1763-1768," *English Historical Review,* XXXIII, 1918.

——— ———, "The Significance of the Military Office in America, *1763-1775," American Historical Review,* XXVIII, 1922-23.

Channing, Edward, *History of the United States,* Vol. III, New York, 1912.

Coffin, Victor, "The Quebec Act and the American Revolution," American Historical Association *Report,* 1894, 273-79.

Collins, Varnum L., *The Continental Congress at Princeton,* Princeton, 1908.

Connor, R. D. W., *History of North Carolina, Colonial and Revolutionary Period 1584-1783,* Vol. I, Chicago, 1919.

Conrotte, Manuel, *La Intervencion de Espana in la Independencia de los Estados Unidos,* Madrid, 1920.

Cox, Isaac J., "The Indian as a Diplomatic Factor in the History of the old Northwest," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications,* Vol. XVII, 1909.

Cruikshank, Ernest A., "The Story of Butler's Rangers and the Settlement of Niagara," Lundy's Lane Historical Society Publications, *Report,* 1894, Welland, Ontario. This is an excellent study of the British Indian policy in the north, based on Canadian source material.

Crumrine, Boyd, *History of Washington County, Pennsylvania,* Philadelphia, 1882.

Dodridge, Joseph, *Notes of settlement, Indian wars of the western parts of Virginia and Pennsylvania 1763-83,* Wellsburg, 1824.

Farrand, Max, "The Indian Boundary Line," *American Historical Review,* X, 782-791.

Fiske, John, "Parties in the Continental Congress," *Atlantic Monthly,* LXIV, 220.

Gallaher, Ruth A., "The Indian Agent in the United States before 1850," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics,* XIV, no. 1, 3-56, 1916.

Gayarre, Chas. E., *History of Louisiana,* 4 vols., New York, 1854.

Goodpasture, Albert V., "Indian Wars and Warriors of the Old Southwest," *Tenn. Hist. Mag.,* IV, 1918.

Halsey, Francis W., *The Old New York Frontier,* New York, 1901.

Hamer, Philip M., "The British in Canada and the Southern Indians 1790-1794," *East Tenn. Hist. Soc. Pub.,* II, 1930.

——— ———, "The Wataugans and the Cherokee Indians 1776," *East Tenn. Hist. Soc. Pub.,* January, 1931.

Hamilton, Peter, *Colonial Mobile,* Boston, 1897, revised 1910.

Henderson, Archibald, *The Conquest of the Old Southwest,* New York, 1920.

——— ———, "The treaty of Long Island on the Holston, July 1777," *North Carolina Historical Review,* VIII, January, 1931.

Hodge, Frederick W., editor, *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico,* 2 vols., Washington, 1910, Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, *Bulletin 30.*

Hughes, Rupert, *George Washington,* I, 1732-1762; II, 1762-1777; III, 1777-1781. New York, 1926-

Hulbert, Archer Butler, *Historic Highways of America,* 15 vols. and index, Cleveland, 1902-05.

Innis, Harold A., *The Fur Trade in Canada,* New Haven, 1930.

Jackson, George B., "John Stuart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern District," *Tenn. Hist. Mag.,* III, 1917.

James, James A., *The Life of George Rogers Clark,* Chicago, 1928.

Jameson, John F., *Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States.*

Kingsford, William, *History of Canada 1608-1841,* 10 vols., London and Toronto, 1888-98.

Leavitt, O. E., "British Policy on the Canadian Frontier 1782-1792," Wis. Hist. Soc. *Proc.,* 1915.

Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries, 29 vols., New York and Chicago, 1877-93.

Manuel, Serano y Sanz, *Espania y los Indios Cherokis y Chactas,* Seville, 1900.

McCrady, Edward, *The History of South Carolina under the Royal Govt., 1719-1776,* New York, 1899.

McCrady, Edward, *South Carolina in the Revolution,* 2 vols., New York, 1901-1902.

McIlwain, Chas. H., *An Abridgement of Indian Affairs by Peter Wraxall, 1678-1751,* Cambridge, Mass., 1915.

McLaughlin, A. C., "The Western Posts and the British Debts," Am. Hist. Assoc. *Report,* 1894, 413-444.

Miner, Charles, *History of Wyoming in a series of letters from Chas. Miner to his son Wm. Penn Miner,* Philadelphia, 1845. One of the best of the older accounts of the Wyoming massacre.

Nevins, Allan, *The American States during and after the Revolution,* New York, 1924.

Notestein, Wallace, "Western Indians in the Revolution," *Ohio Archaeological and Hist. Quarterly,* XVI, 1907.

Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly 1887-

Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 1877-

Perkins, James H., *Annals of the West to 1845,* Cincinnati, 1846, revised 1850 St. Louis, and 1858 Pittsburgh.

Phillips, Paul C., *The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution,* Univ. of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, XI, no. 7, 1913.

Pickett, Albert James, *History of Alabama and incidentally Georgia and Mississippi from the earliest period.* 2 vols., Birmingham, 1900.

Putnam, A. W., *History of Middle Tennessee,* Nashville, 1859.

Ramsey, J. G. M., *The Annals of Tennessee,* Philadelphia, 1853.

Reid, Marjorie, "The Quebec Fur Traders and Western Policy 1763-1774," *Canadian Hist. Rev.,* VII, 1925.

Robertson, James A., *Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France and the United States 1785-1807,* 2 vols., Cleveland, 1911.

Roosevelt, Theodore, *Winning of the West,* 4 vols., New York, 1889-96.

Russel, Nelson V., "The Indian Policy of Henry Hamilton, a Revaluation," *Canadian His. Rev.,* XII, 1930.

Schmeckebier, Laurence F., *The Office of Indian Affairs; its History, Activities, and Organization,* Baltimore, 1927.

Sears, Louis M., *George Washington,* New York, 1932.

Shaw, Helen Louise, *British Administration of the Southern Indians 1756-1763,* privately published, 1931.

Siebert, Wilbur H., "The Tories on the Upper Ohio." Dept. of Archives and History of West Virginia, *Biennial Report,* 1911-14.

——— ———, "Tory Proprietors of Kentucky Lands," *Ohio Archaeological Publications,* XXVII, 1919.

Smith, W. Roy, *South Carolina as a Royal Province 1719-1776,* New York, 1903.

Stevens, Wayne E., *The Northwest Fur Trade 1763-1800,* Univ. of Illinois Studies in Social Science, XIV, no. 3, 1926.

Stone, William L., *Life and Times of Sir William Johnson,* Albany, 1865.

——— ———, *Life of Joseph Brant,* New York, 1838.

Thwaites, Reuben G., editor, *Chronicles of Border Warfare,* etc., by Alexander Scott Withers, new edition, 1912.

Trant, William, "The treatment of the Canadian Indians," *Westminster Review,* CXLIV, 506-527, 1895. An excellent summary of the British Indian policy in Canada.

Van Tyne, Claude H., "Sovereignty in the American Revolution," *Am. Hist. Rev.,* XII, 1907.

——— ———, *Causes of the War of Independence,* New York, 1922.

——— ———, *The War of Independence, American Phase,* New York, 1929.

Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 1893-

Volwiler, Albert T., *George Croghan and the Westward Movement,* Cleveland, 1926.

Walker, Mabel G., "Sir John Johnson, Loyalist," *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.,* III, 1916.

Weeks, Stephen B., "Gen. Joseph Martin and the War of the Revolution in the West," Am. Hist. Assoc. *Rept.,* 1893, 403-477.

Weil, Robert, *The Legal Status of the Indian,* Columbia University Ph.D., thesis, 1888.

West, Elizabeth, "The Indian Policy of Galvez," *Proceedings* of the Miss. Valley Hist. Assoc., VIII, 95-101, 1915.

Whitaker, Arthur P., "Spain and the Cherokees 1783-1798," *North Car. Hist. Rev.,* IV, 1927.

——— ———, *The Spanish-American Frontier 1783-1795,* Cambridge, 1927.

——— ———, "Alexander McGillivray 1783-89," *North Car. Hist. Rev.,* V. 1928.

Williams, Samuel Coe, *History of the Lost State of Franklin,* Johnson City, 1924.

Winsor, Justin, *The Westward Movement of the Colonies and the Republic west of the Alleghanies 1763-1798,* Boston, 1897.

Yela Utrilla, Juan F., *Espana ante La Independecia de Los Estados Unidos,* 2 vols., 1925.

V. NEWSPAPERS

Library of Congress.

Pennsylvania Gazette 1776-1786.

Carlisle Gazette and Western Depository of Knowledge.
1785—Aug. 10, to Dec. 28.

1786—Jan. 4 to Dec. 27.
1787—Jan. 3 to Dec. 26.
1788—Jan. 2 to July 30.

Charleston Library.
South Carolina Gazette 1775-1780.

American Antiquarian Society (Wooster).
Boston Independent Chronicle.
1778-1779.
1780-1781.
1781-1783.
1784-85-86.
1786-1788.

Boston Gazette.
1774-1775.
1776-1779.
1780-1782.
1783-1784.
1785-1788.

Maryland Journal (Baltimore).
1785-1786.
1787-1788.

Maryland Gazette (Annapolis).
1776-1789.
One volume containing scattered numbers mostly, for the years 1776-1783-1786.

Independent Chronicle (Richmond, Va.).
1787.

Gazette (Richmond, Va.).
1786—March 30 to Nov. 30.
1787—Feb. 8, Aug. 9, Oct. 27, Nov. 8, Dec. 13.
1788—April 3.
1789—Aug. 20.

Maryland Journal and Baltimore Advertiser.
1785-1786.

INDEX

A

Albany, treaty at, 35; conference at, prevented, 67; 89; Douglass to return by the way of, 95; 120; trade to be opened at, 180; 184; trade into west through, 191.

Albany corporation, in difficulty with the Mohawk Indians, 28; 35.

Allegheny River, 17; 77; General Brodhead to lead an expedition up, 79.

Allen, Ethan, requests aid of Caghnawaga Indians, 44; captured, 45.

Ancrum, Major, sends copy of Fort Finney treaty to Lieutenant Governor Hope, 116; fears American seizure of northwest posts, 116.

Apalache Bay, western boundary of Creek claims, 4.

Appalachian Mountains, 7; 151.

Arnold, General Benedict, 68.

Articles of Confederation, Franklin's plan for, 38; 110; 159; status of Indians under Franklin's plan, 176; status of Indians under Dickinson's plan, 177; status of Indians under final draft, 177; 184.

Askins, John, 192.

Atkin, Edmund, appointed superintendent of the southern Indian department, 5; succeeded by John Stuart, 5.

Auglaize River, 136.

Augusta, treaty of, 13; conference at, 26; 148; American headquarters for Indian trade at, 187; 190.

Augusta County, claimed by Virginia, 18.

B

Bahama Islands, Indian migrations to, discouraged, 61.

Baltimore, 175; merchants of, interested in Tennessee trade, 188.

Barnard, Timothy, 20; 147; 162.

Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan, 11.

Beaver Creek (Pa.), 2; 73; 111; 134.

"Bent of the Tennessee," *see* Muscle Shoals.

Bethune, Farquhar (commissary to the Choctaws), hopes to succeed Cameron.

Beveridge, Albert J., 199.

Big Beaver Creek, *see* Beaver Creek.

Bird, Captain Henry, raids of, 82.

Bland, Colonel, 104.

Blount, William, purchases goods for Indian treaty, 140; at Hopewell treaty, 148; opposes federal Indian policy, 167; comments on Indian affairs, 169; engages in Indian trade, 190.

Blue Licks, battle, 85.

Blue Ridge Mountains, 3; 54.

Board of Trade, opposes Shelburne's policy, 9; consents to cessions by Creek and Cherokee Indians, 13.

Board of War, instructions to Nathaniel Gist, 39; assumes responsibilities of Indian committees, 41; reports on western Indian affairs, 41; 42; recommends assistance for Fort Pitt frontier, 50; 71; Indian matters referred to, 176; reports in favor of military Indian agents, 176; reports in favor of appropriations for Indian education, 195.

Boonesborough, raids on, 50; 85.

Boston, 44; 52; Indian goods to be purchased at, 184.

Boudinot, Elias, 103.

Bourgoing (French emissary), reports on American trade, 191.

Bowles, William A., 166.

Boyd's Creek, battle, 57.

Braddock, Major General, appoints Sir William Johnson superintendent of Indian affairs, 5.

Brant, Joseph, to be won for the American cause by Dr. Wheelock, 27; becomes supporter of British interests, 28; leads Mohawks out of New York, 35; influential among the Six Nations, 40; 44; 45; 61; at Battle of Long Island, 62; carries instructions from Guy Johnson, 62; meets Six Nations on the Susquehanna, 62; urges Six Nations to act against Americans, 64; opposed by John Butler, 64; Carleton refuses war materials to, 64; helps to collect Indians at Oswego, 67; at siege of Fort Stanwix, 67; sent to ambush Herkimer, 67; proposes joining Burgoyne, 68; overcomes disaffection of Six Nations, 68; ambushes part of Clark's troops, 84; raid into Kentucky, 85; destroys American supplies, 89; Douglass confers with, 96; disapproves of negotiations with Schuyler, 98-99; Schuyler's reply to, 99; supports New York negotiations with the Indians, 109; correspondence with Monroe, 110; opposes taking of hostages, 110; inquires as to status of Indians, 118; 120; goes to England, 121; 122; attends Buffalo Creek conference, 123; 124; inquires as to delay of reply to Indians' communication, 129; influences gift to western Indians, 131; urges Indians to make peace with Americans, 131; not sure of united support of Indians, 131; 133; withdraws from negotiations with the United States, 135.

Brant, Mary (wife of Sir William Johnson), 67.

Brantz, Lewis, explores trade possibilities of Tennessee regions, 188.

Braxton, Carter, 182.

Brodhead, Colonel, sent to frontier, 71; appointed to command at Fort Pitt, 74; leads raid into Indian country, 79; expedition confuses British, 81; faces difficulties at Fort Pitt, 83; failure of Indian expedition of, 83; attacks Delawares, 83; controversy with Colonel John Gibson, 83; opposes Virginia's land policy, 83; resigns position, 84; 134.

Brown, Jacob, 15.

Browne, Thomas (British superintendent of Indian affairs), urged to bring about Indian attacks on frontiers, 56; takes charge of eastern Indian district in the south, 58; tries to secure the coöperation of the Creeks, 59; prefers military men as Indian officers, 60; terminates work of British southern Indian department, 61.

Bryan, Jonathan, 14; 16.

Buffalo Creek, Indian conference at, 123; 124.

Bull, Lieutenant Governor, 20.

Burgoyne, General, 39; 65; expedition of, 66; speech by, 66; Brant and Butler plan to join, 68; surrender of, 68.

Burke, Edmund, debates question of Indian participation in the war, 37; ridicules Burgoyne's speech, 66.

Butler, John, influential among Six Nations, 40; instructions from General Carleton, 45; ordered to furnish Indian auxiliaries, 46; appointed Indian superintendent, 62; criticised by Sir John Johnson, 63; wins Six Nations to British side, 63; advocates Indian neutrality, 63; opposes Brant's aggressive tactics, 64; instructed by Carleton not to furnish Brant with war materials, 64; ordered to join St. Leger expedition, 67; prevents American conferences at Fort Pitt and Albany, 67; at siege of Fort Stanwix, 67; proposes joining Burgoyne, 68; calls conference of Six Nations, 68; assists Indians against Sullivan expedition, 80; 85; Pennsylvanians from Wyoming join rangers of, 90; reports on Cherry Valley raid, 91.

Butler, Richard (Indian agent at Fort Pitt), complains of Virginia land surveys, 31; chosen superintendent of the northern Indian department, 107; chosen as commissioner to negotiate with the Indians, 108; doubts whether Indians will come to treaty, 114; signs treaty of Fort Finney, 115; accompanies Cornplanter to Congress, 122; 124; conference with St. Clair, 128; Brant corresponds with, 129; secures information from Indian country, 133.

Butler, Walter (son of John Butler), 85; 91.

C

Caghnawaga Indians, aid of, solicited by Ethan Allen, 44; delegation of Oneidas to, 65; 195.

Caldwell, Captain, raids New York frontier, 85; helps destroy Crawford expedition, 87; 113.

Caldwell and Elliott (Detroit merchants), trade with Duncan and Wilson, 192; bankruptcy of, 192.

Camden and Yorke (British jurists), supposed opinions of, the basis for Henderson purchase, 15; 16-17.

Cameron, Alexander, is refused permission to accept a land cession from the Cherokees, 12; chides Cherokees for making land cessions, 14; opposes Henderson's purchase, 15; criticises illegal conduct of frontiersmen,

16; reports irregular conduct of Richard Pearis, 19; assures Major Williams that Stuart has not planned an attack on the frontier, 24; describes Indian conference with Pearis, 25; 43; Henry Stuart denies that he and C. had urged an attack on frontiers, 52; 53; appointed superintendent of the western district in the south, 58; instructions from Germain, 58; criticised by Germain, 58; services of, in southern department, 59; loss of assistants, 59; death, 59.

Campbell, Arthur, accuses Stuart of favoring the Indians, 15; assists in raid on Cherokees, 57; discusses possibilities of Virginia's western trade, 189.

Campbell, Colonel John (superintendent of Indian affairs at Quebec), 42; 66; commander of Niagara, 123.

Campbell, General, 58.

Canada, 28; 35; American attack on, fails, 38; 40; 44; 45; 46; 61; 64; 65; attack on planned, 76; Haldimand fears attack on, 80; 81; 110; 119; 121.

Canadian Indians, aid of, solicited by Massachusetts, 43; Guy Johnson's conference with, 44; youths of, at Wheelock's school, 195.

Canadian merchants, oppose trading posts, 8; interest in northern trade, 22; oppose Quebec Act, 22; 178; 179; 182; 190.

Canajoharie, 17.

Cape Breton Island, 1.

Cape Fear, 26.

Carleton, Governor, permitted to set up civil government in Indian territory, 22; reports number of Indian officers, 42; conference with Indians, 45; not ready for aggressive warfare by Indians, 45; restrains Ottawa Indians, 48; gives consent for employment of Indians, 50; discourages Indian migrations to the Bahamas, 61; terminates southern Indian department, 61; appoints John Butler superintendent of the Six Nations, 62; instructions to Butler, 64; unable to furnish Burgoyne with sufficient Canadians and Indians, 66; orders Butler to join St. Leger, 67; sounds Indians as to their attitude toward British abandonment of northwest posts, 119; expect collapse of the American Confederation, 119; 123.

Carrington, Edward, 105; 160.

Carroll, Daniel, 143.

Caswell, Governor (N. C.), 56; assures McGillivray of North Carolina's peaceful intentions, 156; informed of land encroachments by state of Franklin, 156; informed of trading activities of French merchants at Muscle Shoals, 156-57.

Cataraqui (Ontario), 110.

Catawba, reservation, 131.

Cayuga Indians, few present at Albany treaty, 35; aid in driving Americans from Canada, 46; 65; loyal to British, 68; ask Sullivan for mercy, 80; kept loyal to British by necessity for supplies, 81; repudiate Fort Stanwix treaty, 122.

Cedars, The, 46; 64.

Charleston (S. C.), Indian commissioners to meet at, 143; 187; Indian goods imported through, 190.

Chase, Jermiah, 139; 183.

Chattahoochee River valley, home of Creeks, 4; Indian towns in, destroyed, 54.

Cherokee Indians, location and number, 3; Virginia insists on a further cession from, 10; 12; 13; 14; sell land to Jacob Brown, 15; sell land to Richard Henderson, 15; rum smuggled into tribe, 19; 20; agents to, appointed, 24; South Carolina prepares to treat with, 25; chiefs treat with W. H. Drayton, 25; reports concerning, reach John Stuart, 26; in southern department, 32; Green proposes treaty with, 42; 43; at Detroit conference, 48; defeat of, 51; 52; attack on frontier, 53; urged by northern Indians to combine against Americans, 53; colonial attack on, 54; compelled to sue for peace, 54; Joseph Martin agent among, 55; 56; defeated by Sevier, 57; Cameron influential with, 58; 59; 60; 87; 88; at Wakatomica council, 113; at Niagara council, 123; 125; 140; State of Franklin treats with, 142; 147; treaty of Hopewell with, 148-49; North Carolina opposes treaty, 149; 153; land controversies with the state of Franklin, 156; 158; 161; 163; Joseph Martin appointed federal agent to, 164; 165; 166; Alexander Dromgoole commissioned as peace messenger to, by North Carolina, 167; 170; refuse to attend federal treaty, 170; Knox reports violation of treaty with, 171; 188; 189; 190.

Cherry Valley, raid, 90; sufferings in, 91.

Chester, Governor (West Florida), appoints Indian commissioners at Pensacola, 58; Charles Stuart refuses offer of, to be Indian commissioner, 58.

Chickamauga Creek, Cherokee settlement on, 54; 142; 188.

Chickamauga Indians, block western communications, 56; raided by frontiersmen, 56; defeated by Sevier, 57; move further south, 57; 87; favorable disposition of, reported, 141.

Chickasaw Indians, 3; location, 4; complain of traders, 19; 43; 88; 130; friendly attitude of, toward Americans noted, 140; 141; Spain hopes to establish trading alliance with, 145; Spanish treaty with, 146; North Carolina violates rights of, 149; Treaty of Hopewell with, 152-53; American commissioners pleased with conduct of, 153; Americans hope to open trade with, 153; Georgia tries to win friendship of, 154; Joseph Martin, Georgia's agent to, 154; 158; 162; Joseph Martin appointed federal agent to, 164; 188; 189.

Chickasaw Landing, 142.

Chillicothe, attack on, by Clark, 82.

Chippewa Indians, at Detroit conference, 48; favor British, 49; at Fort Pitt treaty, 49; peace

between, and Ottawas, 50; at Detroit, 95; at Fort McIntosh treaty, 111; at Niagara conference, 123; Harmar attempts to conciliate, 125.

Choctaw Indians, 3; location, 4; 19; 43; won over by Spanish, 59; join garrison at Savannah, 60; 88; Spain hopes to establish trading alliance with, 145; Spanish treaty with, 146; treaty of Hopewell with, 151-52; American hope to open trade with, 153; Georgia establishes relations with, 154; Georgia hopes for assistance from, against Creeks, 154; Spanish influence among increasing, 156; 158; 162; 164; 189.

Cincinnati, 115.

Clark, Colonel Elijah, 146.

Clark, George Rogers, 60; 74; captures Vincennes and Kaskaskia, 75; secures supplies from Fort Pitt, 75; unable to attack Detroit, 75; British plan attack on, 82; raids Shawanees at Chillicothe, 82; proposed attack on Detroit not supported by Brodhead, 83; British attempts to waylay, 84; fails to secure assistance of Kentuckians for an attack on Detroit, 85; attack Shawanees, 87; chosen as Indian commissioner, 108; 114; signs treaty of Fort Finney, 115; 126; plans purchase of Chickasaw lands, 141.

Claus, Captain Daniel, Indian superintendent with St. Leger expedition, 42; leaves New York with Colonel Guy Johnson, 44; 45; 61; Carleton displeased by appointment, 62; Sir John Johnson supports, 63; criticises Butler, 64; criticism of Indian leadership in Burgoyne expedition, 66; criticises Butler's policy at Fort Stanwix, 67; criticises St. Leger expedition, 68; activities end, 68; protests omission of Indians, 97.

Clay, James, 174.

Clement, Lieutenant, raid of, 85.

Clinton, Sir Henry, Stuart corresponds with, 20; no instructions to Stuart, 26; in conference with Stuart off Cape Fear, 26.

Clinton, General James, leads New York contingent to aid General Sullivan, 79.

Clouds Creek, 55; 151.

Colbert, James (Stuart's deputy among the Chickasaws), 43.

Commission to investigate Fort Pitt frontier, appointed, 70; report of, 71.

Committee of Safety (Georgia), in conference with John Stuart, 23.

Committee of Safety (South Carolina), tries to arrest John Stuart, 23; activities of, 24-25; nominates three southern Indian commissioners, 33.

Committee of Safety (Virginia), petitions for Indian treaty at Fort Pitt, 30.

Congress, *see* Continental Congress.

Connecticut, emigrants illegally settle Wyoming country, 17; 41; 90; Western Reserve of, 104;

Congress calls for troops from, 126; 183; 195.

Connecticut-Pennsylvania land controversy, 35; 90.

Connecticut River, 76; 195.

Connolly, Dr. John, land surveyed for at Louisville, 17; warns frontiersmen of Indian war, 18; associated with firm of Simon and Campbell, 29; confers with Indians, 30; failure of plan for conquest of Fort Pitt frontier, 34; 46; proposes boundary on Ohio River, 97; at Louisville, 135.

Continental Congress (after 1781, Congress under the Confederation), 1; southern Indian traders agents for, 20; favors neutrality of Indians in the Revolutionary War, 26; 28; petitioned by Virginia Committee of Safety for an Indian treaty at Fort Pitt, 30; coöperation of Virginia with, 31; resolves to establish three Indian departments, 32; chooses Indian commissioners for three Indian departments, 33; treats with Indians at Fort Pitt, 34; sends talks to Six Nations, 35; land disputes referred to, 35; 37; opposition to employment of Indians in, 38; not successful in securing Indian recruits, 38; Indian enlistments authorized, 39; determines to attack Indians, 39; issues commissions to Indians, 40; 41; unable to cope with encroachments on Indian lands, 46; grants Indian request for blacksmith, minister and teacher, 47; commissioners of Middle Dept. ask for assistance from, 49; order powder sent to George Morgan, 49; Indian chiefs visit, 50; notes threatening conditions at Fort Pitt, 50-51; not able to keep agents among tribes, 55; investigates conditions on Fort Pitt frontier, 70; votes money for Detroit expedition, 71; resolves to abandon Detroit expedition, 72; suggests a raid by McIntosh, 72; approves Fort Pitt treaty, 72; 73; relieves McIntosh of Fort Pitt command, 74; plans attacks on Detroit and Niagara, 76; sends proposed plan to Washington, 76; needs time for financial readjustment, 77; addressed by Delaware chiefs, 77; 78; attempts to stabilize finances, 79; engaged in problems of peace, 86; 91; Indians to be informed of peace treaty, 94; 97; inefficiency of, 98; and Schuyler, 98-100; opposes private purchase from Indians, 102; committee report on northern and middle department Indian affairs, 102; land policy of, stirs up tribes, 103; petitions to, for settlement in Ohio, 104; accepts Virginia cession, 104; Land Ordinance of 1785, 104; debates Indian Ordinance, 104; 106; 107; 108; 112; prepares for Indian treaty on Miami River, 114; military post on the Ohio authorized, 117; Indians disgusted with policy of, 121; 122; Indian message to, 124; military measure for west proposed to, 125; prepares for frontier defense, 126; 127; passes Northwest Ordinance, 127; treaty with northern Indians authorized, 128-129; 130; appropriations for Indian treaties, 132; does not consider report on southern Indian affairs, 139; passes resolu-

tion for appointment of southern Indian commissioners, 140; southern commissioners chosen, 142; 146; 149; 150; Patrick Henry writes to Virginia delegates in, 155-56; southern Indian superintendent to report on conditions in his district, 156; resolution for protection of Georgia frontier, 158; resolution for appointment of Joseph Martin as agent for the Cherokees and Chickasaws, 165; encroachments on Cherokee lands forbidden, 166; 168; violations of treaty of Hopewell reported to, 171; 173; 174; Indian matters referred to by Board of War, 176; 177; and Indian trade, 180-86; and Indian education, 195; provides minister and priest for Indians, 197; Indian policy based on British precedents, 199; 200; 201.

Coody, Arthur, 142.

Coosa River, 4; 57.

Cornplanter (chief of the Senecas), 122.

Cornstalk (chief of the Shawanees), 51.

Cornwallis, Lord, 56.

Coshocton, 47.

Crawford, Colonel, surveys island near Fort Pitt, 31; capture of, and death of, 87.

Creek Indians, 3; location, 4; 13; not willing to cede land to Georgia, 14; lease land to Jonathan Bryan, 14; 19; 20; complain because of lack of goods, 23; agents to, appointed, 24; 25; led by McGillivray, 43; 52; Cherokees fly to, 54; 56; Stuart's difficulties with, 57; courted by Americans and Spanish, 57; join General Prevost, 58; do not coöperate in defense against Spanish, 59; under Galphin's influence, 60; attack Wayne's army, 60; complain of American aggressions, 60; 88; relations with Georgia, 141; did not appear for meeting with continental commissioners, 143; Spanish relations with, 145-46; 147; negotiations with United States fail, 148; 153; Georgia tries to secure assistance of Choctaws, Cherokees, and Chickasaws against, 154; hope for Spanish support, 155; treat with Georgia, 155; difficulties with Georgia 156-66; Miró promises ammunition to, for defensive purposes, 163; North Carolina tries to make peace with, 167; treaty with, postponed, 168; 169; 170; 179; 189; 190.

Croghan, George (Sir William Johnson's Indian deputy), 8; 17; 18.

Crosby, Rev., 27; 45.

Cruikshank, General E. A., 67.

Cumberland Mountains, 3; 55; 57.

Cumberland River, 4; 15; 152.

Cuyahoga River, 111; 130; 134.

D

Dartmouth, Lord (Secretary of State for the colonies), upholds Stuart in land policy, 13; and Stuart's proposal for the control of land sales, 16; correspondence with Stuart on Indian affairs, 23; 24; 48.

Dartmouth College, 195; 196.

Deane, James (interpreter among the Oneida Indians), American agent, 40; tries to influence Indians in favor of Americans, 44; attends general conference of Six Nations, 45; 46; attends Onondaga council, 63; reports Butler's activities, 63; reports on conditions in Indian country, 98.

Dease, John, 122.

Declaration of Independence, 35.

Delaware or Leni-Lenape Indians, territories of, 2; furnish recruits for outlaw Mingo tribe, 3; Connolly confers with, 30; visited by James Wood, 30; at Fort Pitt treaty, 34; alliance with United States, 40; ask for minister and schoolmaster, 47; ask for American agent, 47; 48; faith in loyalty of, 49; at Fort Pitt treaty, 49; 72; treaty with, at Fort Pitt, 73; chiefs visit Philadelphia, 77; Brodhead attacks, 83; at Fort McIntosh treaty, 111; at Wakatomica council, 113; blamed by Captain Doughty for attacks on whites, 113; propose not to come to Fort Finney treaty, 114; 115; McKee reports dissatisfaction of, 116; 124; Harmar attempts to conciliate, 125; 133; commissions to members of this tribe, 176; education of youths of, 196.

Delaware River, 17.

DePeyster, General, alarmed by attacks on Detroit, 75; notes that Americans are not successful with Indian conferences, 75; ordered to stay at Michillimackinac, 76; plans St. Louis attack, 82; relations with Douglass mission, 95; 96.

Detroit, 2; 3; 30; strategic importance of, 37; 46; Morgan's representatives at, 48; grand council at, 50; loyalists fly to, 69; plans for attacks on, 70-76; Haldimand proposes raising grain at, 81; Clark tries to secure aid of Kentuckians for attack on, 85; Brodhead proposes attack on, 83; British alarmed by proposed Clark attack, 84; 89; scalps supposed to be bought at, 90; proposal of retention of British post at, for three years, 93; Douglass at, 95; 101; 111; Indian council at, 123; 136; 157; 188; trade between, and Muscle Shoals, 189; British trading center at, 190; trade with Fort Pitt, 192.

De Witt's Corner, 54.

Dodge, John, 78.

Dorchester, Lord, *see* Carleton.

Doughty, Captain John, 113.

Douglass, Ephraim, Indian mission of, 94-96; Schuyler not informed of mission, 98.

Dragging Canoe (Chief of the Cherokees), accompanies Henry Stuart, 52; leads dissatisfied faction of Cherokees, 54; starts Five Lower Towns of the Chickamauga, 57.

Drayton, W. H., tries to lease lands from Catawba Indians, 13; 24; negotiations with Cherokees, 25.

Dromgoole, Alexander, 167.

Duane, James, 32; 41; Washington communicates opinions on Indian affairs and western lands to, 100; on last committee for Indian affairs, 175.

Duck River, 4; 152.

Duncan, David, member of firm of Duncan and Wilson, 192; write concerning New Orleans trade, 192.

Duncan and Wilson, trading firm at Fort Pitt, 192.

Dunmore, Lord (Governor of Virginia), and Virginia's western claims, 18; Indian war of, 18; unable to come to Fort Pitt for Indian treaty, 30.

E

East Florida, 14; 58.

Echota, 3; 55.

Elbert, Governor (Georgia), 146; 147.

Elbert County (Georgia), 14.

Elliott, Matthew, 70.

Elmore, Colonel, 65.

Emistesigo (head warrior of upper Creeks), 60.

England, statesmen of, concerned with Indian problem, 1; Wilkinson in, 13; 25; Joseph Brant visits, 28; Guy Johnson visits, 35; 61; 62; 67; faces combination of European powers, 69; preliminary peace treaty with, 94; 97; 110; 119; second visit of Joseph Brant to, 121; 123; fur exported to, 193; support from, for Wheelock's school, 195; 198; 200.

F

Falls of the Ohio, *see* Louisville.

Few, William, 105; 160.

Fincastle County (Virginia), 15.

Finney, Captain, 126.

Fleming, James, 69; 70.

Flint River, 4.

Florida, 4; 20; John Stuart compelled to fly to, 35; Cherokees fly to, 54; 178.

Fort Hand, 74.

Fort Harmar, 116; 133.

Fort Henry, 51.

Fort Laurens, 73; 74; 111.

Fort McIntosh, established, 73; 74; provisions of treaty at, 111; effects of treaty, 112; 113; 117; federal troops at, 127; 135; 136.

Fort Pitt, Virginia takes possession of, 30; garrisoning of, by Virginia opposed by St. Clair, 31; Indian treaty at, 34; treaty at, 46; George Morgan Indian agent at, 47; General McIntosh in command of troops at, 48; relations with Indians at, 49; Board of War recommends assistance for, 50; strengthening defenses of, 51; 67; disaffected population in vicinity of, 69; 70; treaty with Delawares, 72-73; Pennsylvania and Virginia rivals at, 74; 75; 77; raids into Indian country from, 79; 81; difficulties, 83; General Irvine takes charge, 84; morale low at, 86; 89; 124; 125; 127; 182; 185; 187; trade at, 191-192.

Fort Randolph, 51; 71; 74.

Fort Schlosser, 122.

Fort Stanwix, treaty of, negotiated by Sir William Johnson, 10; 49; Schuyler advises necessity of

taking possession of, 63; besieged by St. Leger, 67; 68; 99; 108; treaty with Indians at, 109; 122; 137; 184.

Fort Watauga, 54.

Foster, Captain George, 46.

Fox Indians, 3.

France, 1; 65; 69; 76; 77; 193.

Francis, Turbot, 33.

Franklin, state of, treats with Indians, 142; 154; Chota ford treaty with Indians, 156; 162; 163; collapse of, 164; 167.

Franklin, Benjamin, 8; 33; 38.

Franklin, Governor William, 11.

French, 5; 8; 11; 21; 57; 76; 82; 88; 109; 178; traders in Tennessee country, 188; 191.

French Creek, 77.

French Broad River, 142; 149; 150; 166; 170.

French and Indian War, 5; 6; 26; 178.

French Licks, 141.

Fur trade, 43; 94; 100; 119.

G

Gage, General, 5; 21; warns Stuart that New England colonies are tampering with Indians, 23; instructions to Guy Johnson, 44; 52.

Galloway, Joseph, 8.

Galphin, George, violates trade regulations, 19; agent for Continental Congress, 20; 24; 34; influential among Lower Creeks, 51; 56; 60; 187.

Galphinton, 143; 148.

Gardoqui, Diego de, 164.

Gates, General, 79.

Genessee River, 80.

Georgia, 4; 10; 13; Creeks cede land to, 14; 19; 20; 24; 25; fur traders of, opposed by McGillivray, 43; 54; 57; 58; 60; 105; makes no land cession, 139; 142; 143; interested in securing cessions from Indians, 146; Creeks unwilling to deal with, 147; commissioners of, protest federal treaty, 147; treaties of Augusta, Galphinton, and Shoulderbone with Creeks, 148; 149; 153; tries to secure assistance against Creeks, 154; difficulties with Creeks, 155; hopes for federal assistance against Creeks, 155-56; 157; unable to help finance federal Indian treaty, 158; Knox explains relations of, to the Confederation, 158; 159; objects to federal control of Indian affairs, 162; financial collapse of, 163; 165; 166; 168; 169; 182; 183; 187; deerskins exported by, 193.

Germain, Lord, 28; 37; 52; correspondence with Alexander Cameron, 58; 62; 81; 89.

German Flats, meeting at, 35; 39; treaty at, 63; 85; 99.

German States, furs exported to, 193.

Gibson, Colonel John, 71; 73; 83.

Girty, Simon, 70; 84; 113.

Gist, Nathaniel, 39.

Glasscock, Thomas, 148.

Graham, John, succeeds Cameron as superintendent of the western tribes in the south, 59; 60; 61.

Grand Portage, 190.

Gratz, Bernard and Michael, 47.

Great Britain, *see* England.

Green County, 14.

Greene, General, appoints Indian commissioners, 42; 79; 108; 150.

Gwinnet, Button, 182.

H

Haldimand, General, opinion of Brant's position among the Six Nations, 62; 75; 80; fears attack on Niagara, 81; praises Sullivan's efficiency, 81; 82; 84; proposes raids on New York frontier, 85; 89; 118; suggests northwest barrier state, 119.

Half King (chief of the Wyandots), 116; 124; death of, 133.

Hamilton, Governor, 30; 46; counteracts Morgan's influence, 48; 49; 50; plan for attack on frontier, 56; 58; 74; captured by Clark, 75; 87; 89.

Hancock, John, 63.

Hand, Brigadier General, appointed to take charge of Fort Pitt frontier, 51; difficulties of, 69; 70; failure of attack on Indians, 71; resigns, 71.

Handley, Governor (Georgia), 165.

Hannastown, 30.

Harmar, Colonel, attempts to drive illegal settlers from U. S. lands, 117; 125; 128; 130.

Harrison, Governor (Virginia), 140; 141.

Harrison, General William Henry, 138.

Harrodsburg, 50.

Hart, Rev., 25.

Harvard College, 195.

Harvey, John, 31.

Hausman, John, 184.

Hawkins, Benjamin, 143; 148.

Hawley, Major Joseph, 33.

Henderson, Richard, land purchase of, influenced by Camden Yorke decision, 15.

Henry, Patrick, on Continental Indian committee, 32; 33; 56; opposes Detroit expedition, 72; and Delaware land cessions, 78; invited to join Muscle Shoals speculation, 141; 155; 174; 188; 198; favors project of the Countess of Huntington, 198-199.

Herkimer, General, 44; 67.

Hiawasse River, 3; 54; 57.

Higginson, Stephen, 108.

Hill, Captain Aaron (Iroquois chief), 110; 123.

Hite, Jacob, 12.

Holston River, 15; 54; 56; 142; 146; 150; 154; 166.

Hope, Lieutenant Governor, 116.

Houstoun, William, 105.

Howe, General, 26; 62; 66.

Hudson's Bay Company, 128; 191.

Hudson River, 17; 66; 106.

Huntington, Countess of, 198.

Huntington, Samuel, 41.

Huron Indians, *see* Wyandots.

Hutchins, Thomas, 122.

I

Illinois, 2; 3; 11; 74; 188.

Illinois Indians, 3.

Illinois Land Company, 16; 22.

Illinois River, 17.

Indian boundary line, recommended by Lord Shelburne, 9.

Indian Department (British), renders valuable assistance during French and Indian War, 6; expense of, causes opposition, 8; Board of Trade opposes abolition, 9; tries to prevent illegal purchases in the south, 12; unable to prevent trade irregularities in the north, 21; 43; does not secure efficient coöperation of Indians in south, 60; ends officially in south, 61; 178; 193; 194.

Indian Department (Continental), (Middle Department of), established, 32; commissioners for appointed, 33; Board of War report on, 41; treats with Indians, 47; 49; 65; committee report on Indian affairs of, 102; 182.
(Northern Department of), established, 32; commissioners appointed, 33; reports from, 39; 65; 97; 102; under Indian ordinance of 1786, 106; trade in, 184; 186; 196.
(Southern Department of), established, 32; appropriations and commissioners for, 33; 42; under Indian Ordinance of 1786, 106.

Indian Ordinance of 1786, provisions of, 106; 164; 176; 186; 188; 200.

Iroquois, *see* Six Nations.

Irvine, General, appointed by Washington to succeed Brodhead, 84; at Fort Pitt, 86-87; reports settlers crossing the Ohio, 104; invited to join trading projects, 192.

Irwin, Thomas, 192.

J

Jackson, Brigadier General, 158.

James, Benjamin, 154.

Jay, John, 135.

Jefferson, Thomas, 35; 41; 83; on committee studying Indian affairs in the south, 139; 182.

Johnson, Governor (North Carolina), 165; 167; 168; 169.

Johnson, Colonel Guy, nephew and successor of Sir William Johnson, 26; 27; confers with Indians at Oghwaga, 28; compelled to fly to Canada, 35; 42; instruction from Gage, 44; 45; 61; 62; 82.

Johnson, Sir John, compelled to fly from Mohawk Valley, 62; 67; sent to the assistance of the Six Nations, 80; raids Mohawk and Schoharie Valleys, 82; 96; 112; speech of advice to Indians, 114; 118; 121; 129; 131.

Johnson, Sir William, appointed superintendent of Indian affairs, 5; 6; negotiates treaty of Fort Stanwix, 10; 17; prevents Six Nations from joining in Dunmore's war, 18; complains of trade irregularities, 21; death of, 26; 27; 35; 62; 63; 193; 195.

Jones, Willie, 33; 34.

K

Kanawha River, 3; 10; 18; 51; 71.

Kaskaskia, 1; 75.

Kayaderosseras patent, 17.

Kelly, Hugh, 69; 70.

Kentucky, 2; 17; 50; 55; 56; raids in, 82; 85; 115; 127; 134; 135; 189.

Kentucky River, 10; 15; 85.

Keowee River, 148.

Kickapoo Indians, 3; 95; 133; 134.

Kilbuck, Captain John Jr., 73.

Kilbuck, John, 196-97.

Kilbuck, Thomas, 196-97.

King, Rufus, 105.

King's Mountain, 57; 60.

Kingston (New York), 85.

Kirkland, Rev. Samuel, 27; American agent, 40; 44; 45; 63; 65.

Kiskiskemitas Creek, 69.

Kittaning, 70.

Knox, Henry (Secretary of War), success of Indian department dependent on caliber of superintendent, 107; message from Indian tribes to, 122; 123; military posts in west, 125; 126; 127; 129; 131; 132; 134; 157; plan for protection of Georgia, 158; explains relations of North Carolina and Georgia to U. S., 159; summarizes Indian problem, 171; 174; Indian affairs under control of in Washington administration, 201.

Knox, William (Under Secretary of State), 22.

L

Lafayette, General, 76; 109.

Lake Champlain, 44; 179.

Lake Erie, 2; 47; 78; 101; 103; 104; 125; 136; 188.

Lake Huron, 101; 188.

Lake Michigan, 2; 3; 101; 188.

Lake Ontario, 66.

Lake Sandusky, 111.

Lake St. Clair, 101.

Land Orders of 1774, 11; 12.

Land Ordinance of 1785, 104; 129.

Langan, Lieutenant, 131.

Laurel Hill, 86.

Laurens, Henry, 72; 175.

Lebanon (New York), 195.

Lee, Arthur, 108.

Lee, General Charles, 11.

Lee, Richard Henry, 31; 199.

Lewis, General Andrew, battle of Point Pleasant, 18; appointed Indian commissioner, 30; 73.

Lewis, Francis, 180.

Lewis, Thomas, 73.

Library of Congress, 19.

Licking River, 85.

Ligonier, 29.

Limestone River, 85; 134.

Lincoln, Benjamin (Secretary of War), 95; 108.

Lincoln (Georgia), 14.

Little River, 142; 168.

Livingstone, Philip, 32; 41.

Logan, Colonel John, 126.

Long Island on the Holston, 54; 55.

Long Island (New York), 62; 64.

Loughry, Colonel, 85.

Louisiana, 143; 181.

Louisville, 17; 125; 126; 130; 134; 135.

Loyalhanna, 86.

Lynch, Thomas, 182; 183.

M

Mackay, Aeneas, 47.

MacLean, General Allan, 95; 96.

Madison, James, 110; 170; 171.

Madrid, 191.

Mad River, 101.

Marbois, 191.

Marietta, 104.

Marshall, Chief Justice John, 161; 174; 198; 199; 200.

Martin, Joseph, in correspondence with John Stuart, 55; 57; invites Henry to join in Muscle Shoals speculation, 141; gives information concerning Spanish trading projects, 141; 142; chosen Indian commissioner, 143; 148; opinion on North Carolina protest against Hopewell treaty, 150; Georgia's agent to Cherokees and Choctaws, 154; gives information concerning encroachments by the state of Franklin, 156; 158; appointed federal agent to Cherokees and Chickasaws, 164; 188; 189.

Maryland, 139; 183.

Maryland Retaliators, 69.

Massachusetts, 4; 27; solicits Indian aid, 43; 126; 160; 183.

Matthews, Governor (South Carolina), 139; 140.

Matthews, Governor (Georgia), 155; 158; willing to compensate McGillivray for confiscated estates, 162; 163; appointed Indian commissioner, 164; 165; 166.

Matthews, Major, 120.

Maumee River, 101; 104; 111; 134; 136; 188.

McArthur, General, 61.

McGillivray, Alexander, friendly to English, 43; opposes Georgia's fur traders, 143; friendly with Spanish, 143; 146; blocks federal negotiations, 148; opposes Indian treaties at Hopewell, 152; 156; 157; 158; offered compensations for confiscated property, 162; Miró advises to work for peace with Americans, 163; 166; 167; Panton correspondence with, 170; 179; 187.

McIntosh, John (Stuart's deputy among the Choctaws), 19; 43.

McIntosh, General Lachlan, difficulties with George Morgan, 48; succeeds General Hand at Fort Pitt, 71; 72; builds Forts McIntosh and Laurens, 73; failure of, 74; retires from command, 74; 75; 148.

McIntosh, William (Stuart's deputy among the Creeks), 43.

McKee, Alexander, 70; 84; raids Kentucky, 85; at defeat of Crawford, 87; 112; 114; 116; 121.

Melonthee (chief of Shawanees), 126.

Memphis, 4.

Mercer, John, 197.

Miami Indians, 2; 3; 49; 95; 133.

Miami River (Great), 101; 111; treaty at mouth of, 114; 115; 117; 125; 127; 136. (Little), 134.

Miamitown or Omi, 134.

Michigan, 3.

Michillimackinac, strategic importance of, 37; 75; 76; 93; 111; 188; 190.

Micmac Indians, 1.

Milwaukee River, 2.

Mingo Indians, 3; 30; 34; 49; 113; 114; 123.

Miró, Governor, 163; 166.

Mississippi, 4.

Mississippi River, 2; 4; 7; 56; 59; 83; 112; 129; 141; 149; 152; 154; 157; 171; 178; 189; 192.

Mobile, captured by Spanish, 51; 60; Spanish treaty at, 142; trade shifting to, 178; 187.

Mohawk Indians, 27; in difficulty with Albany corporation, 28; leave New York with Guy Johnson, 28; 35; 44; 131; withdraw from negotiations with Americans, 135; 137; 197.

Mohawk River, 17; 44; St. Leger expedition down, 62; 63; 66; 79; 80; raids in valley of, 82; destruction in valley of, 85; 89.

Mohican Indians, 49.

Monongahela River, 17.

Monroe, James, 105; 110.

Montour, John, 31.

Montreal, 6; merchants of, oppose New York trade regulations, 21; British authorities fear that merchants of, will join the revolting colonies, 23; 44; 67; 68; traders of, protest treaty of, 1783, 97; 120; 181; 184.

Moravian Massacre, 86.

Morgan, George, 31; appointed Indian agent at Fort Pitt, 47; opposes Indian participation in the war, 48; difficulties with General McIntosh force resignation, 48; reports Indian treaty, 49; opposes punitive expedition against Pluggystown, 50; 75; 78; 187; supervises education of Delaware youths, 196-97.

Morris, Lewis, 41; 78.

Muscle Shoals, land speculation at, 141; Spanish traders at, 142; 150; 153; 154; French traders at, 156; 163; trading post at, 189.

Muskingum River, 2; 18; 47; settlements on, 104; 111; 117; 125; 127; 130; treaty to be held at mouth of, 131; treaty site changed to Fort Harmar, 133.

N

Natchez, 83; 151; 153.

Navarro, Martin (Intendant of Louisiana), 143.

New Brunswick, 1.

New Hampshire, 126; 195.

New Jersey, 78; 183.

New Orleans, 51; 56; trade with Fort Pitt, 86; 88; 163; headquarters for Spanish Indian trade, 187; 188; 191; 192.

New York, 4; Canadian merchants fear discontinuance of trade with, 23; 27; becomes active in Indian affairs, 28; 29; 41; 44; 61; 62; 79; 80; 82; raids on frontier of, 85; 86; 87; 89; opposes concessions to Six Nations, 100; 101; 105; treats separately with Iroquois, 109-110; 133; 185; 191; 195.

New York City, 20; 40; 64; 89.

Neville, Captain John, 30; 47.

Niagara, 6; strategic importance of, 37; 47; plans for attack on, 76; 77; 79; 81; 93; 95; Douglass at, 95; 118; 120; Indian council at, 123; 125.

Nollichucky River, 15; 54; 56; 154.

North, Lord, 37; 119.

North Carolina, 14; attacks Cherokees, 54; treats with Cherokees, 54; Joseph Martin agent of, 55; 56; 57; 105; confusion concerning land cession of, 139; negotiations with Cherokee Indians, 140; 142; 143; 148; protests against Treaty of Hopewell, 149; 150; continues opposition against Cherokee treaty, 151; 155; 156; relation to United States explained by Secretary Knox, 159; objects to federal control of Indian affairs, 160; Cherokee negotiations, 163; 164; 166; 167; finances of, 168; 169; 170; 175; 183; 190; 193.

Northwest Ordinance, provisions, 127; reënacted, 128.

Northwest Territory, 136; 138.

Nova Scotia, 1; 27; 43; 61; 197.

O

Ocmulgee River, 148.

Oconee River, 141; 148; 153; 164; 170.

Oghwaga, conference at, 28.

Oglethorpe County (Georgia), 14.

Ohio, 103; 104; 112.

Ohio River, 2; 4; 10; 15; 17; 18; 22; 26; 47; 56; 73; 77; 84; 85; 86; 97; 101; 103; 104; 106; 108; 111; 112; 113; 115; 124; 125; 127; 130; Indians unwilling to sell lands north of, 131; 136; 141; 152; 166.

Omi, *see* Miamitown.

Onaka Mountains, 54.

Oneida Indians, Samuel Kirkland missionary among, 27; 39; 40; 44; remain faithful to American cause, 46; 63; 65; 68; 109; members of tribe given commissions, 176; 184; 197.

O'Neill, Governor, 187.

Onondaga Indians, 35; 44; 68; 197.

Osborne, H., 169; 170.

Oswego, 28; 44; 67; 95; 109.

Ottawa Indians, 2; 48; restrained by Carleton, 48; 49; 50; 95; 111; 123.

P

Panton, Leslie and Company, support McGillivray in his opposition to Georgia fur traders, 143; 145; importance of, 165; 166; oppose Indian negotiations with U. S., 170; agent for Spain, 179; 187.

Parliament, 7; 16; 22; 37; 66; 93.

Parsons, William H., 115; 122.

Paullin, C. O., 175.

Pearis, Richard, illegal land transactions, 12; 16; 19; 24; 25.

Penn, Thomas, 21.

Pennsylvania, 4; boundary dispute with Virginia, 17; establishes Westmoreland county, 18; 29; 30; to coöperate in an attack on Detroit, 71; 72; rivalry with Virginia in Illinois, 74; 79; 84; raids on frontier of, 85; 87; 90; 94; 101; 104; Iroquois cede land to, 109; 134; 160; 182; 193.

Pennsylvania-Virginia Land dispute, 29; 31; 41; problem of, successfully faced by General McIntosh, 74.

Penobscot Indians, 27; 38.

Pensacola, Stuart headquarters at, 26; strategic importance of, 37; 51; Henry Stuart sent to, 52; merchants of, do not abide by trade regulations, 57; 58; 59; 60; 142; treaty at, 146; 158; 166; trade shifting to, 178; 187; 188.

Peters, Richard, 71.

Philadelphia, 32; 35; 36; Indian chiefs visit, 50; visit to, by Delaware chiefs, 77; 86; Indian goods to be purchased at, 140; 175; 190; 191.

Piankishaw Indians, 2; 95; 134.

Pickens, Andrew, southern Indian commissioner, 143; 148; 165; 166; 170.

Pinckney, Charles, 105.

Piomingo (chief of the Chickasaws), 188.

Pipe, Captain (chief of the Delawares), 73; 124.

Pittsburgh, 17; 18; 30; 70; 134; 192.

Plan of 1764, provisions of, 7; 22; 193.

Pluggystown, 50.

Point Pleasant, battle of, 18.

Pontiac's conspiracy, 6.

Portugal, 193.

Pottawatomi Indians, 2; 48; 95; 123.

Powell, Captain, 86.

Pownall, Governor Thomas, favors Sir William Johnson for Indian superintendent, 5; 37.

Presque-Isle, 47; 77; 192.

Prevost, General, 58.

Prince Edward Island, 1.

Princeton, 64; 78.

Proclamation of 1763, provisions, 6-7; 9; 11; 17; 127.

Q

Quebec, 6; council of, oppose New York assembly trade regulations, 21; 22; Colonel John Campbell superintendent of Indian affairs, 42; 47; 67; 76; 81; 120; 179; 191.

Quebec Act, purpose of, 22; opposition 22-23; 127.

R

Rae, Robert, 24; 34.

Randolph, Governor, 189.

Rankin, James, 133.

Red Jacket, 109; 138.

Redstone settlement, 70.

Reed, Jacob, 139.

Reed, Colonel Joseph, 71; 83.

Revolutionary War, 2; 5; 18; outbreak of, in Carolinas, 20; 31; entered by Spain, 51; 64; 69; 87; 88; 91; 112; 149; 160; 165; 178; 179; 186; 197; 201.

Rhode Island, 126.

Richardson, Colonel Richard, 25.

Robertson, James, 54.

Rock Landing, 164.

Ross, Major, 85.

Rutledge, Edward, 41; 182; 183.

S

St. Augustine, 23; 24; headquarters for British southern Indian department, 60; 163; 187.

St. Clair, General Arthur, 29; 31; chosen governor of the Northwest Territory, 128; Indians propose boundary to, 130; 131; 132; 133; proposes plan of attack on Indians, 134; reports completion of treaties, 135.

St. Francis Indians, 27; 38.

St. John Indians, 38; 39.

St. Johns (Canada), 45.

St. Johns River (Florida), 4.

St. Joseph River, 2; 101.

St. Lawrence River, 44.

St. Leger, General, expedition, 42; 61; 66; Indians with, 67; failure of expedition, 68.

St. Louis, 82.

St. Marys River, 148.

Salisbury (North Carolina), 26; 34.

Sandusky, 3; failure of raid on, 71; 74; 87; 124; British trading center at, 190.

Sandusky River, 47; 78; 83; 111.

Sangerachta, 86.

Saratoga, battle of, 69; 184.

Sauks Indians, 3.

Savannah, 24; 59; 60.

Savannah River, 3; 4; 54.

Schenectady, 180; 184.

Schuyler, General Philip, on Indian committee, 32; Indian commissioner for Northern Department, 33; considers enlistment of Indians impossible, 39; tries to win Indians to American cause, 44; 45; 46; advocates taking possession of Fort Stanwix, 63; 64; points out lack of organization in Indian department, 65; 68; 79; speeches of, alarm Indians, 96; starts negotiations with Six Nations, 97; ideas on Indian policy, 98; asks for instructions, 98; reply to Indian speeches, 99; advice of, taken by Congress, 102; 174; 181; 184; 185.

Scioto River valley, 2; 18; 78; 83; 104; 117; 125.

Scotland, 198.

Seminole Indians, 3; 4.

Seneca Indians, 2; 30; at Fort Pitt treaty; 34; 35; 46; 48; 65; lose heavily in attack on Herkimer, 68; 95; 176.

Seven Ranges, 104; 126.

Sevier, John, battle of Boyd's

Creek, 57; 134; Georgia tries to secure assistance of, against the Creeks, 154; 155; arrest of, ordered, 167; 188; 189.

Shawanee Indians, 2; 3; 18; visited by James Wood, 30; 48; 49; join British, 51; 57; 72; 78; 81; raid on, by Clark, 82; 87; 95; 113; 114; chiefs sign treaty of Fort Finney, 115; 116; 123; 124; Logan attacks, 126; 133; 136.

Shelburne, Lord, 5; favors westward expansion, 8; policy opposed, 9; 97; 193.

Shelby, Colonel Evan, 56.

Sherlock, James, 113.

Sherman, Roger, 175; 183.

Shirley, General, 5.

Simms, Charles, 31.

Simon and Campbell, 29.

Six Nations, location of, 1; 3; loyal to British during French and Indian War, 6; cede claims south of the Ohio, 10; 18; 26; report confusion among tribes, 27; 28; 32; treaty with, at German Flats, 35; Congress asks for their neutrality, 38; Butler and Brant influential among, 40; Guy Johnson acting superintendent of, 42; 43; Brant ambitious to lead, 44; general conference of, attended by Deane, 45; 46; 47; at Fort Pitt treaty, 49; 61; Brant's position among, 62; Butler wins favor of, 63; 64; 65; 67; conference of, 68; 79; 81; 82; used as raiders, 89; negotiations with Schuyler, 98-99; New York opposes concessions to, 100; Treaty of Fort Stanwix with, 109; 114; 118; 120; 121; 122; Niagara conference of, 123; 131; 133; 135; treaty with, at Fort Harmar, 137; 176; 177; trade with, 180; 184; 197.

South Carolina, 4; 13; 16; 20; 41; fur traders of, opposed by McGillivray, 43; attack on and treaty with Cherokees, 54; 139; 140; 143; 147; 156; 162; 163; to furnish one third of money for southern Indian negotiations, 164; 165; Blount criticises policy, 169; 182; 183; 187; 188; 193.

South Carolina Provincial Congress, 25; 142.

Spaight, Richard, 139.

Spain, 1; joins the Revolutionary struggle, 51; tries to win favor of Creeks, 57; 59; 76; begins attack on West Florida, 82; 88; 144; has assistance of Panton, Leslie, and Company, 145; treaty of Pensacola, 146; bids for southern Indian trade, 149; 155; Georgia seeks aid from, 162; 170; 178; 179; 187; 200.

Steele, John, appointed North Carolina agent to negotiate with the Cherokees, 167; discusses North Carolina finances with Governor Johnson, 168; Blount discusses Indian affairs with, 169; 170; 175.

Stephens, Andrew, 30.

Stockbridge Indians, address to, by Masschusetts, 27; 38; 39.

Stone, Thomas, 183.

Stuart, Charles (deputy of John Stuart for Mississippi regions), 43; 58.

Stuart, Henry, 43; 52; 53.

Stuart, John, 5; southern Indian boundary negotiations, 10; tries to prevent illegal land sales, 12-13; the Augusta treaty, 14; and Henderson purchase, 15; feels necessity of Parliamentary legislation to prevent illegal land purchases, 19; reports development of trade regulations in south, 19-20; flies to Florida, 20; 23; moves headquarters to Pensacola, 26; 35; assistants of, 43; difficulties of, 51; no instructions from Gage, 52; 54; Joseph Martin writes to, 55; 57; death of, 58; 88; 187; 193.

Stuart, Rev. John, 197.

Sullivan, Daniel, 78.

Sullivan, General John, 79; raids, 80; raid of, discussed, 81; 89; 134.

Supreme Court, 55; 102.

Susquehanna River, 28; 62; 69; 195.

Sycamore Shoals, 15.

T

Taitt, David (Stuart's deputy among the Creeks), 19; 43; 58.

Taliaferro County (Georgia), 14.

Tallapoosa River, 4.

Telfair, Governor (Georgia), 154.

Tennant, Rev. William, 24.

Tennessee River, 4; 10; 51; 54; Spanish trading posts on, 141; 142; 152; 154; 156; 164; 168; 188; 189. (Little), 3; 54.

Terre Haute, 134.

Thompson, Captain, 84.

Tice, Gilbert, 44.

Ticonderoga, 6; 45.

Tioga, 80.

Tobaco (chief of the Choctaws), 189.

Tonyn, Governor (East Florida), 58.

Treaty of Chota Ford, 156.

Treaties of commerce and alliance with France, 69; 184.

Treaty with Delawares, 1778, 73.

Treaty of Dumplin Creek, 142.

Treaty of Fort Finney, 115-16; 121.

Treaty of Hard Labor, 10; 12.

Treaty of Hopewell (Cherokees), 148; 149; 150; 152; 169; 171; 190.

Treaty of Hopewell (Chickasaws), 152-53.

Treaty of Hopewell (Choctaws), 151-52.

Treaty of Peace 1783 (Provisional), 93; 94.

Treaty of Peace 1783 (Definitive), 94; 97.

Treaty of Shoulderbone, 148.
Trenton, battle of, 65.

Tryon County (New York), 85.

Tugaloo River, 54; 141.

Tuscarawas River, 111; 113; 125; 130.

Tuscarora Indians, 39; 64; 65; 68; 109; 176.

Twightwee Indians, 2.

U

United States, 39; 50; 70; 73; Delaware Indians propose cession of land to, 78; 83; 84; 94; 95; 100; 101; 102; and Indian trade, 106; 109; 110; 111; 114; 115; 116; illegal settlers to be driven from lands of, 117; 119; 122; 123; 125; 129; 131; 132; 133; 136; 139; 146; 147; 149; 151; 158; relations of, to Georgia and North Carolina explained by Secretary Knox, 159; 161; 166; 177; 178; 184; 186; 193; problem of financing Indian department, 194; 195; 199.

V

Vandalia Company, 11; 17; 78.

Venango, 77; 127; 130.

Vergennes, 191.

Vincennes, 60; captured, 75; 82; 127; 130; 134; 188.

Virginia, refuses coöperation with Indian officers, 8; boundary discussions, 10; 14; 15; boundary difficulties with Pennsylvania, 17-18; interest in northwestern land, 18; 19; 29; organizes Committee of Safety in west, 30; garrisons Fort Pitt, 31; 34; 41; 45; 49; 50; 51; relations with Cherokees, 54; Joseph Martin Indian agent of, 55; 57; 60; to assist in attack on Detroit, 70; 72; 74; George Rogers Clark acts for, 75; 77; 78; 79; 83; 84; cession of, accepted by Congress, 104; 105; 108; 110; 114; 139; 140; commissioners of, engaged in land speculation, 141; 142; 146; 150; 151; 155; 160; suggests the appointment of Joseph Martin as federal agent to the Cherokees and Chickasaws, 164; 167; 177; 183; 189; 193; 198; 199.

W

Wabash Company, 17; illegal purchases, 22; 102.

Wabash River, 2; 17; 77; 116; 189.

Wabash tribes, 130; 133.

Wakatomica, 113.

Walker, John, 33; 34.

Walker, Thomas, 30; 33.

Walton, George, 182; 183.

War Department, 107; 176; 200.

Washington, George, 30; informed of his election as commander-in-chief, 31; faces problem of Indian participation in the Revolutionary War, 7; deals with the problem of Indian enlistments, 38-39; disapproves plan for attack on Detroit, 47; 66; sends aid to frontier, 71; approves General McIntosh's policy, 74; disapproves of Franco-American attack on Canada, 76; addressed by Delaware chiefs, 77; makes careful inquiries concerning Indian country, 79; instructions to Sullivan, 79; alarmed by raids on New York frontier, 82; 87; 89; 91; advice concerning Indian affairs and western lands, 100; 101; advice taken by Congress, 102; 103; thinks Congressional policy dilatory, 109; 122; 174; favors plan of the Countess of Huntington, 198-99; 201.

Washington, Colonel Samuel, 71.

Watauga River, 14; 54; 56; 154.

Wayne, General Anthony, 60; 138.

Westmoreland County, 18.

Wharton, Thomas, 21.

Wheelock, Eleazer, heads school attended by Joseph Brant, 28; 33; tries to influence Indians to remain neutral, 43; his Indian school, 195.

White, James, 107; 155; 157; 158; resigns Indian superintendency, 164.

White Eyes, Captain, 47; 48 represents Delawares at Fort Pitt treaty, 73; 197.

White Eyes, George, 196-97.

Whitefield, George, 165.

White River, 2.

Wilkes County (Georgia), 14.

Wilkins, John, 192.

Wilkinson, Edward, illegal land grants, 13; joins colonial side of controversy, 24; southern Indian commissioner, 34; 52.

Willett, Colonel, 85.

William and Mary College, 195.

Williams, Major, 24.

Williamsburg, 18; 31.

Williamson, Hugh, 143.

Wilson, James, 31; 32; 33; 41; 180; 182; 183.

Wilson, William (agent of George Morgan), 48; 131.

Winne, Richard, 165; 166.

Winnebago Indians, 3.

Witherspoon, John, 183.

Wolcott, Oliver, 33; 41; 108.

Wood, James, 30.

Wooster *vs.* Georgia, 151.

Wraxall, 178.

Wright, Governor James (Georgia), 13; 14; adopts trade regulations, 19; 24.

Wyandot Indians, 2; 3; 30; at Fort Pitt treaty, 34; 44; 47; 48; 49; 78; 81; 83; 95; 111; 113; 115; 116; 123; 124; 133; jealousy between, and Six Nations, 135; 136.

Wyoming Country, illegally settled, 17; raids into, 72; 79; 90.

Yeates, Jasper, 182.

York (Pennsylvania), 175.

Youghiogheny River, 18.